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Psycho-Historical Investigations: Freud, Jung and Adler

by

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Supervisor

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External Examiner

Date 10 December 1982

To my grandma

Yetta Goldfarb

Who, born in Poland or Russia

Loved me in the way

Only a grandmother can

May the Creator caress her Spirit

Abstract

All four major essays which comprise this work are identified by a common theme, that of psychohistory. Psychohistory is minimally understood as a method in which the psychological dimensions of the object of historical inquiry are viewed within a particular socio-historical context. The first essay, "Roots in the Shtetl: Modern Western Thought and the Case of Sigmund Freud", considers Freud's principle theories and lifelong themes in relation to both his Jewish and Viennese roots. In addition, Freud is employed as a vehicle for illustrating and comprehending the reasons for the phenomenal influence which academics and professionals of Jewish origin have assumed in the modern western world.

The second essay, "On Carl Gustav Jung: Psycho-social Basis of Morality during the Nazi Era", discusses Jung's questionable relationship with the nazi regime after Hitler's accession to power. A second, and perhaps over-riding concern, is an evaluation of the moral responsibility of the scientist *vis a vis* humanity as opposed to the more limited parameters of scientist *qua* scientist.

The third essay is entitled, "Alfred Adler: The Decline and Meaning of Socialism in his Work and Life". Here, the shifting loyalty of Adler's commitment to socialism is described against the backdrop of the Viennese society in which he grew up. The effect which his socialistic leanings had upon his psychological system is also delineated and set in perspective to his own personality. Implicity, one comes to the understanding that political philosophy and action cannot be separated from the character structure of the individual himself.

The last essay, "Psychohistory as the Art of Detection", although it may stand on its own, is integrative in approach. Historical detection is used as a metaphor to identify how psychologists and historians achieve insight in the process of doing historical research. Detection on the outward, or objective plane of existence, is illustrated and systematized through using data gleaned from the three preceding essays. Detection as a

principal of historical inquiry is then turned to the inward, or subjective, plane of existence, and the writer *cum* historian's own psychological relation to his material is spotlighted using the method of free-association. The results of this introspection -- called retransference -- are generalized to the larger population.

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I've received critical appreciation from Hester Elliott of Edmonton, who read each of the four main essays, and whose suggestions have enriched their content.

There were times I felt such despair about my own life that I never thought this thesis would see its way to completion. But I've been the recipient of the most profound help far away from the university to which I've been associated for so long. I am grateful for these friendships: Harvey and Helen Tootoosis of Poundmaker's Reserve in Saskatchewan, who are like brother and sister to me; George Goodstriker of the Blood Reserve in Alberta, who encouraged me to listen to myself; and Doug and Marilyn Cardinal of Stony Plain, Alberta, whose singular wish was that I learn to believe in myself.

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I. Introductory Essay

The leitmotif of this total work has been, through example and theory, the wedding of the disciplines of psychology and history. One major focus of psychology is the detection of human motives, especially those most recondite. Such a focus leads one, quite naturally, into an examination of the unconscious mind. Consistent with this approach, it is not uncommon to begin with the only mind to which an individual has direct access, one's own. One 's identity, however, is neither created nor perceived in isolation, but understood within a social community compiled of various histories and traditions. The people who live in social communities reflect these traditions and histories and are guided by them. In fact, a person could be defined as a living microcosm of the larger community in which he or she is embedded. In order to comprehend the self, therefore, one must also understand how one's actions, and motives for action, have been programmed by the seemingly larger and impersonal forces of the social and historical world. This may lead to the study of history, not as an abstract gesture, but as a significantly personal one. The four essays in this thesis are relevant to my own life, but the scientific enterprise commands that we extrapolate, systematize, and create meaning beyone one's individual person, for otherwise our endeavors become nothing but curios and idiosyncracies. To this scientific end I have also, of course, applied myself. The result of the present endeavor may aptly be called "psychohistorical investigations".

Four essays comprise the bulk of this thesis. Each essay may stand on its own, yet the methodology, the employment of a psychohistorical perspective, is consistent throughout. Chapter Two is entitled "Roots in the Shtetl: Modern Western Thought and the Case of Sigmund Freud". The title of Chapter Three is "On Carl Gustav Jung: Psycho-social Basis of Morality During the Nazi Era". These essays have been separately published in the *Journal of Psychology and Judaism*. Chapter Four is entitled "Alfred Adler: The Decline and Meaning of Socialism in his Work and Life". Each of the first three essays utilize, as subjects, one of the three great pioneers of modern psychodynamic psychology. The last essay, Chapter Five, is entitled "Psychohistory as the Art of Detection". Unlike the others, which can be defined as problem-oriented case-studies, the last chapter is theoretical in nature, considering the interdisciplinary subject of psychohistory as a whole.

The intent of the first three essays, on Freud, Jung, and Adler, was not to write brief life-histories of each, yet it was necessary to resurrect the inner meaning of their lives in order to establish a foundation upon which each of the problems could be comprehended. In the case of the Freud essay the main problems were twofold: 1) To establish to what extent his psychological theories sprung from his specifically Jewish roots and traditions; 2) To discover, using Freud as an exemplary model, why people of Jewish extraction have achieved such pre-eminent success and influence in western science since the mid-nineteenth century.

In order to attain the answers I sought, it was important to examine the manner in which some of Freud's most significant tenets and theories were situated in the social world in which he grew up. It was perforce necessary to understand both Viennese life as well as the sub-culture of the Jewish people who resided there and directly influenced how Freud thought about himself, the familial, educational, and economic opportunities he was provided, and also the constraints. I took it as given that the birth of ideas do not come into the world as a totally ineffable process, but could be traced in a concrete fashion employing social history as a basis. Through extrapolation and analysis it was possible to generalize from Freud to the successes of the overall Jewish population of academics and professionals in the modern western world.

Chapter Three focussed attention upon the problem of Carl Gustav Jung's questionable relationship with the nazi regime in the 1930's. Beginning with his ascension to presidency of the General Medical Society for Psychotherapy in 1933, Jung's actions and writings in the field of psychology were traced and set within the context of an increasingly nazified Europe. As Jung's part in these events has become a source of continual controversy, the data put forth by opponents and colleagues of Jung's, as well as their conclusions, were tapped for relevant information. In order to ascertain whether there was any consistency in Jung's manner, what changes he made in himself, and his reflections on the pre-war period, I needed to achieve an understanding of Jung as he lived and expressed himself in the post World War II period. Finally, the roots of Jung's temperament were sought in his young life growing up in Switzerland with particular attention being paid to his later association with Sigmund Freud and the early psychoanalytic circle.

A second, and in some ways over-riding interest, was to use the case of C. G. Jung as a vehicle for examination of the paradigmatic values of modern scientists and modern science in general. Implicit and explicit goals of science were discussed, as well as the moral responsibility of the scientist. Given the incredible power at the disposal of present national governments and international corporations, the question of commitment of those individuals who may serve them, and the enterprise of science in which they involve themselves, is highly potent and crucial, and therefore worthwhile exploring.

The Adler paper was written with explicit goals: to trace the nature and source of his socialist beliefs and political participation. It was my further desire to describe how such beliefs influenced his psychological system (individual psychology) and life, and in turn, how the development of his psychological constructs and person affected his beliefs and actions *vis a vis* socialism. Adler's early professional interest in social medicine was highlighted against the backdrop of the growing power of the social-democratic party of Vienna under Viktor Adler (no relation). His life and subsequent professional interests were delineated, first during the introspective psychoanalytic period when he became acquainted with Freud, and then to the reaffirmation of socialism just after World War I. The exile of Adlerian adherents during the late 1920's was put into the perspective of Adler's drive for success and his lessening concern for a socialist political regime. Finally, Adler's exodus to the North American continent was viewed with respect to his ultimate non-participation in politics.

Congruent to Adler's changing political beliefs and participation, his psychological development was noted so that the influence which these two worlds, the inner and outer, had upon each other, could be described in depth. In order to define this interface, it was necessary to unearth the childhood forces on Adler's character structure and make visible his most primary motives and life-plan. In such a way was an integration of Adler's political beliefs and personality completed. Implicit to this study is the principle that political action cannot be understood *in vacuo*, but rather in conjunction with, and partially as a result of, complex personal forces.

The integrative essay, "Psychohistory as the Art of Detection", on the theory and history of the interdisciplinary fusion of psychology and history, while referring to, and synthesizing, facets of the three preceding works, was meant to stand on its own as well. The notion of history as art, without demeaning its basis in fact, is introduced and discussed. The metaphor of the historian *qua* detective is explored and three modes of historical detection on the outward, or objective plane of existence, are identified and explained using examples taken from the three previous chapters. The history and need for the fused discipline of psychohistory, as viewed from the perspectives of both historians and psychologists, is then elaborated. Its sources in North America and Europe are considered and its two dominant trends, that falling under the leadership of Lloyd deMause on the one hand, the other being that of George Kren and Leon Rappoport, are contrasted.

It is then shown how psychohistory, with special attention given to biographical studies, attempts to describe human beings within the specific socio-historical network in which they reside and which guides, constrains, and provides opportunities for them. This is an important aspect of the total work, for it permits a theoretical description of what I actually meant to accomplish in the *quasi* biographical studies of Freud, Jung, and Adler.

Finally, upon realizing that the metaphor of historical detection was incomplete (and building on Erik Erickson) I attempted an analysis of my own motives for writing on the historical subjects I chose to study. This was detection on the inward, or subjective plane of existence, through expropriation and identification of hitherto unconscious "selves". The process employed for detection of such hidden determinants of my own attitudes was that of free-association. It was, may I add as a personal note, an exciting and surprising mental adventure. I had to deal with transference and counter-transference, or what Erikson called "retransference", at the level of historical inquiry.

The reader may find him or herself nonplussed at such a seemingly personal endeavor in the midst of an otherwise scholarly dissertation. This is not to be wondered at, for one is educated in the belief that the self has no place in an academic work. But as George Kren has noted (personal communication, November 1982) "One of the few things that psychohistory has achieved is to legitimatize the personal component in scholarship". Therefore I stand by what I have expressed in this work on psychohistory, at least if what is understood by "academic" is the disarmingly relentless and integral pursuit of systematic understanding and insight. Finally, I must leave it to the conscientious reader to evaluate whether what I have written about myself, and the search for my own roots, has some scientific generalizability to the human condition.

7

II. Roots in the Shtetl: Modern Western Thought and the Case of Sigmund Freud

A. Part I

In view of the extraordinary number of Jews who have influenced western thought since the mid-nineteenth century, the question of the actual relationship of modern western scholarship, art, and science, to people of Jewish origin, excites, at the very least, and even astonishes or disturbs. A perusal of the *Encyclopedia Judaica* (1972) under the headings the various social and physical sciences tends to confirm the hypothesis of their great collective, but secular, influence. Most everyone is aware that Freud, Marx, and Einstein were Jews, but fewer people realize that Claude Levi-Strauss, Aleksandr Luria, Heinz Werner, Niels Bohr, Robert Oppenheimer, Ernst Cassirer, and Erik Erikson were also Jewish, to name several others just at random. Jews, who have constituted less than one half of one percent of mankind, have won more than fifteen percent of the Nobel prizes awarded since 1901 (Patai, 1977).

Hitler made a great deal out of their influence, a pernicious one in his eyes. On the other hand, no less a thinker than Thorstein Veblen, the American social philosopher, once wrote an essay on the positive contributions of thinkers of Jewish origin:

> It is a fact that must strike any dispassionate observer that the Jewish people have contributed much more than an even share to the intellectual life of modern Europe... It is not only that men of Jewish extraction continue to supply more than a proportionate quota to the rank and file engaged in scientific and scholarly work, but a disproportionate number of men to whom modern science and scholarship look for quidance and leadership are of the same derivation. (Veblen, 1934, p.221).

Certain questions spring into mind: Has the West been influenced by a partially alien "Jewish thoughtstyle" or "weltanschauung" which has superimposed itself itself on a host of culture or cultures? If not, what is the exact nature of Jewish integration and way of thinking in western civilization? Is the term "Jewish thought-style" actually misleading because there is no such thing? And finally, what accounts for the broad influence of Jews in western culture?

The foundation of this study is the shtetl, the small town Jewish community of Eastern Europe. The shtetl, or its urban complement, the ghetto, is the common origin of nearly all the significant Jewish thinkers in the West in the recent era, for either they or their immediate ancestors were born there. Even when they moved into the more cosmopolitan cities of the western world, such as Viennna, Berlin, or New York, they carried the ambience of the shtetl and ghetto with them. The shtetl dates back to the Crusades, and only the wars and revolutions of the twentieth century, with the final destruction of six million lives, put an end to its role as the current home of the tradition.

The Ashkenazim, as the Jews of Eastern Europe were called to differentiate them from the Sephardim (Spanish and Portuguese Jews) were isolated from their neighbors by edict and also by preference. The everyday language of the Jews in these communities, with only minor variations according to the local setting and host country, was Yiddish. The written language was primary Hebrew. The themes which characterized the Ashkenazi community were "isolation from the non-Jewish world and complete penetration of religious precept and practice into every detail of life" (Zborowski and Herzog, 1965). Despite "countless local variations, the Jews of Eastern Europe had one culture: a language, a religion, a set of values, a specific constellation of social mechanisms and institutions, and feelings of its members that they belonged to one group" (Zborowski and Herzog, p.23). The ghettos of the cities of Eastern Europe, in which Jews abounded, were like walled-in shtetls, and culturally speaking were not unlike their country-cousins. Although the ghettos were also separated geographically, often by great distances, situated in various countries, with their own unique, but relatively minor, differences, they were a homogenous entity (Wirth, 1928, p.71).

The intention of this work is to render some clues as to the nature of the relationship of Jewish secular thought to modern modern western civilization. The specific vehicle for this investigation is Sigmund Freud, founder of the psychoanalytic method of thinking. Because Freud is one of the three or four most influential thinkers of modern western thought, because he has so profoundly influenced its direction and shape, he is an excellent case to choose. It should be plainly understood, however, that other significant thinkers of Jewish origin could have been selected.

The dimensions of this study include an analysis of Freud's works within the historical framework of western civilization, Freud from a biographical point of view, including his social context, and Freud as a Jew whose roots lay only a short distance from the shtetl.

B. Part II

The following statement appeared on the third page of Freud's autobiography written in 1927 while living in Vienna: "I was born on May 6th, 1856, at Frieburg in Moravia, a small town in what is now Czechoslovakia. My parents were Jews, and I have remained one myself" (Freud 1925, p.13). And so he announces, publicly, one of his cultural allegiances. He was the descendant of rabbis and Jewish scholars on both the paternal and maternal sides of his family (Grollman, 1965, pp. 46-7). His wife, a Jew, was also the descendant of rabbis and Jewish scholars (Grollman, 1965, p. 70). He was brought up, and indeed, continued to live even as an adult, in the district of Vienna known as the Leopoldstadt, the Jewish ghetto, which housed "a large number of immigrant Orthodox 'Ostjuden' from Galicia, who were the very antithesis of their capitalistic co-religionists in the fashionable upper-middle-class" (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p.59).

It is important to remember that Freud, in spite of his religious forebears, and in spite of his immediate living environment, was a secular Jew. His son, Martin, says of his own childhood: "We were brought up without any traces of the Jewish ritual. Our festivals were Christmas, with presents under a candle-lit tree, and Easter, with gaily painted Easter eggs.

I had never been to a synagogue, nor to my knowledge had my brothers or sisters" (Freud, M., 1967, p. 203). Freud professed a lifelong disinclination for the purely religious aspects of all religions. Near the end of his life he wrote:

> That conviction I acquired a quarter of a century ago, when I wrote my book on *Totem And Taboo* (in 1912), and it has only become stronger since. From then on I have never doubted that religious phenomena are to be understood only on the model of the neurotic symptoms of the individual, which are so familiar to us, as a return of long-forgotten important happenings in the primeval history of the human family, that they owe their obsessive character to that very origin and therefore derive their effect on mankind from the historical truth they contain. (Freud, 1939, p. 39).

Still, Freud was always aware of himself as a Jew, as a member of the Jewish community, and as a member of the cultural community. Many of his theories were first delivered before the Fraternity of Jewish Students and the B'nai B'rith, and took part in their social get-togethers, playing cards every second Tuesday in their company (Grollman, 1965, p. 83). Freud was brought up in a Jewish household one degree removed from a Galacian shtetl, "socialized among other Jews, as a member of a minority group" (Cuddihy, 1974, p. 81).

Anti-semitism, as a condition of life in Vienna, grew increasingly strong during Freud's lifetime, culminating in Hitler's orgies and Freud's eventual exile to England. Anti-semitism had touched Freud most painfully in terms of his own professional career. It may well have been the decisive reason why his early mentor, Brucke, had advised him against continuing his theoretical work in neurophysiology. Freud did not maintain this as the reason, but his collaborator and biographer, Ernest Jones, speaks of it (1953, pp. 66-67). Had he continued his career as a physiologist we might never have heard of Sigmund Freud, but for the young and aspiring scientist this was a difficult trial.

It is also likely that anti-semitic feelings were one of the main reasons why it took him so long to become a professor at the University of Vienna, being appointed a privatdocent in 1885 but not receiving his professorship until 1902 (Grollman, 1965, p. 91).

These events in his life do not prove that Freud's scientific works were in any way influenced by his own Jewishness. However, they do stimulate continuing the investigation in search of elements in his vast psychoanalytic studies that could be considered "Jewish".

There is one further aspect of his professional life which needs comment: Why were nearly all of Freud's colleagues in the early psychoanalytical circle of Jewish origin? The only exceptions were Carl Jung and, interestingly enough, his official biographer, Ernest Jones. Neo-Freudian and other psychoanalytically-orientated schools even today seem to draw a plethora of Jewish professionals. But this fact, when put into a larger context, becomes less remarkable. Jews have also been extremely prominent in most other fields of psychology and in some cases have dominated them. These include the schools of the German gestaltists, the humanists, existentialists, phenomenologists, the social and anthropological psychologists, as well as those involved in intelligence and projective measurement. What we do learn about Freud, however, is that not only in his scholarly pursuits, but in his private life as well, were his immediate companions of of Jewish origin. One would assume that if there were a Jewish way of thinking, Freud could hardly have avoided being influenced by it.

In this respect it is most educational to note Freud's apparent respect for Carl Jung, not only as a brilliant psychologist, but as a vehicle for political means. When his Jewish colleagues protested Freud's proposition that Jung, in 1910, be made president of the International Psychoanalytic Association, Freud remarked:

> "Most of you are Jews, and therfore you are incompetent to win friends for the new teaching. Jews must be content with the modest role of preparing the ground. It is absolutely essential that I should form these ties in the world of general science. I am getting on in years, and weary of being perpetually attacked. We are all in danger." Seizing his coat by the lapels, he said, "They won't even leave me a coat to my back. The Swiss will save us--will save me, and all of you as well." (Bakan, 1958, p.58).

In view of the reception in Europe of Freud's theories of childhood sexuality (he was accused of being obscene and a degrader of human beings), his statement to his Jewish colleagues does not appear paranoid. Given the aura of anti-semitism that prevailed in Europe, especially in Vienna, one begins to understand Freud's statement more clearly. His dependence on the Swiss, for political purposes, does not seem out of line. Because he was so sensitive to the social climate in which he dwelt, Freud understood that it would take more than the simple truth of his theories to keep psychoanalysis from being destroyed.

Many of Freud's early colleagues broke with him over what was considered the correct interpretation of psychoanalysis. These included the two Freud considered the most brilliant, Jung and Rank. But Freud's obstinacy in the face of his breakaway charges is more readily understood by considering the social pressures of the time. He was well aware that his theories were unpopular. Psychoanalytic theories about sex were called "dirty". There was something of a messianic nature about Freud, for he was also well aware that psychoanalysis was an utterly new model in scientific thought, that it was the key methodology to an understanding of the human unconscious. Its medical applications were enormous, and its social applications, both applied and theoretical, were on the way towards illumination. Given that he and nearly all his early colleagues were Jewish, he felt compelled, in anti-semitic Vienna, to defend the "new teaching" against the too easy criticism that it was a "Jewish psychology". Feeling beleaguered, Freud crystallized psychoanalytic thinking around his childhood theory of sex. Alternatives to this way of thinking were not countenanced by him. Ironically, the psychological world has become so much the richer due to the schisms and diverse thought forms that resulted.

Nonetheless, little insight has yet to be gained in our pursuit as to whether psychoanalysis is essentially a "Jewish thought-style", how it has integrated into a dominant mode of western thought, and why this has taken place. It would be pertinent, in this light, to investigate Freud's actual contributions to the world of scholarship and ideas, the particular coloring with which he expressed himself, and his philosophy of human nature.

The complete psychological works of Freud comprise twenty-three volumes, including material written between 1893 and 1938. Freud was an extraordinarily creative thinker who was continually in the process of developing his ideas. The collation of the major themes and characteristics of his thinking is, at the least, not an easy task. Nevertheless, I shall list what appear to me as the most characteristic themes and preoccupations in his life's work, and attempt to relate them both to the Hebrew and the more general western experience. In this way one can begin to decipher both the Jewish and non-Jewish elements in the psychoanalytic mode of thinking. These themes include: 1) children, 2) family, 3) psychotherapy, 4) unconscious mind, 5) stylistic implications, 6) ethical implications, 7) history of humankind and 8) future of humankind.

C. Children: Psycho-sexual Development and Jewish Child Rearing

One of the cornerstones of Freud's theory of neurosis is his oft-contradicted and thoroughly disliked theory of infantile sexuality (Freud, 1925, pp. 60-62). Briefly, the theory asserts that the child passes through several stages of psycho-sexual development, that these feelings are repressed during the latency period, and that they reassert themselves during the phallic period, corresponding to the onset of puberty.

In the shtetl there was a slowly diminishing withdrawal of physical affection shown towards children, especially the male child, and this break was most noted when, at the age of five or six, the child went off to the *Cheder*, the elementary school, where he was then expected to act "grown-up". Interestingly enough, this is the age, according to Freud, when the latency period begins, and repression takes place.

Affection in the Jewish household was expressed, of course, but not physically, nor even verbally. It was shown by constant attention to health, by the offering of food, care in the case of illness, the attention to the child's education, etc. In the household everything was discussed before the children, except sex, and that was not discussed before anyone (Zborowski & Herzog, 1965). Here one can evoke Freud's thesis that repressed sexual instincts became sublimated and could only be demonstrated, by adults, through symbolic acts which had no apparent roots in sexuality. Freud's theory of infantile sexuality fits the culture of the shtetl perfectly. The question is: how well does his theory fit other social contexts where sexual repression of children takes on somewhat different coloring?

The ascendancy of his theory may well have received recognition because sexual repression itself was common amongst European and North American Gentiles. Freudian theory opened up an area which has had wide, if distasteful, relevance. According to Stefan Zweig, Vienna

> was a society completely preoccupied with the thought of sex. The very fact that sex was never to be discussed openly insured that it was always upon one's mind. Sexual taboos, far from promoting 'purity' of thought and deed, served to make people sex-conscious to the extreme....This conspiracy of silence about sex had two results; on the one hand, an overt inhibition and ignorance of sexual matters; on the other, a covert emphasis on sex. (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, pp. 46-47).

Carl Jung's criticisms of Freud on these matters do not lie with the theory of infantile sexual repression itself, but rather with the narrowness of a theory relating all neurosis to this factor, as well as with Freud's deep seated cynicism in seeing only the neurotic aspect of infantile repression, and not its creative potential (Jung, 1934, pp. 157-73). As to the latter point, Freud's endeavor was to show that one could overcome neurosis through recognition of the repressed material and use the subsequently liberated energy creatively.

As to the former point, Jung's criticism aims at the crux of where many other colleagues also disagreed with Freud: the relating of all neurosis to repressed sexuality. But whatever the case, repressed sexuality in childhood was a concept whose applicability went beyond the limited Jewish society.

D. Family: The Oedipus Complex and the Jewish Patriarchal Family

The way in which Freud described the Oedipus Complex seems to bear similarity to the dynamics of a Jewish family, where, in the shtetl, the father was a remote figure, "psychologically and often literally. He may be away from home a great deal and this is more or less as it should be. 'Children, household, is not a man's business'"(Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 292). The obligations of the child to the parent began with obedience and respect, especially the respect due the father. Not much is known about Freud's early childhood, but one would expect that this socialization process was as true in his own family as with the Jewish people from which it took its source.

Freud, as early as 1913, having studied the works of Charles Darwin, introduced the notion of the primal horde (Freud, 1913/1966, p. 125) and, based upon Darwin and other anthropological forerunners such as Frazer and Wilhelm Wundt, helped develop the idea that ontogeny parallels phylogeny. That is, even the modern individual's mental processes duplicate, in childhood, the development of the primitive person and only later in development do they go beyond. And, just as in the primal horde, the sons band together to kill the father, in order to possess the mother and become the leader, the children of modern civilization fantasize the murder of the father, and so mentally recapitulate the actions of primitive man. In both cases the result is guilt and repression, either of the deed itself, or else of the fantasy of having done it. The original fear of the father takes the form, in men, of a castration complex, seen in the light of infantile sexuality. Freud spoke of the Sophoclean tragedy in his *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1916/17/1961, pp. 278-79) from whence the name Oedipus Complex was derived. If Freud had any inkling that the Oedipus Complex was misapplied when it came to the Gentile population, he would more likely have given it a Hebrew rubric, like the "Mosaic Complex". But Freud assumed he was defining one of the archetypes of the unconscious, for all people, universally. The fact that he did not use the term "collective unconscious", as did Jung, does not mean that his approach was any the less universal in conception.

The implications of the Oedipus Complex--fear of the father, repressed hostility, and sometimes outright aggression--were as true a set of themes in the dominant population as they were among the Jews. In Vienna, at least among the bourgeois or "nouveau-riche",

> it seemed immoral that the sons should reject the values of a society in which they themselves struggled to obtain an identity. Once having succeeded in establishing themselves in the old order, the fathers were the staunchest defenders, and they did their utmost to curb the innovating natures of the younger generation. (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 46).

The bourgeois patriarchal paterfamilias was certainly not confined to Jewish society alone, as any reader of Thomas Mann's *Buddenbrooks* will confirm.

In spite of the fact that the new science of anthropology showed that matriarchal societies existed, and had even preceded the patriarchal forms, Freud considered the patriarchal structure as definitive. This is curious since Freud was a widely read man who had access to the writings of Lewis Morgan and Johann Bachofen, both of whom showed that matriarchal structure was the ealiest form of family. Although it would not be just to call him to account for the changing nature of family that has occurred since his death, one must view his lack of appreciation of anthropological investigations with certain dismay. Viewed in the light of the social conditions of his time, it would be far-fetched to call his inaccuracies "Jewish mistakes", for they were biases shared far too generally.

E. Psychotherapy: Verbal Solutions and Jewish Oppression

One of the most cogent aspects of psychoanalytic therapy is its complete dependence on the relation of the patient and the therapist, who, through a verbal process, will ultimately guide the patient out of a particular psychic morass. Freud set great weight on the strength of the intellect, believing that once patients rationally understand, for themselves, the mechanisms of their own neurosis, they will change themselves, not only in the doctor's office, but outside it as well. Education equals therapy equals cure. Freud put great stock in the efficacy of a purely verbal deed preceding manifested change. He also went to great lengths to dissect the interior of the words and phrases that a patient used, including the dissection of what are now called Freudian slips, jokes, witticisms, the language of dream-work, and free verbal association, as methods of therapy. Psychiatry, until that time, with the exception of a few French doctors who were experimenting with hypnosis, was mainly a manual technique, going all the way from sordid punishments of the insane to the popular use of hydrotherapy. Foucault writes of Freud's contribution in this fashion:

> That is why we must do justice to Freud....Freud went back to madness at the level of its *language*, reconstituted one of the essential elements of an experience reduced to silence by positivism; he did not make a major addition to the list of psychological treatments for madness; he restored, in medical thought, the possibility of a dialogue with unreason.(1967, p. 198).

Jews are well-known as garrulous people. In the shtetl, words were

> more than a mere medium of communication. The word is a force in itself, a tool. More than that, the word itself embodies substance--the Hebrew root is the same for 'word' and for 'thing' or 'object.' Thus the word endows its referent with existence. (Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 413).

The original act of creation, according to the Bible, was a verbal act. In the shtetl no great dichotomy was made between word and deed, for words, including prayers, supplications, beseechings, and other forms of verbal expressions, were very difficult to distinguish from the deed itself. Naturally words took on a superstitious meaning, and curses were not laughed off as meaningless. In a closed-in atmosphere like that of the shtetl, or an urban ghetto with its walls, the people simply could not afford to vent their emotions in a physical way; and so too with the overcrowded section of Vienna known as the Leopoldstadt. Words were not only a means of communication, but a safety-valve, a means for emotional catharsis (Zborowski & Herzog, 1965 pp. 413-15). It would seem that Freud came by his verbal method of therapy very naturally.

The belief that words--verbalizations of previously repressed material--would lead to a patient's complete recovery, is a natural consequence of Freud's belief in the efficacy of the word leading to understanding. His presumption that words carried such an emotional charge is quite legitimate in view of his upbringing, where, for the Jew, the word and the deed were one. It is certainly an enormous step beyond the rationality of his age where the word had been mechanically stripped of its affective force. Freud had been trained in that same tradition, for he began his career, not as a psychiatrist, but as a physiologist, and not a particularly imaginative one at that.

In the closely-knit artistic and scholarly milieu of Vienna,

> the linked problems of communication, authenticity, and symbolic expression had been faced in parallel in all major fields of thought and art--by Kraus and Schonberg, Loos and Hoffmansthal, Rilke and Musil. So the stage was set for a philosophical critique of language, given in completely general terms. (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 119).

And so, one might add, was the stage set for the analysis of language set in psychological terms.

The use of free-association, called by Freud 'word-association', was claimed by him as being his own invention, and was certainly a main contribution to the psychoanalytic method. Carl Jung, however, of the Swiss school, was paid tribute as the creator of the *Assoziationsexperiment* (Freud, 1914/1966, p. 28).

Not only was an individual of non-Jewish origin responsible for a basic form of verbal diagnosis, but several psychiatrists of Jewish origin broke away from traditional psychoanalysis to create therapies which were either partially or totally non-verbal in scope. Examples are Jacob Moreno's psychodrama and Wihelm Reich's orgone therapy. The point is that verbal therapy can hardly be understood as purely a Jewish creation, nor non-verbal therapy as an un-Jewish one.

F. Unconscious Mind: Dreams and the Psychic Life of Jews

Two closely linked phenomena in Freud's repertoire are his use of dream analysis as a method of therapy and later rendering of the knowledge he gained from dream interpretation into a comprehensive theory of the structure of the human mind.

Dream interpretation was not something new with Freud. Biblical prophets were interpreters of the meanings of dreams as well as prophetic dreamers. Among the most popular types of literature in the shtetl, written in Yiddish, were the peddler's "dream books, telling the significance of any dream you have" (Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 127). "The tractate *Berakoth*, one of the less legalistic in the Talmud, contains one of the most extensive treatments of dreams and dream interpretation in rabbinic literature" (Bakan, 1958, pp. 258-9). One of the two fundamental principles in *Berakoth* is that all dreams have meaning, for "A dream which is not interpreted is like a letter which is not read" (Talmud, *Berakoth*, 55a). This is a fundamental tenet of Freud's as well. The second principle in *Berakoth* is that "All dreams follow the mouth" (Talmud, *Berakoth*, 55b). With Freud, free verbal association was the basic method of getting at the interpretation of dreams.

Through the use of dream interpretation as an analytical tool, Freud originally postulated the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious mind (Freud, 1916-7, p. 249). There was nothing essentially new either in the idea of the dream interpretation or in the proposition of an unconscious mind (Whyte, 1962, pp. 105-6, 130, 160). Freud's originality lay in his method of getting patients to elucidate their dreams, in his use of language analysis to clarify their meanings, and in the convergence of his discoveries towards a total conception of the structure of the human psyche. No one had ever described the mechanisms of the psyche in such a deep, comprehensive, and detailed manner before him.

But Freud's influences were not only Jewish in origin. The last days of the crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire were upon him:

> In the popular imagination, the name "Vienna: is synonymous with Strauss waltzes, charming cafes, tantalizing pastries, and a certain carefree, all-embracing hedonism. To anyone who has scratched this surface even slightly, a very different picture emerges. For all those things that went to make up the myth of Vienna, the City of Dreams, were simultaneously facets of another, darker side of Viennese life. (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 33).

The Viennese have become famous for their penchant as inveterate cafe sitters. What is not generally known is the real reason they spend so much time at cafes. From the nineteenth century on, Vienna has had an immense housing shortage.

> Its apartments were dreary and impossible to heat adequately, so there has always been a need to escape these dingy and cold living quarters, and it was satisfied by the warmth cheer of the ubiquitous cafes. Once again, the charm of the cafes was the other face of the hard realities of life as most Viennese knew it; and similar ambiguities characterized many aspects of Viennese life. (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 34).

The "City of Dreams" is most aptly named in connection with Freud; just like the city, the human psyche was not what it appeared to be.

But one could look at the shtetl tradition, particulary Galicia, saturated with Jewish mysticism and dreams, and contend the Freudian tradition is rooted there, for from Galicia had migrated a large number of Viennese Jews, including Freud's own family (Bakan, 1958, p. 80). The Galician Jews were an emotional, wild, and resistant people, according to Freud's son Martin (Cuddihy, 1974, pp. 100-101). It is not farfetched to posit that Freud was influenced directly by these sources and this would have been influential in his ability to perceive the mythic quality of dream and language. The one area of life that the Ashkenazi Jews did share with their Gentile neighbors, that penetrated their world, was belief in superstitions, dreams as omens, and the efficacy of magic and folk cures (Patai, 1977, p. 517). In this sense--and I am not speaking of the mystical tradition of the Kabbalah--the Jews participated in the more general folk society of Eastern Europe, and therefore the knowledge and information contained by this tradition was open not only to Freud and other Jews, but to Gentiles as well.

G. Stylistic Implications: Written Expression and Talmudic Scholarship

Freud is rarely easy or fluid to read. He tends to evoke a many-sided discourse on whatever subject he writes about. He is detailed in the extreme, almost labyrinthine, and thinks in a Socratic manner. He first presents an argument, then its contradiction--which is only an apparent contradiction--and then proceeds to resolve the discussion. With Freud there seem to be no paradoxes, only ignorance of the truth. His technique is true. One always has the feeling that if you stick with him throughout the course of his discussion, no matter how elaborate, a positive answer will come forth. Only in *Moses and Monotheism* (1939) and *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930/1962) does his self-assurance, at times, seem to waver. And only when he is writing linear history, such as *On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* (1914/1966), or his own autobiographical study, does he seem to be clear and simple.

The Talmud contains commentaries, and commentaries upon commentaries, of the Law as written in the five books of Moses. "The reconstruction itself is in the form of notations rather that full-flowing prose, so that the Talmud and its earlier commentaries are in a laconic and at times almost cryptical style" (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 79). Psychoanalytic jargon itself is replete with made-up words and phrases such as ego, id, superego, and Oedipus Complex, plus new uses for words such as regression, repression, and sexuality. Understanding psychoanalytic discourse means learning a new vocabulary, one that is both cryptic and condensed. Moreover, like the Talmudic writings, Freud was always addressing himself to the concrete objective situation, the practical state of affairs, what people do and how they act, the everyday speech patterns and interactions of the Jewish people, including those amongst whom Freud grew up.

Certainly he could not have acquired his style as a direct result of the popular literature of Vienna. The "feuilleton" was the epitome of the kind of cultured literature which the Viennese were reading, even in their newspapers.

> It called for a species of vignette, in which a situation was described with all the color the author could muster; it was a subjective response to an objective state of affairs, intended to be conveyed in language which was laden with adverbs and especially adjectives; so much so, that the facts were thus viewed through the prismlike emotions of the writer. (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 176).

Neither was Freud's style of writing similar to the aphoristic method of the philosophers, although both were cryptic enough. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is the most potent example of such writing.

What other possible cause can then be found for Freud's mode of expression, outside of using the Talmud as a model? One must again recognize the fact that Freud had been an experimental physiologist, specializing in neurology, before founding psychoanalysis. Between 1885 and 1886 he published three papers, all dealing with the medulla oblongata. Jones says of his two years of research on this complicated little organ that "to trace the fibres passing through it to their connections elsewhere required great dexterity, patience and precision" (1953, p. 224). When one considers Freud's earlier career as a scientist, one sees that detailed self-expression would have been natural to him.

As to the cryptic nature of psychoanalytic expression, this could be explained in terms of the highly technical nature of his field, a derivative of medicine, not written for the layman but for the specialist or interested scholar. Because Freud was doing truly original work, he had to coin terms and redefine others so that his language would express new meaning. Expressions such as "defense mechanism" and "projection" had not yet come into everyday parlance, as they have now. In a sense our language has been "Freudianized," and even expressions whose meanings we now take for granted must have appeared abstruse in his own time.

As to the dialectical, or apparently dialectical nature of his discourse, Marx, Hegel, and Socrates had preceded Freud historically, and this brand of thinking was therefore not new to the western world. This is not to say that Freud was not influenced by a Talmudic form of discourse and argumentation, but rather that the western world also provided him with similar formats upon which to draw. His own earlier career as a doctor and physiologist further educated him towards his particularly detailed and painstaking writing style.

H. Ethical Implications: Psychoanalysis as Derivative of the Law

The ethical implications of psychoanalysis, particularly as it concerns individual freedom, social justice, and the place of women--a uniquely sensitive index of social justice--is to be understood as the secular derivative of the Law, meaning religious law, in the shtetl. Concerning the Law, Zborowski and Herzog write:

> Throughout history, nations have had their national, cultural, and religious centers located in the capitals....The Jews, however, had their real center in the Torah, the Law. When their capital fell, they took the Law into Exile with them. The stronger the attack against it, the stronger the resistance that rose to meet it. (1965, p. 429).

To the man of the shtetl, Jewishness was his way of life, and that meant an inextricable blending of religion, values, social structure, and individual behavior (Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 428). Laws permeated every aspect of life, including the food one ate, the education one received, observance of the Sabbath and other religious holidays which meant the closing down of all business activities, and the binding tie on everyone, according to means, to the welfare of the entire community. Great pressure was put on people to conform. There was no escape, for the individual community was small, and one's personal business was everyone else's business. According to custom, each person had a function which befit his or her station in life. This was so even of the poor, for they allowed the rich a chance to gain a "mitzvah," or religious credit, by the giving of charity (Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, pp. 191-213).

The woman had her set place and function in the shtetl. Informally, she was in charge of the household, and more often than not, was the realist in day-to-day affairs, sometimes even being the breadwinner of the family while the man was off in his ivory tower studying the Law

(Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 131). Her formal value was as a good wife and mother, and one who could help her husband fulfill his spiritual obligations. The shtetl was set up "as a man's culture, with women officially subordinate and officially inferior" (Zborowski & Herzog, 1965, p. 133). In such a world, where individual acts and people's social functions were so severely regulated, one has to question whether there was any individual freedom at all. There was, of course, and this became evident in respect to the learning and interpretation of the Law, although freedom was not restricted solely to this sphere. In the Jewish tradition the rabbi is not an intermediary between people and God. Rather, he derives his authority because of his learning, wisdom, and piety. But all authority, "even that of God, is subject to check, question, and criticism" (Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 421). True understanding of the Law is a very personal thing, and any man, no matter how poor or young, could become a leader of the community if his learning were great enough. Understanding of the Law was a proposition to be taken seriously; there was no room for politics or fraud.

Given this background in which Freud, in the transposed setting of the Leopoldstadt, had been influenced, the dispute as to whether psychoanalytic therapy is a masquerade for enslavement takes on deeper perspective. Some people insist that the net result of Freudian therapy is for patients just to become walking replicas of the therapist. Freud himself intended his therapy to help people increase awareness, and thereby autonomy, over their own lives. Early on, in regard to his giving up the use of hypnotism, Freud writes:

> Hypnotic therapy allows the patient to remain inactive and unchanged, consequently also helpless in the face of every new incitement to illness. Analytic treatment makes as great demands for efforts on the part of the patient as on the physician, efforts to abolish the inner resistances. The patient's mental life is permanently changed by overcoming these resistances, is lifted up to a higher level of development....the patient has to accomplish it and the physician makes it possible for him to do this by suggestions which are in the nature of an "education". It has truly been said, therefore, that psycho-analytic treatment is a kind of "re-education". (1916-1917/1961, p. 131).

As regards the nature of the suggestions made by the physician, Freud was careful to point out that psycho-analysis did not stop at this, but analyzed the nature of the transference between patient and therapist so that even the suggestive aspect of the relationship was held up to both the patient and physician. His conclusion was that "if success then supervenes and is maintained, it is not founded on suggestion, but on the overcoming of the inner resistances effected by the help of suggestion, on the inner change achieved within the patient" (Freud, 1916-1917/1961, p. 131).

Foucault's assessment of Freud in writing on the development of madness concludes in this way:

> To the doctor, Freud transferred all the structures Pinel and Tuke had set up within confinement. He did deliver the patient from the existence of the asylum within which his "liberators" had alienated him; but he did not deliver him from what was essential in this existence; he regrouped its powers, extended them to the maximum by uniting them in the doctor's hands; he created the psychoanalytical situation where, by an inspired short-circuit, alienation becomes disalienating because, in the doctor, it becomes a subject. (1967, p. 278)

Looked at from Foucault's perspective, Freud changed the nature of the relationship of the madman to society, even made it possible to dialogue with him, but his essential confinement, now one of being manacled to the therapist, remained. In his later years Freud himself had doubts about the very possibility of the individual achieving autonomy. For Freud it was an awareness of the contradiction of individual freedom versus the demands made upon the individual by society. The invention of the superego, the internalization of society's demands, could not have come upon Freud by accident, for he came from a tradition in which even minor acts were highly regulated. In this respect, Cuddihy (1974, p. 25) shows that the "primitive" Jew needed all sorts of genteel mannerisms (i.e., a strong superego) to "make do" and "pass" socially into the modern west. One of the essential conundrums of the human condition according to Freud was the maximization of freedom in a society which compelled obedience, both by external and internal compulsion.

Freud was not alone, of course, in wishing that people would rise above the mediocre in order to express their true individuality. These tensions were felt in Vienna in the face of the powerful bourgeois demands for stability and order (Janik and Toulmin, 1972, pp. 92-115). The more inspired journalists and artists wished the same thing for their public. Of course the problem of social organization versus individual autonomy has not only been a reflection of urban Viennese society but a leitmotif of modern western civilization as well. This tension is experienced by every ethnic group as it becomes transposed and modernized into bourgeois genteel society.

The same ambiguity which one sees in the possibility of individual freedom is recast as it revolves around women. Freud's work has been brought into controversy most recently by feminists who argue that he was totally off-base in his concept of female "penis-envy". In this connection, Freud wrote:

> The subsitute formations of this lost penis on the part of the woman play a great role in the formation of many perversions....The little girl does not react with similar rejections when she sees the differently formed genital of the boy. She is immediately prepared to recognize it and soon becomes envious of the penis; this envy reaches its highest point in the consequently important wish that she should be a boy. (1905/1938, p. 595).

Whereas lack of a penis results in envy for the female, the fear of castration results in "lasting depreciation for the other sex" (Freud, 1905/1938, p. 595) for the male. Whether or not Freud, by the elucidation of this theory, did lasting damage to the development of feminine liberation, is open to argument. By elaborating his theory and making it explicit, the conclusion one might draw is that the so called inferiority of women is only a psychological illusion caused by anatomical differences. To view Freud's theory in this light would be tantamount to accepting women as different from, but equal to, men.

The opposite interpretation is also possible. Freud's theory could be used to explain, on a biological basis, the implicit inferiority of women. Freud did not elaborate much on this question, and since he did not spend much energy on the psychology of women anyway, it could be taken to mean that he felt women too insignificant to give them his time. The psychology of women did not make much progress until later, with the coming of the neo-Freudians, and this work has been advanced primarily by female psychologists.

Freud once remarked to a friend, Marie Bonaparte (Jones, 1955, p. 468): "The great question that has never been answered and which I have not yet been able to answer, despite my thirty years of research into the feminine soul, is 'What does a woman want?'" This is an extraordinary admission, given that Freud had spent so much time doing practical work with women in therapy. Nonetheless, it is understandable that his view of women would have been so narrow, for he came from a Jewish tradition where separation of the sexes was the custom from early childhood. This mode of living must have influenced him even in his childhood home in the Leopoldstadt. Furthermore, one must consider the possible genuine insight of Freud that women, allowed less freedom than men, felt an altogether understandable envy towards the opposite sex. Freud glimpsed the truth and they most likely gave it a biological explanation, rather than a sociological one as it deserved. In this sense he was a scientist developing out of a nineteenth century positivistic ethos.

Ernest Jones (1955, p. 431) portrayed Freud's wife as being an efficient, tidy woman, a perfect social hostess, devoted to her husband, as he was to her, but who had little oppportunity or desire to familiarize herself with her husband's work. Reading between the lines, one concludes that Freud, like any shtetl scholar, did not have a great deal of energy left over, after his own studies, writings, patients, and colleagues, for his own wife. On the other hand, the tone of Viennese society and its conception of women encouraged men to regard women as inferior, "to be led and formed by a man in marriage without any will of their own'" (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 47).

In Freud's professional circle all the significant people were men. Then again, many of his patients apparently were women. Was Freud actually listening to these women, or rather to his own colleagues' professional theories about them, all from a male point of view? One can only guess the difference it would have made had there been a strong feminine input in Freud's early circle while he was doing his basic theory building.

I. History of Humankind: Moses and the Hebraic Experience

Freud's last major work, *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), was conceived and written over a period of several years, in two countries, Austria and England, from 1934 to 1938. It was a work which he could not seem to let go of in spite of his terminal illness. He includes in it not one, but three prefatory essays. These essays show a rare facet of Freud, not the unyielding and sure-minded physician, but a wavering and self-doubting thinker who had to express his theory almost in spite of himself (Bakan, 1958, pp. 137-143). It is a compelling work, especially for his Jewish readers, as it is Freud's definition of the Jewish community. He writes:

> We know that of all the peoples who lived in antiquity in the basin of the Mediterranean the Jewish people is perhaps the only one that still exists in name and probably also in nature. With an unexampled power of resistance it has defied misfortune and ill-treatment, developed special character traits, and, incidentally, earned the hearty dislike of all other peoples. Whence comes this resistance of the Jew and how his character is connected with his fate are things one would like to understand better. (1939, p. 165).

Freud asks the same question that Jews have been asking themselves for centuries: "How is it we have survived?" Considering that it was his last work, completed under the duress of exile, extreme anti-semitism, and terminal illness, one must then pose the question: "Was this what Freud was attempting to come to the whole of his life?"

As romantic as the teleological argument sounds at first, explanations for understanding Freud's motivations must be sought in the changing social context of his life. As already mentioned, this work was written during a period of extreme anti-semitism, and without totally accepting Bakan's extraordinarily insightful thesis, that Freud had it in mind to write double-messages in the Kabbalistic vein, or that "The Moses-as-a-Gentile fantasy may be understood as a desperate and brilliant attempt to ward off anti-semitism" (1939, p. 151), at the very least one can go along with the idea that in some way this was a "response to the outward events of his life" (1939, p. 152). It was a personal attempt to define, both for him and his co-religionists, what it meant to be a Jew. This is not a far-fetched idea in view of the fact that Freud had identified with the Jewish community all his life, and now was under such extreme pressure because of it.

If such an explanation of *Moses and Monotheism* stopped there, it would simply brand his book as, at best, the epitome of what good ethnology is all about. Developmentally, however, it can be shown that this book is a logical sequel to earlier works, none of which are concerned with the specific experience of the Jewish people, but rather with the relationship of mental processes to the development of culture. These works include *Totem and Taboo* (1913/1966), *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921) and *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930/1962).

By defining the Jewish community, Freud also comes to grips with the Hebrew roots of western civilization. There is disagreement about the amount and kind of influence the Hebrew root has had on a primarily Christian civilization, and especially the nature of the continung influence of the Hebrew people as they themselves evolve in a civilization dominated by Christianity. In this connection Carl Jung wrote:

> The neurotic fear in Judaism, an imperfect or at any rate unsuccessful attempt at sublimation by a still to barbarous people, gave rise to the excessive severity of the Mosaic law, the compulsive ceremonial of the neurotic. Only the prophets were able to free themselves from it; for them the identification with Jehovah, complete sublimation, was successful. They became the fathers of the people. Christ, the fulfiller of their prophecies, put an end to this fear of God and taught mankind that the true

> relation to the deity is love....Later, the imperfect sublimations of the Christian Mass resulted once again in the ceremonial of the Church, from which only those of the numerous saints and reformers who were really capable of sublimation were able to break free. Not without cause, therefore, does modern theology speak of the liberating effect of "inner" or "personal" experience, for always the ardour of love transmutes fear and compulsion into a higher, freer type of feeling. (1909/1949, p. 165).

But if Jung here is implying that Freud's way of thinking is both parochial and anachronistic because of the Jewish content of psychoanalysis, as he does elsewhere (1934/1964), then he must also answer the question of the "imperfections of the Christian Mass" and why they have not been remedied. Perhaps the root of this answer would lie in its Hebrew source.

Jung shows scant knowledge of the ecstatic traditions of Jewish life beginning with the Essenes, who also believed in "the liberating effect of 'inner' or 'personal' experience" which transmuted into a oneness with God--and yet neither did they, nor the Ananites, the Kabbalists, and the Hasidim, accept the Christ.

Lastly, what was the goal of psychoanalytic therapy if not the transmutation of fear and compulsion, etc., by dint of inner work, through rational means, into a freer creative form. To criticize Freudian psychoanalysis, as Jung seems to, for not making use of the mystical tradition already developed in Christianity--and, by the way, in Judaism--for making too great a use of rational means as a methodology, is tantamount to accusing Freud, and the Jewish tradition as a whole, of being responsible for foisting the positivistic ethos upon an unsuspecting Christian world. The absurdity of where Jung's criticisms lead is evident.

In sum, one can say of *Moses and Monotheism* that it was an attempt by Freud to understand the human psyche as part and parcel of the cultural and historical fabric out of which it had been developing and in which he himself was embedded. But to call it simply a "Jewish" work written by a Jew about Jews would be terribly misleading. More justly, *Moses and Monotheism*, with all its faults and brilliance, should be considered the endeavor of one man to establish the roots of western civilization through the particular source which he, at gut-level, understood most intensely.

J. Future of humankind: Cynicism and Jewish Thought

The cynical, and in some ways negativistic outlook that the Jew has on life is a subject of commonplace knowledge amongst both Jews and those Gentiles who have kept their company. A number of proverbs, known in the shtetl, celebrated the "misfortunes of the Jew. 'There is no Jew without his bundle of troubles'. 'When a Jew is right he gets a beating'. 'No misfortune will ever miss a Jew'." (Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 425). This attitude could not have escaped the young Freud, living, as he was, amongst people who had formerly experienced the derisory taunts of Gentiles as an eveyday occurrence (Cuddihy, 1974, p. 49). The Jews, having experienced disaster wherever their wanderings had taken them--often these "wanderings" were more the result of exile or oppression rather than "wanderlust"--naturally feel that no matter how well treated they are at the hands of the Gentile world, a pogrom is waiting just around the corner. When Jews are not prepared, as in the 1930's, a catastrophe does occur, just to set them straight. The history of well-being, pride, arrogance, and sudden reversal, is a documented legacy of the Bible.

One of the areas in which Carl Jung disagreed with Freudian psychology was in its avowedly pessimistic outlook on people. "Repression, sublimation, regression, narcissism, wish-fulfillment and the rest are all concepts that relate to the grand drama of the pleasure principle. It almost looks as if man's desire and greed have been made the cardinal principle of psychology" (1934/1964, p. 160). Insofar as Jung is accurate, it looks as if Freud compounds the tradition of Jewish negativism.

In Freud's most despairing work, *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930/1962), man's individual development was likened to the development of civilization as a whole. Just as individuals have superegos, likewise, civilizations. Freud wrote:

> If civilization is a necessary course of development from the family to humanity as a whole, then--as a result of the inborn

> conflict arising from ambivalence, of the eternal struggle between trends of love and death--there is inextricably bound up with it an increase of the sense of guilt, which will perhaps reach heights that the individual finds hard to tolerate. (1930/1962, p. 80).

This is so because society, for the sake of its own survival, must put strictures on the individual's instinct for pleasure. Were one to rebel against these strictures, one would feel a sense of guilt--because these same strictures have become internalized in the form of the superego. On the other hand, when one obeys the laws handed down by society, it goes against one's own libidinal instincts for pleasure, and that is also self-damaging. It is, however, "vouchsafed to a few to salvage without effort from the whirlpool of their own feelings the deepest truths, towards which the rest of us have to find our way through tormenting uncertainty and with restless groping" (Freud, 1930/1962, p. 80). So there is a glimmer of light--for the chosen few.

Freud suggests, very tentatively, that there may be a time when the union of the individual's aims and desires will correspond to that of civilization's. He continues by stating that since individual and societal development are in significant ways parallel, cannot a whole civilization be termed "neurotic" (1930/1962, pp. 88-91)? To those who believe that the present oppressive state of affairs is only temporary, Freud answers (1930, p. 92): "I bow to their approach that I can offer them no consolation" (1930/1962, p. 92).

It must be considered, when viewing Freud's pessimism--which, by the way, is still justified in the half century since he wrote *Civilization and its Discontents*--that he was heir not only to the cynicism of the Jewish tradition, but also to the mainline thought of Charles Darwin. The notion of "survival of the fittest", an extremely dark and unromantic idea in the hands of the social Darwinists, has influenced a great deal of twentieth century thinking, and Freud was quite familiar with Darwin.

Another factor in Freud's pessimism is associated with his life in Hapsburg Vienna at a time when the whole Austro-Hungarian edifice was crumbling from within. Any perceptive individual would have sensed its failings and felt a concomitant despair:

> The stability of its society, with its delight in pomp and circumstance, was one expression of a petrified formality which was barely capable of disguising the cultural chaos that lay beneath it. On closer scrutiny, all its surface glories turned to their opposites; this is the fundamental truth about all aspects of the Dual Monarchy. (Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 37).

This is also the fundamental truth about people as Freud inspected them.

It is quite apparent that the cynicism inherited by Freud from the Jewish tradition melded in well with the negative attitude of the society in which he grew up, as well as with at least one strong intellectual current of western civilization. Furthermore, it should be noted that *Civilization and its Discontents* appeared between the two great wars, a time of huge general despair in the West.

K. Part III

In answering the question "How Jewish is Freud's thought in regard to psychoanalysis?" it is apparent that every one of the eight major themes and leitmotifs elucidated and commented upon in the body of this paper was shown to have its source in Jewish thought. This source is embodied in the lifestyle, social milieu, and philosophical outlook of the shtetl. It must be kept in mind that Freud himself was born in Frieberg in Moravia, where the Jews were a minority. He moved to Vienna and spent nearly his entire life in the Leopoldstadt, the Jewish quarter. It is reported that later on, when his father was no longer working, he, Jacob Freud, "divided his time reading the Talmud and many other Hebrew and German books, sitting in a coffee house and walking in the parks" (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 429). Although Freud had left home by this time, one must assume that a heavy Jewish influence had permeated the household throughout his early years. It is not known whether Freud received his earliest education at home, or in one of the many Jewish elementary schools, but it is known that he did not attend a state school until the age of ten (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 429). It should be understood that the shtetl mentality was not simply passed on to Freud through genetic transmission, nor was it just some magical quality in the air he breathed. Freud's upbringing and environment were such that the shtetl traditions would necessarily have been communicated to him albeit in a transmuted form. This transmission of culture is detectable even though little is actually known about his childhood; one can, however, make reasonable extrapolations.

One could argue quite rightly that there are other significant aspects of Freud's work which have not been investigated in this paper, most notably his thought on religion and art. Furthermore, this paper has not touched upon the most evident omission in Freud's system,. his lack of understanding the explicit relationship of psychological concepts to the particular socio-cultural milieu and era in which he lived. It was given to his colleague and student, Alfred Adler, in his system of individual psychology, to attempt to form such a realistic psychology.

Another criticism which might be rendered is that there are some important aspects of Freud's work which do not seem to have their base in any evident Jewish tradition. One such aspect is how Freud structured the psyche. He himself described it as "topographical, by which we mean that it has to do with the spatial relationships we assume within the mind...with the structure of mental apparatus out of separate psychical systems" (1916/1917/1961, p. 187). Here the structure of the psyche could be viewed as having the superego on top, pushing down, the id on the bottom, pushing up, and the third quasi-independent system, the ego, right in the middle, balancing and displacing and transforming these currents of pressure. It makes one think of Watt's steam engine, or in a more modern vein, the action of a piston inside an automobile engine. The metaphor is mechanical, an outcome of the industrial revolution in the West, a revolution in which Jews, hidden away in shtetls and ghettos, did not take part; nor was there anything in the Jewish philosophy roughly comparable to this mechanistic thought. Freud was, after all, trained as a neurophysiologist at a time when the body itself was coming to be seen as a rather elaborate structure of engineering. However, the main corpus of his works and ideas (his psychoanalytic system) was influenced by the Jewish tradtion formulated in the shtetl, as has been shown. This thesis related to the dominant cluster of Freudian concepts, and does not imply a one hundred percent equivalence between them and the Jewish tradition.

On the other hand, it is equally evident that Freud had been strongly influenced by the dominant, not specifically Jewish, intellectual tradition of the West, as well as by the culture of the specific social milieu, Vienna, in which he was embedded. This fact was also shown previously. Here it may be argued that there were specific Jewish elements in his thinking not equivalent to anything found in the more dominant western tradition, such as the influence of Kabbalah on Freud's *Moses and Monotheism* (according to David Bakan's intriguing thesis). However, in most meaningful areas of the psychoanalytical system, western thought permeates and shows its influence.

The answer to the question "Is Freud's thought Jewish?" must be both yes...and...no. The question of why so many Jews predominated in the field of psychoanalysis rears its head once more. If psychoanalysis is as much a western thought form as Jewish, why then was Freud's circle made up from its inception almost entirely of Jews? This question looks overwhelming unless one considers the extreme influence of Jews in almost every other area within psychology, dominating some of these just as they have psychoanalysis. One must appreciate the influence of people of Jewish origin in all fields of the social sciences, not only psychology. With this in mind the question of the predominance of Jews in psychoanalysis becomes one of why the influence became so great in all the social sciences and modern western thought in general.

When one considers that Pierre Janet, a predecessor of Freud's, was not Jewish, and that he spent many years developing a psychological system he termed "psychological analysis", which had close affinities to psychoanalysis (Ellenberger, 1970, Chapter 6) and when Carl Jung and the Swiss contribution to psychoanalysis--including that of Eugen Bleuer and Hermann

Rorschach--is also considered (Ellenberger, 1970, Chapter 9), the appearance of a Jewish hegemony in psychoanalysis diminishes.

The fact that nearly all of Freud's associates were Jewish may be a result of the sure cultural sympathy they were likely to have felt for one another, a newly urbanized generation under fire in an increasingly anti-Semitic environment. But Jews no more predominated psychoanalysis than they did several other schools of thought, and furthermore, there were other contributions to psychoanalysis of a highly significant nature made by people of non-Jewish origin.

The conclusion is that psychoanalysis, albeit a major new form of thought in modern western civilization, is still one amongst a myriad of schools of thinking which have been developed in part or predominantly by Jews since the nineteeenth century. It is a style of thinking which gives an answer to the problems and conundrums of the shtetl Jew in the process of moving out and integrating with the urban west. But in no way could psychoanalytic thinking have become such a powerful force unless it also recognized and attempted to answer the major problems faced by all western societies. In this sense the answer to the question of whether Freud's thought is Jewish is truly both yes and no. It is both Jewish and western in origin, as the problems posed by the Jewish culture were also poignantly felt by western people in general. A simple corollary must be borne in mind: if Freud's work had not been more universally applicable than to just the Jewish people, then psychoanalytic thinking could never have been foisted, insidiously or otherwise, upon the Gentile mind. But if that were the case, psychoanalysis would have died many years ago and not have become so embedded in our intellectual tradition.

The limitations of Freudian thought may be ascribed both to Freud the individual, and to Freud as a member of larger traditions, the Jewish and the more dominant western mode. On the other hand, credit must also be given to the creative impetus of these cultural traditions in which Freud participated. Culture must be seen as a two-sided affair, both as a constraint and impetus.

L. Part IV

We understand now that psychoanalysis cannot be accounted for simply as a "Jewish psychology." Neither can it be considered an exceptional case whose originators were in large part people of Jewish extraction. Almost all fields of intellectual endeavor since the nineteenth century have been penetrated and often originated by Jews, especially in the social and exact sciences. Furthermore, it cannot be said that Jews have had a predictable predilection for certain philosophical systems. Marx, Engels, and Trotsky, for instance, were all Jews and internationalists, but Theodor Herzl was also a Jew, and a zionist. To the argument that Jews were not prone to involve themselves in making an exact statistical science out of the psychology of the person, that a Jew would not model a human psychology on a system fit for physics, one need only turn to David Wechsler or Lewis Terman in the field of intelligence testing to refute the argument. It can be unequivocally stated that the Jew has entered nearly every area of intellectual endeavor in the West since the nineteenth century and has been influential far beyond what could reasonably be conceivable. Why?

By examining the life of Freud, and by analyzing the Jewish population in general as it moved from the shtetl to the city, one discovers three main social factors which help explain the intellectual prowess of the Jew in the West:

1. The shtetl as a closed system;
2. the Jew and abstract thought;
3. the Jew as a marginal individual.

The shtetl was a pressure-cooker, a place where for several hundred years people had been concentrating their energy on understanding, interpreting, re-interpreting, and teaching the Law. Formal education usually began at age five or six. Isaac Deutscher, reminiscing about his early experiences, always spoke of them with disgust:

> It was a dirty and fetid hole with twenty or thirty boys squeezed tightly together on wooden benches, with the unwashed and unkempt teacher drilling into his charges the *alef, beis, geml,* the Hebrew alphabet, the Bible, and the Scriptures in a mechanical monotonous singsong. Very often the teacher had recourse to the stick with which he could reach the head, the face or the shoulders of an unruly pupil.
>
> On my very first day at the *kheder* I was terrified by the 'basin punishment'...A bad student would be told to strip naked and had to stand in front of the class with his feet in a chipped enamel bowl. I vowed firmly this would never, never happen to me. I strained every nerve to follow the words of the teacher and to be always ready to answer any question. Only once was poor Iciu smacked across the face. His attention did flag: a flock of geese outside in the courtyard proved to be too much for his absorption in the Hebrew alphabet. (1968, pp. 7-8).

Deutscher used to dream of life outside the shtetl, a life beyond the grim little schoolroom. As he grew older he fought with his father to be allowed to go to the state school:

> Everything seemed so attractive there: the modern, light and airy building covered with vineleaves; a large playground; the teachers, some of whom I knew already; but above all I longed to wear the school uniform. I saw myself as a real student with shining buttons on my jacket and a satchel full of books--all, of course, about Polish poetry and history. (1968, pp. 13-14).

Deutscher got his wish to leave the shtetl, as did so many other Jews during that era. Freud himself could be seen in a somewhat parallel light, although circumstances were outwardly less nasty. One sees the young Freud, troupes of young Freuds, children of Yiddish speaking parents driven from small villages and towns, all brought together into the Leopoldstadt of Vienna, but unaware of the cosmopolitan life that, within walking distance, surrounded them. What a relief it must have been to Sigmund to go to the state school at age ten. The *Sperlgymnasium* "had high educational standards. Among the teachers were the naturalist Alois Pokorny, the historian Annaka, and the future politican Victor von Kraus" (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 429). For Freud, too, life beyond the crowded Jewish quarter must have represented freedom.

As has already been noted, Jews had little to do with their Gentile neighbors. Basically, they were confined to their own kind, in their own small town, in their own particular affairs. In the urban ghetto, with an actual wall around their settlement, the separation of Jew and Gentile was even more pronounced. What added to the pressure of the cooker, with all its internal strain, was the same fear that any coal miner knows so well, that at every moment a cave-in might occur. In the Jewish case, it was fear of the enmity of the Gentiles who surrounded them, peasants, townspeople, and government officials alike. Imagine the anxiety impressed within the very cells of one who, as a child, experienced pogroms, the fear engendered thereby, the ever present possibility:

> All lights were out. We heard shouts and cries and the tumult of the approaching mob. The shrieks and cries for help or pity became louder and louder. Through the chinks in the shutters we could see the glow of distant flames. Were they going to set the whole town on fire? I sat petrified on the little steps which led from my parents' bedroom to my room. In a whisper I was reciting my prayers and I was clutching feverishly at the strings of my short *Tales* which I always wore over my shirt. (Deutscher, 1968, p. 10).

The entrance of the shtetl Jew into mainline western culture both before and after World War I was like an explosion in which the lid had been snatched off the pressure-cooker. It meant the arrival of the small-town individual, in the case of the shtetl, into urban society. In terms of ghetto Jews, urban though they were in residence, their thinking tended to remain as provincial as their small-town brethren, so that even entrance into the city, as more fully accepted members of cosmopolitan life, was a shocking change. This entrance to city life for the Jew has been vital in changing the modes of knowledge for western civilization, and its original effects are still being felt several generations later. Face to face with western science and art, the Jew finally had a chance to apply immense logical faculties and ethical concerns in any number of new areas. This "enlightenment" did not hit the Jews quite that suddenly, for the loosening of tradition began in the late eighteenth century (Patai, 1977, p. 222), with the promotion of a secular way of life called the "haskala." Secularization, however, does not imply a complete disassociation from one's own identity as a Jew.

The second factor which accounts for the prowess of the Jew in the intellectual traditions of the West is the propensity for abstract thought. In the shtetl, dialogues and verbal logic achieved a razor-edged precision and deftness within the confines of religious thought, although the people of the shtetl felt confident that the reasoning process applied to Divine Law was adequate for coping with any human, worldly problems.

> The popular picture of the Jew in Eastern Europe, held by Jew and Gentile alike, is true to Talmudic tradition. The picture includes the tendency to examine, analyze, and and reanalyze, to seek for meanings behind meanings, and for implications and secondary consequences. It includes also a dependence on deductive logic as a basis for practical conclusions and actions. (Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 121).

This deductive logic often worked at lightning speed, much like the "pilpul" (pepper) process of teaching a rabbinical text.

It is said that in a learned dispute

> one may become very angry indeed without violating decorum. He may even in an extremely heated argument grow so angry that he foams at the mouth. Two discussants will stand close together, gesticulating, shouting, perhaps seizing a button on the other's coat and twisting it to emphasize the words. In such cases the contact will always be between flesh and fabric, not between flesh and flesh. (Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 148).

Whether this is a case of culturally induced sublimation of the instinct for aggression or not, it is true that a small village can not afford the luxury of physical violence amongst its members and expect to survive, especially when they are constantly "under siege". But by the channeling, or transformation, of this aggression into its verbal equivalent, the Jew became a more potent thinker, forced to think out rather than act out.

The Jew, until recently with the advent of Israel, had not been known as an athletic or agricultural type of person. In the shtetl the Jew did not concentrate energy on such concrete things as housing or land. In fact, government edicts dating back to the Middle Ages prevented Jews from owning land.

> The consequence of the prohibitions and restrictions has been that in basic consumption their economic activity has been disproportionately low, while in distribution it has been disproportionately large. Above all, they have served as middlemen, although by no means as exclusively as is sometimes assumed. (Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 242).

This has given rise to the well-known *luftmentsh*, the man of air, who

> literally lives on hopes and miracles. He has no fixed business, no regular means of support. He is a small-scale 'commissionaire', darting about, seizing on almost anything, making a customer materialize almost out of thin air, selling to him almost by hypnotism, and collecting a fee that is almost invisible'. Into each effort the luftmentsch puts all the fervor and conviction of the artist shaping a masterpiece, although for the most part his efforts miscarry and his hopes of reward vanish into the air, his element.(Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 258).

It is as though the Jew had been forced into a life of fantasy even in order to make a living, to survive. What captured attention was the life of the intellect and dreams. Even the appearance of the house was shabby and neglected, for home meant family and people, and not the temporary dwelling-place made up of walls, a roof, a yard, and a broken fence (Zborowski and Herzog, 1965, p. 62).

In respect to Freud, one sees the careful interpreter of people's dreams and words and a therapeutic method that depended on the power of the word. There is nothing to indicate that Freudian therapy had anything to do with physical contact.

The same estimation of language and learning that went on in the shtetl must have been carried over, diluted no doubt, into the Leopoldstadt. Few facts are actually known about Freud's childhood, but his assertion that "throughout his schooling he had constantly led his class has been confirmed by the school archives" (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 429). At any rate, this same tradition of academic and educational excellence, but now within the larger field of secular learning, was part of Freud's early heritage.

The third characteristic of Jewish life which helps explain the intellectual influence of Jews is their marginal, or cross-cultural, nature. It is the secular Jew in the West, and not the religious counterpart, who has made the significant contributions. No longer embedded in the shtetl where they are "not different", western Jews are confronted by a dominant majority of Gentiles with whom they cannot, or will not, identify. Deutscher, in speaking of great Jewish intellectual luminaries, says of them:

> They were *a priori* exceptional in that as Jews they dwelt on the borderlines of various civilizations, religions, and national

> cultures....Their minds matured where the most diverse cultural influences crossed and fertilized eachother. They lived on the margins or in the nooks and crannies of their respective nations. Each of them was in society and yet not in it, of it and yet not of it. It was this that enabled them to rise in thought above their societies, above their nations, above their times and generations, and to strike out mentally into wide new horizons and far into the future. (1968, p. 27).

Although the secular Jews no longer feel confined by the religious prescriptions of the past, this does not mean they are divorced from the Jewish community. Freud, for instance, certainly never repudiated his link with Judaism, and yet he was a non-believer. Of the Jew, Veblen wrote:

> Because he no longer accepts his own heritage uncritically does not mean that he therefore will take over and inwardly assimilate the traditions of usage and outlook which the gentile world has to offer; or at the most he does not uncritically take over all the intellectual prepossessions that are always standing over among the substantial citizens of the republic of learning. The idols of his own tribe have crumbled in decay and no longer cumber the ground, but that release does not induce him to set up a new line of idols borrowed from an alien tribe to do the same disservice. By consequence he is in a peculiar degree exposed to the unmediated facts of the current situation; and in a peculiar degree, therefore, he takes his orientation from the run of the facts as he finds them, rather than from the traditional interpretation of analogous facts in the past. In short, he is a skeptic by force of circumstances over which he has no control. Which comes of men in that intellectual enterprise out of which comes the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men, that net modicum of intelligence which takes effect in the play of the idle curiosity. (1934, pp. 229-230).

Having predilections for abstract thought, and given the old stress on learning, combined with a practical intelligence forced on them by centuries of poverty and misery, it is no wonder that so many Jews should be found not only in scholarly fields, but also in the professions, in medicine and law. In an era of burgeoning expansion of the democratic principle, there were few barriers because of ethnic background.

> Science, medicine, and most scholarship, were primarily rational, being secular, international, with a universal similarity of technique and validity and applicability of results. Achievement there was indisputable and seemingly invulnerable to anti-semitic attack--at least from within the field of science itself. Moreover, the period was one of extraordinarily rapid expansion of scientific and professional work, with large-scale re-organization of departments and staffs of new research institutes and schools of technology. Especially in this rapidly advancing field, old prejudices lost their hold more quickly and the Jew was often welcome. (Cohen, 1942, p. 345).

Freud himself understood the desirability of being marginal, the spirit of conflict and the strength accrued from overcoming challenge. His reaction to a friend, Max Graf, who wondered whether he should bring up his child as a Christian in view of the prevailing aura of anti-semitism in Vienna, was interesting: "If you do not let your son grow up as a Jew...you will deprive him of those sources of energy which cannot be replaced by anything else. He will have to struggle as a Jew, and you ought to develop in him all the energy he will need for that struggle. Do not deprive him of that advantage" (Bakan, 1958, p. 47).

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III. On Carl Gustav Jung: Psycho-social Basis of Morality During the Nazi Era

A. Introduction

In 1933, Ernst Kretschmer resigned from presidency of the International Gerneral Medical Society for Psychotherapy (Jung, 1933). Carl Gustav Jung, vice-president of the Society for three years, took on this post (Hannah, pp. 218-21). Chief editorship of the Society's official publication, the *Zentralblatt fur Psychotherapie*, was a position assumed automatically by the president (Hannah, pp. 218-21). Thus commenced a most problematical ethical controversy which, to date, some forty-five years later, has not been satisfactorily solved. It was not until 1940, when the increase in international hostilities forced discontinuance of the Society's activities, that Jung gave up active leadership (Jung, 1973, pp. 286-88).

The purpose of this article is to examine Carl Jung's actions within the socio-historical context and intellectual tradition in which they took place. Furthermore it is an attempt to clarify the psychological motives, including those most hidden, which caused him to act as he did. And finally, it is an investigation into the social basis of intellectuals in nazified Europe before the outbreak of war.

Jung, son of a Protestant clergyman, was born in Switzerland in 1875. He studied medicine at the Universities of Basle and Zurich. Introduced to Freudian psychoanalysis while interning at Burgholzi Mental Hospital near Zurich, he became a student and colleague of Freud's in 1907, a relationship which was to continue until 1913. On turning away from Freud he founded a method of psychological analysis which he termed analytical psychology. His fame increased greatly in the years to come, and in 1948 the C. G. Jung Institute was established in Zurich. Jung died in 1961 having left an enormous amount of published works in the field of psychology. His prominence in North America has been on the upsurge ever since.

Jung stressed, in 1934, that his only motive in accepting the leadership of the Society was to perpetuate the science of psychology that the political confusion of the times threatened to destroy (Jung, 1934a, p. 538). He did not engage in public discussions about these matters afterwards, accused though he had been of complying with the Nazi regime, fostering a pro-Hitler attitude, and being anti-Semitic.[1] There is, however, ongoing documentation in his personal correspondence between the years 1933-1940 of his concern about these matters and his desire to clarify the meanings of his actions (Jung, 1973, pp. 131-288).

There have been many critics, both in North America and Europe, who have continued to castigate Jung and his actions. Some of these critics, although not close to Jung personally, were acquainted with him. Others were close to the situation in Nazi Germany, and adversely affected by it. But no one, neither critic nor defender, with the exceptions of Clarence Karrier and Aniela Jaffe, have examined Jung's personal motives within the socio-historical context in which his actions took place. Not to do so is to condemn or exonerate without understanding the social tensions which fostered particular attitudes and which constrained personal choices and modes of action. What may appear clearcut to us in retrospect is likely to have appeared less distinctly to those in nazified Europe. Before posterity makes judgements upon an individual we owe it to him or her to recreate the situation as it appeared to the people living at that time. This is what I intend to do in Jung's case. We hope that our own children will do as much for us.

B. The Psycho-social Basis for Action

The main problem, as Jung saw it, resulted from the German unification program, the *Gleichschaltung*, on all German societies, including the medical and psychological (Jung, 1934a, pp. 535-39). Jews and German political deviants were to be disbarred from them. The situation at German universities was similar, where Jewish professors did not receive deserved promotions, were finally fired, and bright young Jewish scholars not hired (Haberer, Chapter 7, pp. 121-162). Due to the untenability of their positions, many left of their own accord. Jews were, at that time, particularly influential in medical and psychological circles. Jung reasoned that it was necessary to discover a means of satisfying the demands of the German government and yet still involve his Jewish colleagues. The impossibility of compliance with the Nazi regime was not then so obvious. Because Germans were so eminent in the international community of psychiatrists and psychologists, Jung felt that he had to take steps to salvage the continuing work of the whole association. To this end he made it possible for his German-Jewish colleagues to become members of the German contingent. We would call them members-at-large. He attempted to make certain that the *Zentralblatt* would have two editions, one for the international society, and one for the German. Since the political situation was beyond his influence, Jung felt the best he could do was to help keep the new work in psychotherapy afloat until the political turnmoil ebbed. He also felt he owed it to his colleagues, both within Germany and without, to maintain an official body and publication whereby new views could be stated and exchanged.[2]

In answer to a critic, Dr. Gustav Bally, Jung stated his position in 1934 in a Zurich newspaper:

> ...Thus a moral conflict arose for me as it would for any decent man in this situation. Should I, as a prudent neutral, withdraw into security this side of the frontier and wash my hands of innocence, or should I--as I was well aware--risk my skin and expose myself to the inevitable misunderstandings which no one escapes who, from higher necessity, has to make a pact with the existing political powers in Germany? (Jung 1934a, pp. 535-6).

Accepting Jung's testimony that his only desire was to further the interests of psychotherapy and his professional colleagues, the question of the ethical value of a science or art as a discipline, including psychology, is put into relief. Put simply, very few German intellectuals actively resisted the Nazis. Many exiled themselves and others attempted to remain while neither resisting nor participating. Some, such as Werner Heisenberg the psysicist, collaborated with the Nazi regime (Haberer, p. 165-71).

The incredulous case of the composer Richard Strauss is exemplary as a pitiful extreme. Photographed with Joseph Goebbels in Dresden, interviewed by both Goering and Hitler, the tragedy of the destruction of German culture did not strike him until the war's end when the opera houses in Berlin, Dresden, and Vienna, as well as Munich, were decimated. It was then that he wrote

> ...Perhaps sorrow and despair make us babble on too much. But the burning of the Munich Court Theatre, where *Tristan* and *Die Meistersinger* received their first performances, where I first heard Freischutz 73 years ago, where my good father sat at the first horn desk for 49 years...it was the greatest catastrophe of my life; there is no possible consolation, and at my age no hope.(Marek, p. 286).

For Strauss the most important reality was music no matter who the patron. As long as operas were being performed the European war was secondary!

The prevailing attitude about science and art was a live-and-let-live affair. The university as an institution independent of government had been a tradition in Germany since the early nineteenth centruy (Ringer, Chapter 1, pp. 14-80). In von Humboldt's time this had a liberating effect, but by Hitler's it meant that, in compliant neutrality, scholarly work was patronized by the Nazi regime.

One of the main cultural vehicles used for this total usurption of power was the notion of *Volksgeist* and its offspring, *Volks-Psychologie*, of which Jung was a most eminent propounder. Although the cultural archetype was portrayed by Jung as relativistic and neutral-valued, it had, nonetheless, its political analogue. The sense of *Volksgeist* goes back to the eighteenth century and Johann Gottfried Herder whose "discovery" of the "folk" was in radical opposition to the anti-democratic principles prevailing in Germany (Kohn, pp. 354-55). In the nineteenth century the German middle class, unable to establish a bourgeois-democratic state system--unlike the case of most other European powers--used the notion of *Volksgeist* as a means of creating a German identity which "emphasized the role of the private, and created a sentimental cult of nature. This turning inward was a reverse side of the inability to participate in the public realm" (Kren, p. 290). Culture rather than politics became the vehicle for German nationalism during the nineteenth century (Kohn, p. 355). And in this respect German romanticism and historicism, as expressed by the notion of *Volksgeist*, was a reactionary cultural defense against the Enlightenment. It became an effective barrier to the penetration of the broadening political participation such as what was occurring in neighboring France.

When Wilhelm Wundt first created a *Volks-Psychologie* in the 1890's social conditions had not yet deteriorated to the point where its positive value, the delineation of real ethnic differences, were perverted into political characterizations of superiority of one group in contrast to the inferiority of others. But this was on the horizon. This seemingly innocent notion of the folk, with all its sentimentalization of nature, the pristine eulogization of simple hardworking people bound to the land from which they received sustenance, dark irrational forces, and the concomitant mystification, became a brutal instrument in the hands of German ideologues of the twentieth century.

Jung played a role in this romanticization of human nature. His essay, *Wotan*, published in 1936 at the height of Nazi euphoria, was an attempt to describe the archetypical character of the German. Only obliquely aware of political ramifications, he wrote: "The Hitler movement literally brought the whole of Germany to its feet, from five-year-olds to veterans, and produced the spectacle of a nation migrating from one place to another" (Jung, 1936, p. 180). In and of itself, his essay had no express political intent; on the contrary, Jung viewed it as apolitical. It certainly had nothing to do with the vulgar *Volks-Psychologie* of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. But by the very neutrality of Jung's content, along with the stylistic glorification of primeval forces and mystical power, it meant that the Nazis could grab it up and use it to further deify their own ideals:

> ...He is the god of storm and frenzy, the unleasher of passions and the lust of battle; moreover he is a superlative magician and artist in illusion who is versed in all secrets of an occult nature. (Jung, 1936, p. 182).

Thus says Jung, giving voice and character to an ideal of the race about which Hitler earlier wrote:

> *The folkish philosophy is basically distinguished from the Marxist philosophy by the fact that it not only recognizes the value of race, but with it the importance of personality, which it therefore makes one of the pillars of its entire edifice.* These are the factors which sustain its view of life. (Hitler, p. 448).

Jung himself was a Swiss bourgeois who cared little for politics although he did his duty as a Swiss citizen and voted in all elections which took place in his canton (Ellenberger, p.68). Disinterest in international politics was the tradition of his nation and he adhered to it (Jung, 1928, p. 485). Jung, educated in an ivory-tower tradition (Progoff, pp. 7-8) and brought up in a social class (the country parish clergy) which did not engage in politics, was no match for the street-fighter mentality of the Nazi leaders. By setting his psychology apart from the topical political situation, in attempting to erect a permanent and ideal understanding of the human condition, he failed to touch ground.

Had he been a member of an oppressed or marginal class, as was his former mentor Freud, one would have expected him to be more politically astute. But he wasn't. There are not only huge gaps in his political awareness, but as well a frightening naivete. Even his autobiography, suitably entitled *Memories, Dreams, Reflections,* suggests this. Quoting him, one reads in the Prologue:

> In the end the only events in my life worth telling are those when the imperishable world irrupted into this transitory one. That is why I speak chiefly of inner experiences, amongst which I include my dreams and visions. These form the *prima materia* of my scientific work. They were the fiery magma out of which the stone that had to be worked was crystallized.(Jung, 1961, p. 4).

He was as good as his word! There was little that one could construe as "transitory". There was no deep interest nor concern about the incredible economic depression nor two European wars through which he lived. This unwillingness to ascribe significance to the social and economic context in which he partook characterizes his volumes of psychological investigations. Ira Progoff, in a sympathetic interpretation of the social meaning of Jung's psycholgy, wrote that his interest lay not in the external forms of social groups, not in the history of economic or political movements, but rather in the inner content of history (Progoff, pp. 3-14). No reader of Jung's works could dispute Progoff's evaluations.

But Jung's lack of political awareness is also a weakness in his psychological thought. When the cultural archetypes come into contact with the demands of realtiy, the moment and place where the ideal touches the concrete, where the "imperishable world irrupted into this transitory one", this is exactly where Jung's psychology is lacking. As an example one can turn to an essay of Jung's written just after World War II in which he attempted to explain the psychodynamics of the German people:

> ...The contents of the collective unconscious, the archetypes, with which we are concerned in any occurrence of psychic mass-phenomena, are always bipolar: they have both a positive and a negative side. Whenever an archetype appears things become critical, and it is impossible to foresee what turn they will take. As a rule this depends on the way consciousness reacts to the situation. During a collective manifestation of archetypes there is always a great danger of mass movement, and a catastrophe can be avoided only if the effect of the archetype can be intercepted and assimilated by a sufficiently large majority of individuals. (Jung, 1946, p. 229).

Although Jung attempted to enter the arena of mass psychology his investigations could offer neither a sociological genesis of how mass movements did in fact arise nor did they have any predictive value. His social descriptions remained at the level of a quasimystical psychological reductionism, brilliant in its analysis but of slight substantative value. His perception of the social unit was simply the addition of discrete individuals unified by a common archetype but uninformed by the material conditions of life. A more dialectical approach was needed, one that Jung himself could not offer since he was singularly disinterested in the "external realities".

Nor did his socio-political consciousness develop significantly in his later life. In *Mysterium Coniunctionis,* his culminating investigation into the nature of alchemy, he wrote of the relationship between social and psychological disorder:

> Just as the decay of the conscious dominant is followed by an irruption of chaos in the individual, so also in the case of the

> masses (Peasant Wars, Anabaptists, French Revolution, etc.), and the furious conflict of elements in the individual psyche is reflected in the unleashing of primeval blood-thirstiness and lust for murder on a collective scale...The discerning person knows and feels that his psyche is disquieted by the loss of something that was the life-blood of his ancestors. The undiscerning...miss nothing and only discover afterwards in the papers...the alarming symptoms that have now become "real" in the outside world because they were not perceived before inside, in oneself, just as the presence of the eternal images not noticed. (Jung, 1955-56, p. 362).

Three revolutionary movements are lumped together with the abbreviation "etc." as though all mass social disruption was equivalent and let loose "primeval blood-thirstiness and lust for murder". By not making a thorough analysis of social revolutions, by assuming they are all of one and the same nature at the individual human level without giving evidence, Jung's sociological analyses can only be defined as "glib".

A dialectical approach, informed by a greater knowledge of socio-political conditions, would have allowed him to make that extraordinary break-through which he was actually attempting, to understand history and historical change, as it appeared and was reflected in the individual human psyche as represented by the cultural archetypes. In order to do this, however, he would have had to discard the implicit notion that order, or stasis, was the norm, whereas disorder, or change, was somehow unnatural. It was unlikely that Jung was familiar with Karl Marx nor would Marx's social revolutionary ethos have appealed to Jung, who was a staunch and committed Swiss bourgeois. For Jung the ruling order was equivalent to natural order. He attributed that which was most degenerative to the chaos unleashed by social revolution, all of which could be foreseen by the "discerning" through the chaos in their own psyche. That social revolution could be a forward step in human development was not one of Jung's considerations, and neither was the fact that some people in some revolutions act very decisively and intentionally and may even kill without lust. Furthermore, the passions he ascribes to periods of social revolution also take place during periods of seeming order. Oftentimes it is how those in power treat the oppressed. Jung's *Volkspsychologie* allowed him to make social analyses on the basis of race, but effectively deterred him from doing so on the basis of socio-economic class. Had Jung himself been more socially alienated he might have been more capable of understanding class analysis. As it was, *Volkspsychologie* in Jung's hands became a brace against this kind of understanding, the barrier which shielded him from really comprehending what it meant for him, personally, to be a member of the Swiss bourgeoisie, and an elitist intellectual.

But Jung's deficiencies were the common weaknesses of most intellectuals, heirs as they were to an ivory-tower tradition and compounded, in Jung's case, by occult influences (Ellenberger, pp. 664-66) leaving him rather untroubled by the demands of political reality. This history of science in Europe has basically been apolitical, accepting patrons no matter their politics, bargaining, balancing, and accommodating, much as Jung attempted to do upon accepting leadership of the International General Medical Society for Psychotherapy.

C. Relationship of Personal, Social, and Intellectual Realms

To understand Jung's intellectual and socio-historical context is not to exonerate him, only to comprehend somewhat better how his relationship with the National Socialists was derived in the first place. One can sympathize with those who, being more cognizant of the day-to-day misery of life under the Nazis, or those who had to give up their careers and material goods in order to flee, could have become furious at Jung's rather distanced attitude. Franz Schoenberner, former editor of several German literary magazines until he became a refugee, wrote a chronicle of those war years, including commentary on the so-called "great" intellectuals of Europe. He wrote of Jung as being a Nazi collaborator, prophet of an Aryan psychiatry, who came down out of the "foggy clouds of art" to explain that Hitler was a dangerously sick man (Schoenberner, p. 98)). Although Schoenberner has radically simplified the facts one may read through the words to the skepticism and black humor of a man whose life was considerably disrupted by the Nazis in response to another who went through the war in comparative ease and, for whatever reasons, played ball for a while with the Nazis.

During the war Jung lived in relative comfort, either at home in Kusnacht or in his beautiful stone house in Bollingen, both on the Lake of Zurich. He understood, however, the possibility of an imminent Nazi takeover of Switzerland, and was informed that he had been registered on the Nazi blacklist for extermination (Hannah, p. 269). It is also said that he took great pains to aid refugee psychologists who were Jewish (Hannah, p. 226, Bennet, pp. 59-60). Perhaps it's ridiculous to desire that he suffer just like so many others, or to despise him for living comfortably in a neutral country while millions were being destroyed or battling just to survive; but maybe not so ridiculous to dislike his rather high-handed attitude about the collective guilt and responsibility of all Germans. As Wilhelm Roepke pointed out, Jung never wrote about those Germans who actively resisted (Roepke, p. 16). And as Clarence Karrier expressed it, Jung, as early as 1918, clearly identified himself with the Germanic peoples:[3]

> (Freud and Adler) are thoroughly unsatisfying to the Germanic mentality; *we* still have a genuine barbarian in us who is not to be trifled with, and whose manifestation is no comfort for *us* and not a pleasant way of passing the time. (Karrier, p. 347).

Jung's predilections toward the Germanic is not to be wondered at, since he himself was a Swiss-German sharing a common language and cultural bond with all Germanic people. What is to be wondered at, however, is his shift of identification to his Swiss background in his 1945 essay *After the Catastrophe*:[4] "Living as we do in the middle of Europe, *we* Swiss feel comfortably far removed from the foul vapors that arise from the morass of German guilt." Here Jung deftly singles himself out as a Swiss. There is something downright amiss in his change of attitude. Although Jung wrote of "The pseudo-scientific race-theories" which did not, nonetheless, make "the extermination of the Jews any more acceptable" (Jung, 1945, p. 202) he never did mention the effect that his own race-cum-cultural theories might have had on the German people.

In this essay of 1945 he had almost nothing to say of the material and social conditions of life which made the Nazi takeover possible. Rather, he reduced the takeover of Germany to an evil quirk of the collective unconscious. The problem for us is the mindspelling partial truth that Jung's analysis captured and which cannot be fairly dispelled out-of-hand. It is to be expected that his psychological reductionism of the catastrophic events in Europe which caused so much suffering, his tone of moral condemnation (the minister's son) without hardly accusing himself except as a member of the whole European community, would have made him insufferable to so many people. Jung never really did grapple with these issues, as he did with so many others.

Shortly after World War II Leo Baeck, a survivor of the concentration camps, and a Jew, had a private meeting with Jung. He had heard much about Jung's inclination towards naziism and felt reproachful. In a letter to Gershom Scholem, in 1947, Baeck wrote: "(Jung) defended himself by an appeal to the special conditions in Germany but at the same time confessed to him (Baeck): 'Well I slipped up'--probably referring to the Nazis and his expectation that something great might after all emerge" (Jaffe, p. 98). Thenceforth Baeck became an admirer of Jung.

But once again even here Jung gives no evidence of grappling with the significant issues involved. He simply stated, "Well I slipped up". Certainly what he called a "slip" bore more serious self-reflection. But this is missing. Jung betrays himself by his arch offhandedness.

But why single out Jung, the reader may ask, when there were so many others who were far more compliant with the Nazi regime? Wilhelm Roepke again identifies the reason:

> ...foreign intellectuals, for instance C. G. Jung, who had not even the flimsy excuse of their German colleagues of being under moral or physical pressure, helped the Nazis by lending them their prestige and at the same time by betraying the resistant Germans. (Roepke, p. 16).

The key words here are "prestige" and "resistant". One must look at what Jung actually did, unwittingly or otherwise, to bolster the regime, to support

Nazi propaganda, and to lower German resistance.

In the first issue of *Zentralblatt* (which he edited) he stated the need for a Germanic psychology which should no longer be confused with a Jewish psychology. He went on to say that in no way is this to diminish the worth of Semitic psychology, anymore than it would be to propound a Chinese psychology which is peculiar to them and obviously different from western people (Jung, 1933, pp. 533-4). What he states is certainly in line with the whole trend of Jung's *Volks-Psychologie* and represents no radical change in his thinking. We are all heirs to differing traditions, to different sets of cultural archetypes. Why should we presume that one and only one psychology fits all people, German, Jew, Chinese alike?

It is important to understand the social and intellectual climate in which these touchy statements occurred. It was not unusual for German social scientists, in the 1930's, to propound theories of ethnic differences, and to differentiate the Aryan consciousness from others based on psychological and even biological typecasting. The case of Erich Jaensch, famous for his work on eidetic imagery and founder of the Psychological Institute of Marburg, is notable. He attempted to write a comprehensive theory of psychophysiological development which the Germanic consciousness represented the ideal cultural type, whereas Jews and Mediterranean peoples represented weak stock. Based on this biological-cum-cultural structure he went so far as to pronounce interbreeding with Jews as degenerative for the "superior" types (Jaensch, pp. 21-2). His last book, published in 1938, included a patriotic opening statement by Philipp Lenard, a Nobel Prize winner and proponent of a "German Physics".

Jung's declaration of the necessity for differentiating German and Jewish psychology was published in the *Zentralblatt* in 1934, the year after the National Socialists took power in Germany. In addition, Jung's statement appeared next to a letter from a certain M. H. Goering, head of the German contingent of the International Society. The letter was signed "Prof.

Dr. jur. Dr. med. M. H. Goering" (Zentralblatt fur Psychotherapie und ihre Grenzgebiete, Vol. 6, 1934), cousin to Hitler's top aide, Hermann Goering. Jung disclaimed this association by publicly stating that it was not his intention that Goering's political manifesto should have been circulated outside Germany:

> I do not doubt that there were inside political reasons for this, but it was one of those lamentable tactical gaffes which were the bane of German foreign policy even in the Wilhelm era. In this way my name unexpectedly appeared over a National Socialist manifesto, which to me personally was anything but agreeable. And yet after all--what is help or friendship that costs nothing? The incident is naturally so incriminating as to put my editorship seriously in question. (Jung, 1934a, p. 538).

One questions, at that point, why he did not resign from editorship of the *Zentralblatt*. Jung maintained that nothing could be done about the political situation, that one *had* to play ball with the National Socialists (Jung, 1934a, p. 539). One equally ponders why he would have allowed his name to appear next to Goering's within Germany, whereas outside Germany it was wrong. Was it total naivete about the political situation? In view of the preceding quote I would have to deny that. I conclude that Jung's ambivalence at the political and social level were fostered in three congruent realms.

First, at the intellectual level, we have seen how the tradition of *Volksgeist* became, in the hands of psychologists, a *Volks-Psychologie*, which, in the twentieth century, yielded to the interpenetration of Nazi political doctrine and became one more tool for propaganda. Through an almost imperceptible evolution, *Volks-Psychologie* even became an intellectual and educational justification for teaching the superiority of the Aryan people and the concomittant inferiority of other folk. Swept up in this pseudo-scientific doctrine, and one of its progenitors, was, as we have seen, the outstanding psychologist, Erich Jaensch, who developed a theory of racial superiority based on his earlier, and much more circumspect studies, in the neurophysiology of perception. Jung did not take such an "advanced" step, but given the intellectual climate is it so incredible that he went as far as he did? To him it appeared very natural, and because of his identification as a scientist--science being neutral-valued--he could not see the clear relation between scientific theory and political doctrine.

Second, at the social level, pre-World War II Germany (and Europe) was in turmoil. Even the German people, much less an alien Swiss, could not comprehend the depth to which Hitler and Company would go to attain absolute hegemony. Although the establishment of the infamous Dachau Concentration Camp in March, 1933 was commonly known to the German people,[5] who then could have predicted that this prison camp for politically undesirable persons would later be put to such horrendous effects (Guide Book: Concentration Camp Dachau)? The Nazi tactics, like the inclusion of the aforementioned letter of Dr. Goering's, honestly mystified the naive Jung. In reality Jung, like so many others, was overwhelmed.

Nonetheless, Jung's actions, according to the historian Roepke, had a consequence in the real world. The Nazis courted him because his eminence added prestige to their regime. Whether or not a famous man, willingly or not, bears more responsibility than an unknown, is a difficult question. Certainly he bears equal responsibility, just as all those whose resistance was weakened by Jung must also be borne by themselves. Perhaps only children get off the hook in these cases. If the German people must take responsibility for the atrocities of the Nazi regime, then certainly Jung must bear some for adding credence to that selfsame government. That was, after all, the conclusion of the Nuremberg proceedings after the war, that everyone had a choice, and mere appeal to higher authority did not abviate guilt[6]

The third realm of explanation lies in the psychological. Jung wrote that he never really desired the responsibility thrust upon him as president of the Society (Jung, 1973, p. 131, 136-7). And a close affiliate of Jung wrote that never again did he take an active role as leader of any official organization (Hannah, p. 218). There is a discrepancy in this biographer's statement however, for she also wrote that Jung had been very active in initiating the C. G. Jung Institute, founded in 1948 (Hannah, pp.

295-8). And one must also keep in mind that for many years he maintained a school of his own founding, analytical psychology, although on an unofficial basis. He definitely had a feeling for power, a certain understanding of it.

Earlier in his life, at Freud's request, Jung accepted the post as president of the International Psychoanalytic Association (Jones, pp. 37-8). No doubt Freud was compelling, but did Jung then also feel that the mantle of power was being thrust at him? He accepted it. He had later accepted the position as vice-president of the International General Medical Society for Psychotherapy before becoming its president in 1933. Rather than assuming erroneously that Jung was totally naive about political power as he and his biographers would have us believe, I think Jung invited power, but in a passive manner. In this way he could retain his image of himself, as a man above the petty considerations of the humdrum and ordinary. Nontheless, he set himself up in positions in which power would be "thrust" upon him. Like most people, he wanted to have his cake and eat it too, a perception of himself, at least in the realm of personal power, which he did not wish to recognize.

It's also true that Jung did not create a closed circle of unflinching followers as was the alarming case with Freud (Wittels). In fact, he got on well with his associates. He was not dogmatic about the school of analytical psychology which he himself founded, and his former intellectual comrades remained friends.

We have here an enigma. Theodor Reik writes of Jung as having been "very decisive, authoritative" (Freeman, p. 50) and he is often pictured as such. But in the face of the Nazi takeover of Germany, Jung showed himself to be in a quandary. Many people, not only Jung, felt just such a quandary, *vis a vis* the Nazis, and many lost their lives due to the political situation and their own indecision. On the one hand, Jung shows himself to be undogmatic in his personal dealings with associates, the antithesis of a power-mad felon, but on the other hand a man who quite readily accepted positions of leadership when called upon and later founded an institute bearing his own name. That he so readily dismissed himself of responsibility for his actions before the war, that he dismissed any desire for power whatsoever, seems untenable in view of his personal history. I think he simply refused to come to terms with his social indecision and psychological needs which showed their face during the Nazi era. By not doing so neither did he have to come to conscious terms with this dark side of his nature, and this enabled him to retain a more positive view of himself.

It must further be noted that the man Jung replaced as president in 1933, Professor Ernst Kretschmer, was a highly respected scientist. As Jung pointed out, Kretschmer resigned for political reasons (Jung, 1934a, p.535). But Jung never made a public utterance to the effect that the political reasons which caused Kretschmer's resignation was his (Kretschmer's) opposition to the Nazis (Kirsh, p. 115). Indeed, all Jewish members of the editorial staff were forced to resign also. Rudolf Allers, a religious Roman Catholic, also resigned, either out of voluntary conviction (Harms, p. 210) and/or the fact that racially he was also Jewish (Kirsh, pp. 135 - 136). Jung did note, in the first issue of the *Zentralblatt* which he edited, that Kretschmer's resignation "coincided with the great political upheaval in Germany" (Jung, 1933, p. 533). This statement was briefly repeated in his *Rejoinder to Dr. Bally*. Circumspect in what he uttered, there was no outcry at the injustice done to some editorial members, nor support for those who resigned out of voluntary conviction; neither was there any further public statement.

The net effects of Jung's actions, and inactions, as I weigh them, when projected against the social fabric of nazified Germany, were deleterious to those who wished to resist Hitler. His earlier proclamations of "plain human duty" and "higher necessity" in respect to "suffering humanity, doctors, and...science and civilization" are suspect (Jung, 1934a, ppp. 535-6).

D. The Psycho-Social Basis of Anti-Semitism

This leads to criticisms levelled at Jung for his anti-semitism. Jung had been writing about the necessity for a German psychology etched in the cultural archetype of the Germanic people. It is one of the merits of his psychology that he has investigated differences in culture and race and how these differences are manifested at an individual level. He had been doing this even before the National Socialist regime came to power. But there is plenty of room for criticisms concerning the veracity of his descriptions of Germanic and Hebraic archetypes, of the relationship of these quasi-genetic cultural essences to environmental influences, the dynamics and evolution of national archetypes, and lastly, the political use made of them (Glover, Chapter VIII, pp. 141-53).

In 1934 Jung wrote:

> The Jew, who is something of a nomad, has never created a cultural form of his own and as far as we can see never will, since all his instincts and talents require a more or less civilized nation to act as host for their development. (Jung, 1934b, pp. 165-6).

Here Jung showed an alarming ignorance concerning the ancient biblical culture of the Hebrews and the cultural form which modern western man and woman has inherited. As to the predictive element of his statement, its veracity remains to be seen, depending on the subsequent development of the post-World War II Israeli state. This obvious blind spot in Jung is interesting and will be referred to once again. It is to Jung's credit that much later in life he studied and came to appreciate post-Jewish mystical lore as found in Kabbala (Kirsh, p. 127).

At another level of analysis, Jung's remarks cannot be disengaged from the social and linguistic context in which the occurred. Adolph Hitler also wrote of the Jewish people:

> In the Jew, however, this attitude is not at all present; for that reason he was never a nomad, but only and always a *parasite* in the body of other peoples. That he sometimes left his previous living space has nothing to do with his own purpose, but results from the fact that from time to time he was thrown out by the host nations he had misused. His spreading is a typical phenomenon for all parasites; he always seeks a new feeding ground for his race. (Hitler, pp. 304-5).

Biologically speaking, the word "host" implies "parasite". In Hitler's terms "host" and "parasite" are related to German nationalism and Judaism, the Jews of course being the breeders on their German hosts. The parallel between Jung's elevated description of the Jewish archetype and Hitler's vulgarisms are nonetheless unmistakable. By the time Jung's article appeared, the sales of *Mein Kampf* had already risen astronomically and encompassed a wide reading public.

Invective against Jews was not unique to Hitler. One discovers the same anti-Jewish propaganda in Alfred Rosenberg's *Myth of the Twentieth Century* (originally written in 1930), in the anonymous and internationally popular work entitled *The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion* (Anonymous. First appeared in German in 1920), and in much of the common media of the time. Taken out of social context Jung's statements sound innocent enough, especially since he could justify his writings by stating that "Medicine" (and by that he meant psychotherapy and psychology in general) "has nothing to do with politics" (Jung, 193[illegible]a, p. 538).

Not only the sensibilities of the German people, but the German language as well, had pitifully degenerated by the commencement of the war):

> The unspeakable being said, over and over, for twelve years. The unthinkable being written down, indexed, filed for reference. The men who poured quicklime down the openings of the sewers in Warsaw to kill the living and stifle the stink of the dead wrote home about it. They spoke of having to "liquidate vermin"....
>
> The language was infected not only with these bestialities. It was called upon to enforce innumerable falsehoods, to persuade Germans that the war was just and everywhere victorious.... (Steiner, p. 100).

When seen in this light, other "innocent" statements of Jung become charged with ominous meaning. He saw it as a mission of German psychologists, himself included, to create a psychology truly descriptive of the Germanic psyche, and not mindlessly accept Freud, psychoanalysis, and, by implication, the Jew, who "degrades everything to the level of a 'dirty joke' psychology" (Jung, 1934b, p. 168). He wrote of the pleasure principle: "It almost looks as if man's desire and greed have been made the cardinal principle of psychology" (Jung, 1934b, p. 160). Picture, if you will, the popularized characterizations of the Jew at that time, the Jew with hands rubbing greasily together, small, leering, greedy, dirty, and clever. Jung spoke of Freud's characterization of sex as "low-down" (Jung, 1934b, p. 167), and by inference that sex, to the Jew, but not the German, was obscene.

With this view in mind, it is interesting to note the following remark also appearing in the same essay:

> The Jews have this peculiarity in common with women; being physically weaker, they have to aim at the chinks in the aromour of their adversary, and thanks to this technique which has been forced on them through the centuries, the Jews themselves are best protected where others are most vulnerable. (Jung, 1934b, p. 165)

Mein Kampf portrays Jews as clever, capable of any charade, of assuming any mask in order to exploit the weak points of other human beings for the ultimate purpose of conquering them. They were the middle-men, never the tillers of earth, and it is they who have poisoned the German mind so that the Germans lost the respect they once had for manual labor (Hitler, p. 318).

The assumption of a specific racial type for Jews was perhaps *ipso facto* anti-semitism, especially since Jung's Jewish typology corresponded so well with the general stereotype: urban, rootless, sexual, materialistic. Jung's distaste for large cities, his neo-primitivism, vexed him when confronted with the modernity of the Jew. And by rejecting any Enlightenment view of humanity in favour of the German *Volksgeist,* Jung logically prepared himself for racial distinctions that eventually led to anti-semitism (Kren, George. Personal Correspondence, 1978).

Who were these Jews about whom so much was written and over whom there was so much agitation? What was their relationship to the German people as a whole? According to Abram Leon, the economic catastrophe of 1929 threw the working masses into terrible confusion.

> The petty bourgeois regarded his Jewish competitor with growing hostility, for the latter's professional cleverness, the result of centuries of practice, often enabled him to survive 'hard times'

more easily. (Leon, p. 234).

Anti-semitism, although not brought about by Big Business, had been played upon as a diversionary tactic by capitalistic forces since the 1880's so as not to become itself the deserved focus of mass hatred. In this sense, anti-semitism was an important component of fascist ideology.

The real meaning of anti-semitism was of course hidden from even the brightest people of those times, such as Jung, who had available to him all the resources of western civilization, philosophy, science, and religion. Neither was he consciously aware of the real impact of his racial theories on the German intelligensia, nor how closely his descriptive remarks coincided with the vulgarisms of Hitler and others. At one level, Jung stands as an indictment of a total civilization whose falsely assumed norms, thought to be rooted into the very core of civilization, turned out to be inadequate and a failure. Jung's scientizing, psychologizing, and theorizing, without reference to the actual social reality at hand, led him (and so many other "well-intentioned" intellectuals) into this trap. The economic reality, the class orientation, the obfuscation of social morality, and the denial of its concomitant internalizations, all these factors remained obscure to Jung, and are, as well, components of the failure of western civilization to come to grips with the practical meaning of fascism.

What were then Jung's internalizations *vis a vis* the Jew? Here it is possible to trace a certain dislike for Jews, one which he never admitted to. It is also possible to trace some of the socio-historical and intellectual components which acted as vehicles for the negative attitude toward Jews and through which social attitudes were formed.

In responses to criticism of his racial psychology in 1934, Jung stated: "Can it really be maintained that I alone among psychologists have a special organ of knowledge with a subjective bias, whereas the Jew is apparently insulted to the core if one assumes him to be a Jew?" (Jung, 1934a, pp. 540-1). To have even raised the issue of differences between Aryan and Jewish psychology in the Germanic speaking countries would naturally have aroused the ire of those whose lives were so dreadfully altered by the onrush of anti-semitism. Jung's remark must be cast within the pernicious social context in which it was experssed.

Jung's first known intimate contact with Jews on a non doctor-patient relationship was when he met Freud and the early circle of psychoanalysts circa 1907. He of course picked up on the "Jewish paranoia" from this group of minority people who were attempting to promulgate an unfashionable and as yet unproven theory (childhood sexuality) upon a Puritan population. Franz Wittels told the story of how Freud justified the choice of Jung above his other adherents for presidency of the Psychoanalytic Association:

> "Most of you are Jews, and therefore you are incompetent to win friends for the new teaching. Jews must be content with the modest role of preparing the ground. It is absolutely essential that I should form these ties in the world of general science. I am getting on in years, and weary of being perpetually attacked. We are all in danger." Seizing his coat by the lapels, he said, "They won't even leave me a coat to my back. The Swiss will save us--will save me, and all of you as well." (Wittels, p. 140).

Perhaps Jung, sensing himself an outsider, even felt somewhat used. But certainly he could not identify with the tremendous pressure that Freud and his small group of Jewish colleagues were under. Jung himself had an insulated Puritan upbringing in an increasingly anti-semitic Europe. Had he come to Vienna with a modest antipathy toward Jews, it would not have been surprising. Freud certainly thought so, although he never wrote about it until after his split with Jung: "...he seemed ready to enter into a friendly relationship with me and for my sake to give up certain racial prejudices which he had previously permitted himself" (Freud, p. 43).

Jung's relationships with the other members of the early circle was not intimate. Theodore Reik, as an old man, remembered that he and others felt the impress of Jung's dislike for Jews. He used the word "prejudice". In this respect, he also remarked that Jung was:

> too goyish...Oh, he taked too loud and was very decisive, authoritative. He was blond and tall...I think he (Freud) was attracted to him originally because Freud was small, you know, and Jewish-looking, don't forget. (Freeman, p. 50).

Jung was Freud's heir-apparent and this caused dissension and perhaps a certain jealousy amongst the others (Wittels, p. 177). Wittels described him thus:

> He was tall and upright of figure, like a young Sigfried. He had a bullet head with closely-cropped hair, was clean-shaven, and wore gold-rimmed spectacles. My feeling about Sigfrieds is like Hegel's Hagen--they smack too much of the dragon! (Wittels, p. 177).

Neither did Jung like the other members of the early circle. In a letter to Freud concerning Adler and Stekel's defection from psychoanalysis, he spoke of "Adler-Stekel and the whole insolent gang now throwing their weight about in Vienna" (McGuire, pp. 534-5). He was talking about lower-class rabble-rousers. Adler, unlike Jung, came from a working-class district.

Ernest Jones related an interesting sidelight to the proceedings of the 1913 Congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association when it was suggested that those who were against Jung's continuance as president, rather than vote against him, should abstain. Jung, observing that Jones was one of the dissidents, came up to him and said: "I thought you were a Christian" (Jones, p. 15). Jones remarked that "It sounded like an irrelevant remark, but presumably, it had some meaning".

Rather than continue to recite a litany of reports and opinions about Jung and his relation with members of the early circle, one must, at the very least, consider the above evidence seriously. To reduce their judgements of prejudice towards Jews to mere "Jewish paranoia" would be just another form of psychological reductionism. The men who made these statements were perceptive and intelligent human beings who had a great deal of ability to see beyond their own narrow Jewish upbringings. On the other hand, given Jung's own religious upbringing, antipathy towards Jews would not be unnatural. The real question may lie, in fact, in how far Jung was able to go to become aware of these feelings, and what he did about them. All of us, Jung included, have been indoctrinated as children. For this there is no shame. What we do with these "givens" as we develop is of utmost importance. In Jung's case, we are on the trail of analyzing how and why he took his position *vis a vis* racial psychology much later in his life and for this it has been significant to establish his early antipathy towards Jews, a mutual hostility between himself and other members of the early circle, and a not altogether unjustifiable distrust for the motives of his early colleagues in Vienna.

Before proceeding (by way of defense of Jung) to his many positive relations with Jews, and focusing once again on the events of the 1930's, one more psychological factor needs to be established: Freud's personal mastery over his ambitious but youthful colleague. As Wittels pointed out, Freud did not leave much room for independent minded disciples (Wittels, p. 180). In December of 1912, when relations between Jung and Freud had already cooled considerably an interesting exchange of letters took place. Freud had commented on the superficial similarity of Jung's conception of the incest complex with that of Adler. Others had also commented on this, said Ernest Jones. Jung found it a "bitter pill" to be compared with Adler. Jung responded by writing to Freud that "not even Adler's companions think that I belong to your group" (Jones, pp. 166-7). Freud's response by letter followed:

> The habit of taking objective statements personally is not only a (regressive) human trait, but also a very specific Viennese failing. I shall be very glad if such claims are not made on you. But are you "objective" enough to consider the following slip without anger?
>
> Even Adler's cronies do not regard me as one of *yours*. (McGuire, p. 534).

Jung meant "their group", an understandable enough error in German predicated on the substitution of the capital letter for the small one (Jones, pp. 1676-7). Jung replied thus:

> ...I admit my ambivalence of feelings towards you, but am inclined to take an honest and absolutely straight-forward view of the situation...I would, however, point out that your technique of treating your pupils like patients is a *blunder*. In that way you produce either slavish sons or impudent puppies...I am objective enough to see through your little trick (Truc). You go around sniffing out all the symptomatic actions in your vicinity, thus reducing everyone to the level of sons and daughters who blushingly admit the existence of their faults. Meanwhile you remain on top as the father sitting pretty...I am not the least neurotic--touch wood! (McGuire,

pp. 534-5).

Jung was on the defensive, his tone infuriated and self-righteous, with just a hint of humor in his remark "touch wood". Freud, the father-figure whom Jung had not yet mastered, got under his skin. Perhaps it was in reference to incidents like these that Jung later wrote about the unerring capacity for Jews to find the "chinks in the armour of their adversary".

The two famous fainting incidents of Freud's in connection with Jung, as retold by Ernest Becker, show an interesting facet of Jung's character (Becker, pp. 109-15). The first fainting incident occurred in 1909, just after Freud had convinced the fanatically abstinent Jung to drink some wine. The second incident happened in 1912, just after Freud had once again convinced Jung of something, this time to "come back into the fold" of psychoanalysis. Jung contritely agreed to reform. In both cases, Freud won a kind of personal victory over Jung. Yet, in Jung's retelling of these incidents in his autobiography, he never mentioned those facts, a curious omission for such a perspicacious man.

When a person, defeated in battle, does not have the opportunity to redeem him or herself, it is not abnormal to look for a means of revenge. Jung's essays in the 1930's could well have been his means of avenging his old wounds at the hands of Freud, and Jews, with whom Freud was linked. By keeping his revenge at an "intellectual" level, Jung therefore did not have to face the fact of what he was doing; if he had, he would also have had to feel a concomitant shame for not living up to his own self-image.

Jung's defenders have quite rightly argued that Jung had many Jewish friends. His most famous student, Erich Neumann, was a resident of Tel Aviv. Jung and Neumann carried on correspondence for years (Jung, 1973. See correspondence 1934-49). Another of his students, Hugo Rosenthal, wrote an essay entitled *The Contrast of Types in Jewish Religious History* which first appeared in the book, *Wirklichkeit der Seele* in 1934. Jung himself contributed several essays to the volume. An interesting sidelight to this matter is that in later editions, Rosenthal's essay appears under the name "Joshua Jashuvi", an apparent Hebraization reminding one of the kind of going back to one's roots that Jung himself always advocated (Jung, 1973, pp. 162-3, 164-5).

Aniela Jaffe, longtime student, collaborator, and biographer of Jung, was herself a Jewish refugee from Nazi Europe (van der Post, p. 196). Gerhard Adler, analytical psychologist and co-editor of the *Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, was a German Jew who emigrated to England in 1936 (Jung, 1973, p. 93).

Jolan Jacobi, another student of Jung and author on his psychology, was lecturing at the New School for Social Research in 1954 when a critic of Jung, Albert Parelhoff, asked why Jung's anti-semitic *Reply to Dr. Bally* was published and listed as one of his achievements. Dr. Jacobi, taken aback, then called the meeting to order and replied: "I am a Jewess and my husband is a Jew. Does anyone here believe that I would defend Dr. Jung if he were anti-semitic?" (Brome, p. 150).

Jung's allies are loyal, sincere, and intelligent - their arguments compelling. However, a conflictedness in Jung's personality towards Jews is nonetheless detectable and that is why the essential truths of the matter have been so difficult to comprehend. During the years before World War II, it was said that Jung helped any Jewish refugee he could. When the Germans invaded Austria, Franz Riklin Jr. was sent by some exceedingly rich Swiss Jews to go there and persuade some of the leading Jews to leave the country, one of them being Freud. Riklin's father had at one time been associated with Freud. It is recounted that Freud treated the young Riklin very affably but would, to no avail, "accept favors from his enemies" (Hannah, pp. 254-5). Now who were his enemies?--certainly not the rich Jews who had financed the trip and promised asylum to the refugees, nor the young Riklin, whom Freud had asked to dine. There has never been a recounting of any serious feud with the elder Riklin. This could leave only

Jung, with whom he associated Riklin, and who also had something to do with the preparations for the trip. Freud's life was at stake--was it hardheaded vanity which prevented him from accepting help, even from his former pupil and colleague, Carl Jung? When he finally did go to England with persuasion from Ernest Jones, it may well be that he owed his fine living quarters to a Jungian psychologist, Dr. E. A. Bennet (Hannah, p. 255). He accepted this help. Why didn't he accept help from the young Riklin? The matter is very evident. Freud, old and sick as he was, kept track of the recent literature in the field of psychology. He must have been aware of Jung's writings on racial differences during the crucial years of the Nazi takeover and of the effect it would have, at least in academic circles. He saw the hidden anti-semitism in the youthful Jung during the days of early courtship. Iron-willed, he refused.

The above vignette serves as a fair example of the kind of conflicting energy which Carl Jung manifested about Jews. On the one hand, he wrote drafts which served Nazi propaganda during the pre-war years--on the other hand, he proferred aid to his old master with whom he had disputed so many years before.

In Jung's essay on *The State of Psychotherapy Today*, he continually criticized Freud and his Judaicizing of psychology:

> In my opinion it has been a grave error in medical psychology up till now to apply Jewish categories which are not even binding on all Jews--indiscriminatly to Germanic and Slavic Christendom. Because of this most precious secret of the Germanic peoples--their creative and intuitive depth of soul--has been explained as a morass of banal infantilism, while my own warning voice has for decades been suspected of anti-semitism. This suspicion emanated from Freud. He did not understand the Germanic psyche any more than did his Germanic followers. (Jung, 1934b, p. 166).

And yet, in the same year (1934) he had this to say about Freud in a lecture delivered in both Switzerland and Germany:

> That is why Freud became the real discoverer of the unconscious in psychology, because he examined those dark places and did not simply dismiss them, with a disparaging euphemism, as "parapraxes"....
>
> It will no doubt be remembered what a storm of indignation was unleashed on all sides when Freud's works became generally known. This violent reaction of public complexes drove Freud into isolation which has brought the charge of dogmatism upon him and

> his school. All psychological theoreticians in this field run the same risk, for they are playing with something that directly affects all that is uncontrolled in man.... (Jung, 1948, p. 101).

What kind of a quirk could it have been in Jung's mentality that he could have spoken so demeaningly about Freud in one essay, and yet with such compassion, honor, and ceremony in another, both in the same year? It seems that Jung could personally respect people who were Jews but often not insofar as he thought they symbolized the aggregate (the Jewish race). This kind of split happens only when human beings do not have a sufficiently broad self-understanding, when they do not comprehend, at the level of praxis, their active role in the larger (world) community. This attitude was particularly fostered in pre-World War II Europe and North America when the forces of nationalistic capitalism were preparing to meet head-on. Abstracted intellectualism, psychological reductionism, and anti-semitism, were all components of this split world-view, combining to paralyze the individual's ability to logically carry out his/her highest ideals in the social realm. What's more, as in Jung's case, the very lack of awareness of this split either paralyzed the individual or lead him/her to improper action.

In Jung's retort to Dr. Bally, he clearly showed the hiatus between his own ideals and actions:

> But my public will object, why raise the Jewish problem today of all days and in Germany of all places? Pardon me, I raised it long ago, as anybody knows who is acquainted with the literature...This has nothing to do with the form of the German state. If I am to be exploited for political ends, there's nothing I can do to stop it. Or can anyone stop anything he pleases in Germany?...But an event of this kind although regrettable in itself, often has the consequence of ventilating problems which would otherwise be sedulously avoided. (Jung, 1934a, p. 543).

Nonetheless, he could have stopped writing on the subject; he didn't. He could have stopped after Dr. Bally's article appeared in a Swiss newspaper, for by that time he was warned about the possible consequences of his actions. He didn't; several months later his essay on *The State of Psychotherapy Today*, so hostile to Freud, psychoanalysis, and "Jewish psychology", came out in print.[9] Once having been made aware of the possible consequences of this kind of psychological thinking, why did he insist on furthering it?

For Jung, as with most scientists of his time, science had its own value, the social consequences of which he took no responsibility for. Nonetheless, Jung wrote that the airing of views about racial psychology could have a purging effect. But rather than purgation or catharsis, his writings became part of a larger scientific paradigm used ultimately to desensitize people to the obliteration of Jews and other "different" people. Jung's high-flown speech, the vapid "pardon me", this cannot be condoned in light of the desperate seriousness of the social reality of those times.

His was a scientific mentality not prepared to touch the ground of *Real-Politik*. Yet his intellectual aloofness, his inability to relate his theoretical formulations with the practical consequences which necessarily flowed from them, his abdication of social commitment and responsibility, was all implicit in the general nature of western education.

In 1909, Jung spoke of the Mosaic law as being too harsh, giving rise to the "compulsive ceremonial of the neurotic" (Jung, 1949, p. 320). In an addition to the footnote probably added in 1927, he said:[10]

> Only the prophets were able to free themselves from it: for them the identification with Jehovah, complete sublimation, was successful. They became the fathers of the people. Christ, the fulfiller of their prophecies, put an end to this fear of God and taught mankind that the true relation to the Deity is love.

Jung had been on the trail of a cultural psychology for a long time; one hears the voice of a modern Christian prophet obliquely upbraiding the Jews for not accepting the Christ! At this stage he showed his lack of knowledge of Jewish history for otherwise he would have been aware of the famous split in Jewish philosophy between Hillel, who spoke of the essence of Judaism as being simplicity and love, versus Shammai, advocate of legalism. Much later the Chassidim rebelled from the established order and advocated a more simple Judaism based on man's loving and mystical relationship with God. Jung, unaware, at that time, of the ebb and flow of Jewish thought, appropriated love as exclusively Christian.

The Jew as Christ denier (and Christ killer!) was part of the cultural compulsive put out by the churches and shared by Jung with most people of his generation. With his Christian upbringing, Jung most probably internalized this cultural baggage as a child.

Moreover, his early ignorance of the Jewish component of western culture, not an uncommon phenomenon, allowed him to identify almost exclusively with the Germanic and Christian roots of civilization. It is for this reason that Jung was able to argue for a Germanic psychology; he simply did not recognize the very real Jewish influence on western thought, and how it intertwined with the Germanic and Christian.[11]

Just as he posited a singular Jewish tradition, not recognizing the plurality of historical influences brought about by migration and industrialization, etc., neither did he comprehend the plurality of the Germanic. His archetype, Wotan, the "god of storm and frenzy...unleasher of passions...lust of battle...superlative magician and artist of illusion...versed in all secrets of an occult nature" was also severely limited. This identification of the Germanic could not have taken place in the eighteenth century. It is a post-nationalistic definition of what it means to be German, for prior to that time there was no possible unified conception of what is signified to be German. In this sense, Jungian archetypes lack historicity. In Jung's hands, the archetypes are of a very static nature, for this was the model of science within which he worked and was educated.

Because Jung had a more or less static conception of science, he was forced to justify a particular political mode (the National Socialistic) by giving it credence by embeddedness throughout all historical changes. He had little awareness of causation at the social level of reality, but primarily at the internal, personalistic. By not understanding the dialectic of human nature between internal and social forces, he was forced into positing an unchanging archetypical essence ever-flowing beneath the outward manifestations of particular cultures.

Jung's racial psychology was hampered by both a lack of understanding of the plurality and interconnections of ethnicity, as well as the dialectics of change throughout history. This closed world-view characterizes the limitations of Jung's conception of cultural archetypes (Jung, 1936, p. 182). In his defense, it must be added that such a closed system characterized most of the social scientific thinking of his time. It remains to be seen if the post-Jungian scholars will expand on Jung's limitations in this respect.[12]

Unfortunately, Jung's limitations and ambivalencies about Jews and Hebrew archetype were projected onto a Germany all too eager to hear and believe! One's conception of cultural archetypes must be filtered through the personal unconscious. It is only to the degree that scientific understanding allows, as well as how well personal prejudices are clarified (the degree that a person can come to terms with his/her own unworked-through matter) that the archetypes can be accurately visualized and articulated. All else becomes deformed projection.

E. Towards an Integrated Social Science

Jung, ambivalent about personal power and how to use it, ambivalent about his ill-feelings towards Jews, influenced by an insulated and rigid Swiss upbringing, by sour experiences around the early Freudian circle, where he had his first intimate relationship with Jews on an equality basis, in particular by his hostile dispute with Freud, was to some extent caught up in the raging myth of Aryan superiority, a movement he partially identified with. He was not only a mirror of those myths, but played a part in creating them.

Had Jung been less loyal to the scientific model which he himself envisioned, an ideal of science as apart from politics and society in general, a science which was only tangentially affected by the rude incursions of social forces; had his conception of what a viable science was been different, then no doubt his own sensibilities would have been more acute and he might not have undertaken the path he did in the 1930's. Although Jung's model of the scientific enterprise was anti-establishment in notable aspects, he did not differ from it in his conception of science as apart from political events and society in general. By refusing social commitment he also erected a plausible defense against the insights which a more Freudian or Adlerian view would have given him, including his own anti-semitism.

Today, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki and other atrocities of World War II, atrocities made possible through scientific advancement, we scientists have no excuse for setting our enterprise apart from the world. Nonetheless, even now most scientists do not consider this relationship in their day-to-day work. As we note the increasing evidence of destruction to which scientific work is put in military arms effort, pollution, the psychological detriment to our lives, we must confront ourselves and question what the net effect of our discoveries and theories will be on humankind. We cannot any longer release ourselves from responsibility for the uses to which our creations are put, as did Jung, and most others, following the split between ethics on the one hand and good science on the other according to the best available tradition of positivistic science.

We can perhaps better understand the alchemists of the Medieval Age whose conception of knowledge included the ethical. Power was passed down from initiate to initiate in a personal manner. A person could have read the occult works without understanding the riddles unless he/she had been given the key. But the key was expressly *not* written down. Power was given only to those who had the wisdom to use it justly (Taylor, p. 104). We can hardly return to those times, science having become the public endeavor it now is, but we can begin to concern ourselves with an integrated conception of our undertakings, a concern for the net effect of our discoveries on humankind, for whom, presumably, we wish our endeavors to be of benefit.

What would an integrated social science concern itself with: certainly ethics, an inquiry into the relationship of the scientific endeavor and society-at-large? It would require self-reflection and a questioning of one's own private motives as to the underlying purposes of a particular aspect of research and concomitant publication. It might even mean holding the results of one's research in abeyance until a more propitious time for reception. Such a decision would not be an easy one and would certainly go against the grain of positivistic science which isolates the purely technical aspects of science from its social import. Having been educated and conditioned in this mode, a person would have to do psychological battle to break out of it.

A more integrated scientific paradigm would require a recognition and analysis of the relation of scientific thought to the political and economic determinants of society. Once having recognized these determinants, a scientist would have to do the necessary work of re-evaluating previous scientific endeavors to understand how, implicitly, they have added to the destruction of life on this planet. What was the real relation, for instance, between the science as practised in Germany in the 'twenties and 'thirties and the Holocaust in which six million Jews and others were destroyed by every imaginable means possible? To pretend that there was no relation is either a lie, deception, or self-mystification. The social scientist, as well as writer, must see through these mystifications and explain them for what they are. Otherwise, the scientist continues to have a hand in perpetuating every new form of horror.

An acknowledgement of the relationship of social and political forces on the enterprise of science is not enough. One must do something about it. Hard and necessary questions must be grappled with once the scientist decides to become an integrated and responsible human being:

1. "Who, and what segment of society, will benefit from a particular segment of research?"
2. "In whose employ is the scientist working?"
3. "What kind of research would be most relevant in influencing the

evolvement of a more democratic and humane society--and what would aid its negation?"

What steps a scientist would then take, in practical terms, is most difficult to proscribe and would certainly depend on the social context. Sabotage, from within, might be the only weapon available under certain situations. On the other hand, such a stance in the case of an eminent person who appears to the public to be doing the work of the establishment, while sabotaging it all the while, could very well be doing more harm than good. By appearing to play the part of the establishment, a well known scientist might be adding respectability to the very cause he or she secretly rejects. Jung had other alternatives.

An integrated scientific paradigm would have to comprehend the dialectical nature of action within a socio-historical context. Human beings must be regarded as creatures potentially capable of taking control of their own lives, intending their own culture, and not remain mere passive receptors of tradition and socio-economic determinants. Science as education would then abet people in learning how to master their own lives, not to be mastered. Such a way of thinking would radically alter the way we do science at present and even what is called "science".

It would also require of the scientist a broad understanding of the development of civilization. He or she would be a literate person. And yet this prescription is not enough, for the mind balks at the thought of concentration camp executioners who marvelled at Mozart at night while murdering Jews by day. And yet this was the case, and pure literacy, accomplishment in the arts even, did not necessarily prevent people from committing the vulgarest infamies. At the very least, our educational systems which pose, as an ideal, the liberal arts, must be re-evaluated. Although this new scientific and educational paradigm has yet to be implemented, it must come about. Neither was such an ideal for a new science generally understood in Carl Jung's time. Although we cannot totally blame Jung for his ignorance, neither can we condone those actions which, in a minor way, added to the tragedy of Europe and western civilization.

F. Footnotes

1 McGuire and Hull; "On the Attack in the Saturday Review of Literature", interviewed by Carol Baumann and published as a mimeographed private publication Dec. 1949 in the Bulletin of the Analytical Psychology Club of New York.

2 See Cocks, G. for an extensive and more sympathetic commentary on the nature of the *Supranational* General Medical Society for Psychotherapy; also Kirsh, J., pp. 119 – 20.

3 Karrier, p. 347. Quotes from Jung 1918, p. 14. (Karrier's italics added for emphasis).

4 Karrier, p. 347. Quotes from Jung 1945, p. 196. (Karrier's italics added for emphasis).

5 "Dachau (as against the extermination camps) was well known in Germany and never any secret. There was even a popular joke about it: Lieber Herrgott mach mie dumm, dass ich nicht nach Dachau kumm." Quoted in full from personal correspondence, George Kren, Department of History, Kansas State University, 1978. (Translation of the German into English would be approximately as follows: Dear God, please make me dumb, so that I, to Dachau, will not come!)

6 This did not prevent the American Military Court from giving William Calley a remarkably light sentence for his part in the disgraceful episode of My Lai during the Vietnam conflict.

7 Personal correspondence with Dr. Leon Rappoport, December 1978;

Department of Psychology, Kansas State University, Manhattanville, Kansas, U.S.A.

8 Translated by myself from the original: Der Typengegensatz in der judische Religionsgeschicte.

9 Dr. G. Bally's article was printed in the Neue Zurcher Zeitung on 27 February, 1934, "Deutschstammige Psychologie? and Jung's response, "A Rejoinder to Dr. Bally" in the same newspaper under "Zeitgenossisches" several weeks later on the March 13 and 14. The essay "The State of Psychotherapy Today" was first published in the *Zentralblatt fur Psychotherapie*, Vol. 7, 1934. The *Zentralblatt* was published, at the very least, after May 15 of that year, since Meier and Jung signed their names under the "Notes for the Business Meeting of the Society" as of that date.

10 The addition to the footnote may have been added as late as 1949. It is not clear from the text.

11 The concept of dynamic evolution of culture and the plurality of influences of various ethnic roots has been garnered through personal communications and class lectures of Dr. Harry Garfinkle, 1975-78, Department of Educational Foundations, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. Specific criticisms on how to integrate these concepts within the framework of the present paper were received via personal communication, November, 1978.

12 It seems rather doubtful that post-Jungians have either taken up the challenge or have even recognized it as significant. When the editor of the Journal of Analytical Psychology turned down the present paper for publication she remarked: "However often the written evidence is sifted and resifted, ultimately the kind of analysis you have written can only

satisfactorily be done in a living and spoken analysis of Jung by another analyst." (Quoted from a letter written by Judith Hubback, editor of the Journal of Analytical Psychology, to the present author, dated 28 February, 1979.) In other words, since Jung is dead, there is no further possibility of analyzing and understanding his actions, thereby revoking any possibility of psycho-historical investigation. Jung himself, who wrote on the physician Paracelsus, would have found this statement reactionary. Furthermore, according to Hubback, if there were any point in doing this kind of analysis it would be better left to an analyst, not to amateurs who lack the psychological sophistication to do this kind of work. The implication here is, it would be better left to those who are trained and educated in reducing all social phenomena to its psychological foundation, thereby invalidating social criticism, which is one of the significant criticisms of Jungian analysis and credo in the first place!

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IV. Alfred Adler: The Decline and Meaning of Socialism in His Work and Life

A. Introduction

It is often contended that Alfred Adler was a socialist, and that his works were extremely influenced by socialist doctrine. Generally speaking, this point of view is uninformed because it does not take into account the changing aspects of Adler's social thought from the period when he wrote his first major published treatise in 1898 until his death in 1937, a period including the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the rise of Hitler, and the Great Depression. The influence which Adler's form of socialist thinking exerted on his works and practice has been described with some success, but in each case it lacks either detailed thought or critical analysis. Finally (with one exception) none of his biographers have made an authentic attempt to understand and recognize the influence of socialism on Adler within a systematic psycho-historical context. However, the advantage of conducting such an investigation resides in permitting one to consider the subject with both critical understanding and compassion.

B. Adler's Reputation as a Socialist

Carl Furtmuller, a close friend of Adler and an acknowledged socialist, wrote a biographical essay on Adler's life which appeared in a book edited by two of the most prestigious and established post-Adlerians of modern times, Heinz and Rowena Ansbacher (Ansbacher and Ansbacher). In the editor's introduction, one learns that Adler was a member "of the Social-Democratic party (of Vienna) until the 1920's, when it gradually lost importance for him". He also held a minor political office after World War I when the social-democratic party had power, but only for a short while. The Ansbachers go on to write that evidence supporting this view of Adler can be seen from his various contributions to "socialist periodicals and newspapers...in his use of Marxist terms, and in his interest in Marxism, and in some outright statements (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, p.313).

Manes Sperber, another lifelong socialist, and former intimate of Adler, wrote that several years before publication of Adler's first book entitled *Medical Handbook for the Tailoring Trade* (1898) "Adler had joined the League of Socialist Students and had rapidly become one of its most prominent members". Sperber also noted that Adler's early reading material included works by Marx, Marx and Engels, as well as numerous successors (Sperber, pp. 17-8).

During his period of association with Freud, Adler was known as a socialist . Wilhelm Stekel stated that "Adler at this time was a fanatical socialist and all his followers (when Adler separated from Freud) were partisans" (Stekel, p. 141). Stekel was present at one of the scientific meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society when Adler presented a paper entitled "On the Psychology of Marxism" in which he attempted to link the common ground between psychoanalysis and Marxism (Nunberg and Federn, 1967, pp. 172-8). The notes of his presentation, as jotted down by society secretary Otto Rank, are quite abbreviated due to the fact that Adler was supposed to have published the discourse at a later date (Nunberg and Federn, 1967, p. 172). Neither of the two Adlerian bibliographies list this as a publication however, and in all probability Adler never succeeded in putting his lecture material into publishable form (Ansbacher and Ansbacher; Mosak and Mosak). One reason for this may have been lack of encouragement from other members of the society . Although his talk was not received unsympathetically, there seemed to be an evident lack of interest in the subject of politics. Ernst Federn, who was present at the meeting, remarked in a footnote: "At this time Adler was the only member of the Austrian Social Democratic Party." (Nunberg and Federn, 1967, p. 172).

Raissa Adler, Alfred's wife, and a Russian immigrant, was obviously sympathetic to the revolutionary goals of the Russian revolution (Sperber, p. 214; Bottome, p. 28). In the years before the Revolution, many exiles--some of whom would become future Russian leaders--frequented the Adler's house in Vienna (Sperber, p. 214). A. A. Joffe, a close associate of Leon Trotsky and future ambassador of Russia to Japan, was, along with his wife, a good friend of the Adlers (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, p. 315). It is possible that Trotsky himself visited the Adler household in those days (Sperber, p. 214). Kurt Adler, Alfred and Raissa's only son, stated that both his parents "were socialists and anti-monarchists from way back" (Adler, K., p. 200).

Adler's reputation as a socialist has been used as a means to discredit him and his psychological theories. For instance, Nunberg and Federn, in their brief biographical notes on the members of the Psychological Wednesday Evening Society during the period when Adler was associated with Freud, stated: "Adler was a socialist and a member of the Austrian Social Democratic Party; in later life, his scientific views became greatly influenced by his political beliefs" (Nunberg and Federn, 1962, p. xxxiii). The Ansbachers rightly considered such remarks dangerous to the growth of individual psychology and responded sharply, for they did not wish to see Adler's efforts dismissed due to its alleged political contamination. They made an attempt to show how well integrated were Adler's political and psychological beliefs, both springing from the same desire to render a more hospitable future for all humankind (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, pp. 317-319).

On the other hand, Adler was sometimes discredited because he was not sufficiently dogmatic in his socialist views. Vincent Brome, drawing on Phyllis Bottome's official biography of Adler, recorded the following occasion on Adler's return, after having completed his tour of duty as military doctor, to Vienna. He (Adler) went back to the "old Cafe Central to find some of the original Individual Psychology group dead, some far away in other lands and a mere remnant still waiting to hang on his words."

> ...Now, at these meetings at the Cafe Central, another storm within a storm blew up to reveal volcanic troubles disturbing the Adlerians no less than the Freudians. When one of their number asked what the world needed today, Adler answered: 'It seems to

> me that what the world chiefly wants today is *Gemeinschaftsgefuhl.'* From the height of his wisdom and intelligence, from the depth of his experience and imagination, Adler, the great Individual Psychologist, had decided that what the world wanted was goodwill. No wonder that the hard-bitten journalists, the finicky intellectuals, the positivist scientists, sitting around him in the Cafe Central, looked at him with some bewilderment. Was this the great message he brought back from the turmoil of war? (Brome, p. 214)

Such a utopian outlook must have appeared as a shock to would-be socialist revolutionaries as well, for certainly there could be no goodwill between members of differing economic classes, who, after all, were staunch enemies. Adler had said nothing about class consciousness, vested interests, nor economic power within the rising industrial society.

A decade later, Adler accused his "Marxist followers of provoking the ire of the rightists and the Nazis" (Sperber, p. 223). Alice and Otto Ruhle, two of the banished Marxists, were defended by Manes Sperber (also banished) for the Ruhles had achieved prominence before they had become associated with individual psychology. Surely Adler had long been aware of their socialist positions yet chose to throw them out of his circle when it became inconvenient to keep them around. The specific occasion for their banishment came as a result of the publishing of a book in 1927 by Alice Ruhle entitled *Der Weg zum Wir* (untranslated; "The Path to We") which attempted to bind together individual psychology and Marxism. Phyllis Bottome, in defending Adler's actions, remarked that Adler felt that such a publication was more than a little inauspicious, against common sense, and injurious to the future of individual psychology (Bottome, pp. 176-7).

On the whole, there was a gradual and conscious intent on Adler's part during the latter portion of his life to separate himself from political opinion of any kind. This could be evidenced shortly after World War I in his essay "Bolschewismus und Seelenkunde" (untranslated; "Bolschevism and Psychology") in which Adler conceded that political parties, drawing on the experience of the Russian revolution, were bound to invoke their own power to oppress people whilst justifying such actions in the name of freedom. Individual psychology, therefore, would maintain its purity by abstaining from the political arena. In this way, more people of all political presuasions could derive benefit from it. Adler wished to create a positive universal science which would remain unaffected by the vagaries of party politics and governments in power. This does not define the whole of Adler's outlook, of course, as he also perceived how governments, through legislation, could help provide beneficial opportunities for human beings.

Adler made his first trip to the United States, where he commenced lecturing in broken English at several universities and institutions (Bottome, p. 204). After that, Adler began lecturing more frequently in the English-speaking countries until, in 1934, he gave up his home in Austria and took up permanent residence in the U.S.A. From the outset, he sensed that both the future of humanity, and his own system of individual psychology, lay in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Bottome, pp. 205-6). During this period of his professional career, his interest in socialism diminished almost entirely.

Also during the same period, Adler created the final cornerstone of individual psychology, the concept of *Gemeinschaftsgeful*, or social interest. It would be instructive, in order to see just how far Adler had drifted from a socialist perspective, to comprehend just what Adler meant by the concept of social interest: "The oldest striving of mankind is for men to join with their fellow men. It is through interest in our fellow men that all the progress of our race has been made" (Adler, A., 1931b, p. 252). In other words, social interest implies cooperation with others as well as the desire to contribute towards their betterment:

> In politics we know that the best means can be abused; but nobody could accomplish anything by politics if he did not create co-operation. Every politician must have as his final goal the improvement of mankind; and the improvement of mankind means always a higher degree of co-operation. Often we are not very well equipped for judging which politician or which political party can really lead towards improvement. Each individual judges according with his own style of life. But if a political party creates fellow men in its own circle, we have no cause to resent the acitivity...Class movement, also, is group movement and co-operation, and, if the goal is the improvement of mankind, we should avoid prejudice. So all movements should be judged only in accordance with their ability to further interest in our fellow men and we shall find that there are many ways to help in

> increasing co-operation. Perhaps there are better and worse ways; but, if the goal of co-operation is granted, it is useless to attack one method because it may not be the best. (Adler, A., pp. 253-4).

Of course, this piece was written before the full rise to power of the nazis, with their *Bruderschaft* (brotherly love) and Hitler youth corps. But his later writings on the topic reflect no major changes, so one is left with a rather ill-defined, open, and relativistic definition of what social interest could mean. He was specific in so far as he maintained that social interest expressed itself in three human activities: friendship, work, and marriage. He also expressed the idea that social interest was as natural to the human being as any biological drive (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, p. 25). Nonetheless, the terms "co-operation" and "interest" are either too vague or insufficient, and furthermore, he never gave a meaningful definition of "social progress" in so far as the human community is involved. It is certainly not a socialist doctrine, at least in the non-class-conscious form in which Adler has rendered it. Actually, it could be made to serve the interests of many different political systems, including those opposed to socialism.

It was likely Adler's intent that he would create a universal psychology based on the notion of social interest which would be acceptable to the capitalist world of North America. With this in mind, it was necessary for him to rid individual psychology of hardcore socialists who would otherwise sully his system with a disreputable politic. Having succeeded, he was henceforth able to erase the socialist aura from individual psychology and make it palatable to the Anglo-Saxon mind.

With respect to Adler's successors, on reading articles by post-Adlerians such as those contained in the book *Essays in Individual Psychology* (1959) dedicated to Raissa Adler on her eighty-fifth birthday, one would be hard put not only to find anything approaching a Marxist critique of society, but even a critique of society at all. The closest essay to be found in this vein was written by Alfred Farau, entitled "The Challenge of Social Feeling", in which the following statements can be found: "More children die every year at the hands of careless drivers than from all the childhood diseases combined, not because of the lack of scientific knowledge in automobile production but of the demonstrated lack of social feeling in the drivers (Adler and Deutsch, p. 10). He also stated: "At the risk of appearing naive, I dare say that if enough of us had really cared about saving six million Jews, instead of letting them die in gas chambers, a way to save them *would* have been found" (Adler and Deutsch, p. 10). It is not that Farau is wrong so much as his examples lack a broader socio-political foundation within which to place them and so he is unable to identify the relationship between people's lack of feelings and the institutions which guide, educate, and inform them. And yet this article, which purports to engage in a discussion on the meaning of social interest, remains just as vague and open-ended as was Adler's discussion nearly thirty years previously.

With the foregoing in mind, one must assume that modern individual psychologists, aware that their founder was a socialist, or at least labelled as such, have succeeded in disowning this aspect of Adler. There is little in his extant translated works to suggest that he was profoundly influenced by a socialist perspective. Neither is there anything, with one recent exception, to be found in the last twenty years in the *Journal of Individual Psychology*, the official organ of Adlerian psychology in North America, which even interests itself in examining psychology from such a viewpoint.

To sum up, modern individual psychologists are unaware of the possible influence socialism has had on Adler's thought and practice. In part, this is due to the fact that his later writings were practically bereft of earlier socialist influence. Second, what there is of a socialist perspective cannot be readily found in anthologies and selections of his works, and often is not translated. Third, there was a deliberate and explicit attempt on Adler's part to rid himself of the socialist members of his circle. And finally, amongst post-Adlerians, there has been a more or less implicit understanding not to deal with the subject of socialism, nor politics in general, and so the topic has nearly been laid to rest through ignorance of its existence.

However, to gain an accurate estimate of his works, it is important to clarify the nature of his socialistic beliefs as applied to his life. In order to do this, it is necessary to identify the real nature of Adler's socialism, and even to pose the question of whether Adler was a socialist at all, and if so, in what sense.

C. The Nature of Adler's Socialism

The first of Alfred Adler's publications, *Gesundheitsbuch fur die Schneidergewerge* (untranslated; "Health Book for the Tailoring Trade") was issued in 1898. This extremely well documented thirty page pamphlet discussed the poor living and occupational conditions of Viennese tailors. These were people who took in work in their own homes or rooms on an irregular and seasonal basis, as well as those who worked in small or medium-sized shops alongside the master tailor. On reading this manuscript, one is impressed with Adler's knowledgeability of his subject, as if he were writing from firsthand experience or observation. Actually, it is a likely possibility that the young Adler gained personal insight through association with his uncle, David, who himself was a tailor (Ellenberger, p. 601). Adler wrote of the high incidence of various occupational diseases, from poor eyesight caused by required attention to detail under long working hours in dimly lit areas to the poisonous extrusions through frequent finger wounds caused by metal needles. He also included research on growth of the tailoring trade as well as statistics of reported illnesses and disease. One cannot help being impressed by this balance of scientific and medical objectivity with the genuine care and compassion with which he writes about the subjects of his study.

The total population growth in Vienna was enormous, rising from 490,000 in 1859, the first year of the modern census, to 1,675,000 in 1900. In 1902, one-third of all wage earners were employed in workshops of one to five people (Barea, pp. 332-3). "The pre-eminence of the midget enterprises, in other words, of the small tradesman, master-artisan or shopkeeper, was still overwhelming in 1902, and accounted for the political and social weight of this class in Vienna at this time" (Barea, p. 333). The clothing industry employed a huge number of these wage earners, about 125,000 in 1897, representing a 25% increase over the number employed in 1890 (Adler, A., 1898, p. 20). So the people Adler wrote about, their living conditions and occupational hazards, was a far from insignificant population. Adler had begun his writing career in the field of social medicine.

His early life provided him with the opportunity to meet the subjects of his later study firsthand. Accounts of his childhood show him living on the outskirts of Vienna, and due to his father's liberal (for those times) attitude to child rearing, young Alfred was allowed considerable personal freedom (Bottome, p. 8). No doubt Adler made many acquaintanceships with people from lower class backgrounds, typical Viennese who spoke in the Viennese dialect. Adler himself spoke German in the language of the people. A contemporary of his describes him (as an adult) thusly: "I can still picture him at the round table, his eternal Virginia (a particular sort of long, thin cigar) between his lips, talking always in the Viennese dialect..."(Wittels, p. 146). More recently, Ellenberger has shown that he also resided in the Leopoldstadt, the Jewish quarter of Vienna, from the age of seven until eleven (Ellenberger, p. 581). However, whether this latter sojourn, of which Adler never spoke, had the effect of expanding or narrowing his awareness, is a separate problem which will be taken up later.

As a doctor he first set up practice in the Czerningasse in 1897, a popular street not far from the Prater (Ellenberger, p. 583). As a general practicioner, he made further contact with members of the working class, and began to understand their problems through the studied eye of a physician. It was at this time that Adler wrote the aforementioned article, concluding that new legislation be enacted and existing regulations such as sick fund and accident insurance be reinforced. He criticized present-day academic medicine for its lack of awareness of social and occupational conditions, and pressed for a social medicine which could, through introduction of public hygiene, control various prevalent diseases especially noticeable amongst the working class (Ellenberger, p. 600).

After his first article, Adler continued to publish shorter pieces in a new medical journal entitled *Arbeiter Standeszeitung*. He stressed that medicine was a public issue about which the state must take active interest through education and public funding. His work on social medicine ended in 1904 with a book review plus his own views on hygiene and sexual life. By that time he had already become associated with Sigmund Freud and entered a new period of his career which one might characterize as a "turning inward" (Ellenberger, p. 584).

Shortly before publication of this first article on socialized medicine, Adler married Raissa Epstein, a Russian student and sympathizer with international socialism, who came to live in Vienna in 1897. He seems to have met Raissa at one of those informal gatherings of socialist students in the basements of cheap coffee houses and restaurants. Adler himself was not an active debater, but listened attentively and was especially impressed by the sociological facets of Marxist theory (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, pp. 332-4). He was described as "Politically a man of the left he was not far left enough to satisfy his wife but too far left to please powerful friends in high places. His mercurial nature could not easily accept the discipline of party membership and he once said to a friend seeking political advice: 'Don't join things'" (Brome, pp. 16-7).

Given Adler's upbringing and political sympathies, it is not unreasonable to expect that Adler, the physician, should be led towards social medicine, in which the government would hold itself responsible for creating the economic and educational conditions to enhance the unhappy situation of the poor. But beyond social medicine, what could it have meant to Adler to be a member, or sympathizer, of the social-democratic party of those times? The double suicide of Mary Vetsera and Crown Prince Rudolf in 1889 signaled the demise of liberal aspirations and hopes. Liberalism included the turning away from the Prussian alliance, with all its military swagger, towards ties with the more progressive nations of France and England, towards democracy, industry, and reason (Morton, pp. 312-7). The dream of greater production, technology, and knowledge for the betterment of all was the foundation of liberal philosophy, to be spearheaded, naturally, by the bourgeois class.

Into this faltering monarchy led by the increasingly rigid Emperor Franz Josef stepped several new political parties. For the liberal, now without a viable political party of his own, the least difficult alternative was the social-democratic. Certainly both affirmed the possibility of progress through rationalism and education, although the social-democrats were more utopian in their goals, less patient with the prevailing order, more desirous of an immediate welfare state, and more class conscious than the liberals, but at least they spoke the same language and they held an obvious kinship between them (Schorske, pp. 118-9).

The social-democratic party under the leadership of Viktor Adler (no relation to Alfred) was particularly reputed for its unity in spite of including a political spectrum ranging from anarchists to monarchists. Although Viktor Adler insisted upon the "primacy of the economic order and the inevitability of revolution, (he) oriented his life and practical policies around the values of reason, justice, and non-violent opposition to capitalism" (Janik and Toulmin, p. 52). Adult education programmes, discussion groups, libraries and journals were all established in the early days of the party's founding, for there was an inherent belief, not dissimilar to that of the liberals, in the perfectability of human beings through education. All that was necessary was that the people--and by that is meant the proletariat--be prepared, when the time came, to assume power (Janik and Toulmin, pp. 52-3).

With regard to other socialist parties, the social-democrats held a middle ground between the increasingly reformist and revisionist social-democratic party of Germany and, after the rise of Bolschevism, the more hardline approach of the communists. The Austrian socialists could be characterized as a Marxist party expounding "a rigorous and undogmatic science of society retaining its revolutionary character." They were especially adept at social, as opposed to economic, research (Bottome, pp. 1-2).

There is no sure method of discovering to what political party Adler's parents belonged, if in fact they partook of party politics at all, as the information is not forthcoming in Adler's biographies. We do know that his father was well-off during Adler's early years, being a merchant in corn and various dairy products. As time went on his father's business was to suffer and the family was forced to move several times. Both parents came from the comparatively privileged (for Jews) community of Kitsee, in the province of Burgenland. Jews enjoyed a more liberal status there than in other parts of the empire, accounting perhaps for the lack of feeling of persecution encountered by most Jewish families of the realm (Ellenberger, pp. 572-5). At any rate, the atmosphere in the Adler household was generally permissive for that period of time, with much emphasis upon the musical arts. One of Adler's brothers played and taught violin, his sister Hermine was a fine pianist, and he himself had such a beautiful tenor voice that he was often urged to give up science, as a youth, and turn to an operatic career (Bottome, p. 3). The Adler family likely had an implicit belief in the tenets of liberalism, of progress, education, and civilization, with the middle-class at the helm.

Given the varied assemblage of the Austrian social-democratic party, it would have even been possible for a person to remain liberal-thinking and yet subscribe to social-democracy. If this were the case for Alfred Adler, then much might be explained for his eventual turning away from the party politics of Austria towards th liberal atmosphere of the English-speaking countries. One might argue that he was never a true social-democrat but because there was no where else for a liberal to go (especially a Jew who did not subscribe to zionism) then he was "forced" into the cafes of the socialists. It is also debatable whether he believed in the ability of the common people to take control of their own lives through political power, or if he believed it was the role of the educated bourgeois to guide and lead the poor. Social medicine, after all, is as much a liberal ideal as a socialist one.

Although the idea that Adler was a liberal in a social-democratic party is an alluring one, much evidence speaks to the contrary. Adler showed great interest in Marxism, his wife was an avowed socialist, and he himself had a strong reputation as a socialist. In his writings on social medicine, he showed an awareness of class differences and clearly identified with the suffering of the workers. He became a member of the social-democratic party and even, for a short time, held a minor political office. After World War I, Adler published several articles in which he displayed a sophisticated awareness of the interrelationship of social and psychological factors that resulted in the oppression of the poor. The implicit judgement of Adler's was that since the poor were fighting a war for the benefit of the ruling class, then they would be better counselled not to fight at all.

He was not an active member of the social-democratic party and did not subscribe to rigidity and orthodoxy wherein political beliefs were concerned. He himself had come from what was, in all likelihood, a liberal background, but had outgrown it considerably while retaining some of its features. One of the appealing aspects of the Austrian Social-Democratic party, however, was that it did not require dogmatic beliefs from its followers. In this way, it was possible for Adler to maintain membership and familiarity with members, and to be considered a socialist himself, while not feeling forced to follow a rigid party line.

D. The Subsequent Development of Adler's Politics

Adler and Freud met in 1902, but under what auspices we are still in doubt. The oft-repeated story is that Freud sent Adler a postcard inviting him to a visit in his home. Supposedly, Freud was encouraged by the younger Adler's defense of him due to the poor review his book, *The Interpretation of Dreams,* received in the *Neue Freie Presse.* In point of fact, no review of Freud's work has been found in this publication, nor has any letter written by Adler in defense of it (Ellenberger, p. 583). It is ironic that they would have become associated, given their given their different lifestyles and philosophical outlooks. Adler, up until that time, had been interested in social medicine, whereas Freud had already begun building the foundations of psychoanalysis. They shared similar styles of rigorous attention to detail, but that could have been said of most medical researchers of the day.

Certainly, in Adler's case, the association with Freud marked a noticeable change in his thinking about medicine. He seemed to have lost interest in social medicine *per se.* It was during this period that his attention turned inward, toward the purely psychological aspects of the human being. In spite of declamations to the contrary, there is no substantial evidence that Adler had been thinking along psychological lines by the time he met Freud (Bottome, p. 57). In fact, according to Franz Wittels, Freud's first biographer and contemporary of Adler, Adler suffered from one notable weakness, difficulty in discovering "the phenomena of the unconscious mental life" (Wittels, p. 145). It was through association with Freud, however, that Adler began to discover the richness of the unconscious state. This is not to underestimate Adler's accomplishment, but simply to suggest that in matters of the unconscious, it was Freud, not Adler, who was master. It is to Adler's credit that he turned to the wisest and ablest of teachers. Freud was already a recognized author whereas Adler was still a comparatively young man, relatively new to the medical profession. They were not equals.

Adler's one foray into Marxist thought during his Freudian period, as far as can be estimated given the abbreviated text, was a failure (Nunberg and Federn, 1967, pp. 172-8). He attempted some kind of integration, but it seems to have become garbled and confused. Perhaps that is the reason Adler did not publish his discourse.

In 1907, Adler introduced the notion of organ inferiority and its psychological compensation, a biological theory which predates his whole principle of the inferiority complex, masculine protest, and will to power (Adler, A., 1917). Because it deals chiefly with biological matters, it gives good indication of how far Adler had swung from his earlier interest in social medicine. In the meantime he was busy raising and providing for a family while specializing in the field of nervous diseases. He had already converted to the Protestant faith in 1904 along with two of his daughters (but not his wife) and the whole family had moved to larger quarters in a residential and more affluent section of town (Ellenberger, p. 584).

At the point of Adler's disassociation from Freud, a gradual synthesizing of his two tendencies, emphasis on the social world and emphasis on the psychological, became evident. On the whole, he gave somewhat more weight to the mechanisms of mental responses rather than the social causes of individual problems (Leibin, p. 4) but there is no simple equation to describe this tendency. It is also notable that Adler, unlike the more esoteric Freud, or Jung, investigated the ordinary problems which people dealt with, including marriage and occupation, as well as the more disreputable areas of human endeavor such as crime and prostitution. In this respect, Adler's appeal to lay people increased, especially as he went on in his career and learned to write as he spoke, in simple language.

In 1916, although too old for military duty, Adler was called up as a military physician. His wife, who had gone to Russia with their four children, had finally returned after a long separation due to military exigencies. Whereas Alfred accepted the German version of the war, Raissa accepted that of the Allies (Bottome, p. 109). It is difficult to analyze

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Adler's exact sympathies and antipathies towards socialism in the aftermath of the war, due to contradictory evidence. For instance, in an article on war neuroses, Adler wrote:

> From the individual-psychological viewpoint, we must recognize behind every neurosis the existence of a weakling whose capacity for adapting himself to the ideas of the majority calls forth an *agressive attitude* taking on a neurotic form. The proper therapy must solve the fundamental conflict between the duty to the community and to the individual. (Adler, 1923, p. 305).

As a military physician, Adler was forced to decide which soldiers were genuinely incapable of returning to the front, which were capable, and which were malingering. Those whom he recommended to return to military duty stood a good chance of suffering wounds, lifelong infirmities, or even death. He concluded that those who malingered were weak individuals who refused to do their duty on behalf of their community. Neurosis, he inferred, was the outcome of conflict between private wishes and community obligations. Adler's conclusion on war neurosis puts him in the position of defending the state against the individual and justifying the war effort of Austria.

The position he held and the decisions he was forced to make caused him a great deal of anxiety, and thenceforth he was unable to remember his own dreams (Bottome, p. 110). Granted his personal suffering in view of the horrible decisions he was obligated to make, this no way excuses the fact that he justified such decisions by invoking the greater moral authority of the state. His concept of social interest left no room for oddballs or for those who did not fit in, and, by implication, dissenters from the ruling order:

> Everyone at some time, or at some place, must contribute his quota. That man who does not deliver his quota, who denies the value of communal life, becomes an anti-social being, and resigns his fellowship in humanity...In the more complicated cases, we see the eccentric, the hoboes, and the criminals. Public condemnation of these traits and characteristics grows out of an appreciation of their origins, an intuition of their incompatability with the demands of social life. (Adler, A., 1927, pp. 120-1).

But there is another side to Adler. In no less than three articles, all published in 1918-19, Adler characterized the war as unjust, against the interests of the common man, i.e. the boot soldier, and fashioned by the class in power for its own benefit. Given this point of view, any soldier who malingered was justified and at some deeper level correctly perceiving the truth of the war situation--the oppression of the common man. In fact, Adler notes this in one of the articles:

> ...but more and more men tried to escape battle duty and there were conflicts between military physicians and those commissions whose function it was to send men back to the front. Attempts at mass desertion during the Russian offensive were severely checked by the military police. The only means left at disposal was secret passive resistance, and when the collapse came the people rejoiced at having won their freedom, realizing that its true enemy, the ruling class, was defeated. (Ellenberger, p. 588).

Whereas the authoritarian sounding article on war neurosis has been translated into English, none of the other three have been ("Bolschevismus und Psychologie", 1918; "Die andere Seite: eine Massenpsycholgie Studie uber die Schuld des Volkes", 1919; "Ein Psychiater uber die Kriegspsychose", 1918). This may be an indication of how Adler's socialist sympathies have remained unadvertised through neglect, whereas his more authoritarian points of view have reached the North American audience.

One of the most powerful essays written by Adler was entitled "Demoralized Children" (Adler, A., 1923, pp. 339-50). He wrote: "Of the 'blessings' that came in the wake of the Great War perhaps no one thing is of such importance as the tremendous increase in the demoralization of youth" (Adler, A., 1923, p. 339). In this article, Adler blamed the poor social conditions and the aftermath of war for the increase in criminality and lack of useful ambition amongst the Viennese youth. He understood that poverty and lack of stable family life were the social ingredients which caused such disintegration of values and went on to write: "I am quite at sea as to what can be done in an age of intensified demoralization like ours" (Adler, A., 1923, p. 349). He recommended better and more humane institutions for recalcitrant youths with educated and understanding directors. To this end, he suggested that a chair of curative pedagogy be established in an educational setting. In a sense, this reflected the Adler of years gone by, the Adler who first wrote on social medicine, now applying himself to the diagnosis and healing of disturbed children and adolescents.

Shortly after World War I terminated, the social-democrats came to power in Vienna, and remained so until 1934. During this first period of the Austrian Republic, Adler was elected vice-president of the Workers' Committee of the First District of Vienna. Although considered by most incumbents to be a first step towards a political career, Adler himself had few ambitions in that direction, and directed his energies towards the expansion and social application of individual psychology (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, p. 375).

By 1922, the first child guidance centre of Vienna had been created, and these institutions grew rapidly both in Vienna and in other Austrian and German cities until they were shut down by the nazis. The social-democratic government, under the guidance of Otto Glockel, socialist president of the board of education, made it possible for Adler to apply his theories of individual psychology in educational settings (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, p. 375). These guidance centres were meant to benefit not only problem children, but their parents and teachers as well, through education and therapy. There were two essential tenets of these guidance centres, the first being the frankly human and democratic relationship between the guidance worker and child. The second was the public nature of these clinics. The doors were open and free of charge. The child would appear before a large gathering, not to make him or her to feel shame, but rather to make the child understand the problem was communal, not just a private affair. In this way, social interest could be awakened (Seidler and Zilah, as in Adler, A., 1930b, pp. 9-27). It can be seen how Adler's attitude resembled those of his pre-Freudian days, but now with the opportunity to really apply his beliefs.

E. The Expansion of Individual Psychology to North America

As awareness of the imminence of a nazi takeover of Austria increased, so did Adler's level of anxiety; thus, when invited to lecture in the United States, he gladly accepted (Bottome, pp. 205-6). His knowledge of English was poor, and heretofore he had only managed to lecture in German.

Concurrent with the commencement of overseas lecturing were the outbreak of controversies with other adherents of individual psychology. The fullest account of these episodes is given by Manes Sperber, who prefaced it with the history of Adler's rather public image at the Cafe Siller, where a sectarianism, not unlike what occurred amongst the psychoanalytic circle two decades earlier, began to grow (Sperber, pp. 220-4). Circa 1927, two quite serious dissensions took place, resulting in formal banishments from the individual psychology circle. The first dispute was over the religiousity of two members, Rudolf Allers, a Catholic, and Fritz Kunkel, a Protestant. Both men were formidable people in their own right. Kunkels had written several books on individual psychology and was significant in effecting the spread of these doctrines in Germany. Rudolf Allers, it should be remembered, became a member of the editorial staff of the *Zentralblatt fur Psychotherapie und ihre Grenzgebiete* and later resigned (in 1933) when Jewish members of the German contingent were expelled by order of the nazi hierarchy. It was then that C. G. Jung became editor.

As previously noted, Alice and Otto Ruhle were also expelled, presumably due to publication of the book *The Path to We* (1927) which attempted to link individual psychology with Marxism. Both people had been strong socialists before associating with Adler--Otto had been a member of the German social-democratic parliament--and both would continue in the same vein after disassociation from him. It is noteworthy that Adler himself had made such an attempt, in 1925, perhaps obliquely, to integrate individual psychology with a Marxist perspective, in an interview in the New York Times entitled "Salvaging Mankind by Psychology". Adler attempted to show

how individual psychology could be instrumental in changing relationships from power-oriented to democratic and community-inspired.

Other Marxists were also expelled, including his friend Sperber. Sperber wrote that many Marxists in the group had been significant in making individual psychology recognized in various parts of Europe, and that these people could hardly be characterized as "pests", as Adler had called them. Adler's official reason for the expulsions was that they threatened the survival of individual psychology through "provoking the ire of the rightists and the Nazis" (Sperber, p. 223).

Compromise with the nazis, as we now know, was precisely the wrong tact, for it weakened those forces which otherwise would have struggled against them. One must also call up Adler's quality of courage to account for opting for such expediency. And finally, one must truly wonder at the swift changes such actions represented in a man who only a few years earlier had accepted an elected post in a workers' committee in a government run by the Austrian Social-Democratic party. This was the self-same government which encouraged Adler's successful experiments in education and child guidance.

In 1932, Adler, who had by then lectured all over the English-speaking world, was offered a post, which he accepted, as visiting professor of medical psychology at Long Island College of Medicine. Earlier in his life, he had been turned down by the Vienna Medical School for the position of *Privat Dozent*, which would have accorded him permission to lecture at the university. Not only was Adler honored by an academic post which he failed to obtain as a young man, and sought for lecture tours, but he was surrounded by admirers on a foreign (to him) continent (Bottome, pp. 228j-78). Weekly discussion groups were held in his home, where Abraham Maslow counted amongst the guests and friends (Adler, K., p. 202).

Unfortunately, Adler lived under the strain of ill health, for the first time since childhood, in the United States. A second occurrence which distressed him was the disappearance of his eldest daughter, Valentine, who, with her husband, had emigrated to the Soviet Union after Hitler's succession to power. She had become a victim of one of the Soviet purges, but this was not discovered until after Adler's death, and in the meantime he worried continuously about her (Sperber, p. 225). Unlike his daughter, Adler had long ago disclaimed the communist party.

By 1937, the year of his death, Adler's philosophy had come full circle:

> The assertion that human activity takes its pattern from the manner in which the mass secures its livelihood, upon the basis of economic conditions, could apply only to a remote future time when, after sacrifices and unspeakable sufferings, all conceivable failures of mass-movements had been resolved and revised. In the immediate present, however, economic conditions are reflected in, and met by, each individual and the masses *according to their previously acquired style of life*. (Adler, A., 1937, p. 115)

Thus Adler no longer represented economic conditions as primary, as he had in his works on social medicine at a time when he himself was still struggling to gain an economic foothold. In a period in his life when he had achieved fame and economic security, he represented economic conditions as secondary to personality. The personalistic psychology which finally emerged was bourgeois in nature, for it assumed the legitimacy of the class in power. The implication of Adler's psychological outlook was that people, both as individuals and *en masse*, created and were responsible for their social environment. In a vulgar sense, this meant that people deserved what they got. It is ironic, in view of Adler's past, that Abraham Maslow, who used to visit the Adlers so frequently while still a young man, perhaps best represented bourgeois psychology in the 'sixties and 'seventies, when he influenced a whole generation of popular psychologists.

F. Adler's Fear and Failure to Belong

One ponders the reason for Adler's about-face, for the exclusion of his colleagues and friends, and for his turning away from socialism. At the very least, we know that Adler was frightened that individual psychology might be imperilled by its association with socialists. He prepared himself to bring individual psychology to the New World, but without associations which would harm its spread and influence. He was ambitious for his psychology, and long ago had gained the reputation as an ambitious man: "Adler isn't a normal man," said Freud, "his jealousy and ambition are morbid" (Stekel, p. 142). This statement was made after they had separated, and one must consider that Freud himself was a brilliant but tyrranical man who often overstated an opinion. Ernest Jones had a more balanced view of Adler:

> My own impression of Adler was that of a morose and cantankerous person, whose behavior oscillated between contentiousness and sulkiness. He was evidently very ambitious and constantly quarrelling with others over points of priority in his ideas. When I met him years later, however, I observed that success had brought him a certain benignity of which there had been little sign in his early years. (Jones, 1955, p. 147).

But he was ambitious as an older man as well: "With an almost messianic attitude, Adler expected his movement to conquer and transform the world through education, teaching and psychotherapy" (Ellenberger, p. 596). Ambition itself was fired by another motive, the desire to secure a place to belong in a world which, in spite of various pretensions, he found alien. Let us read what Theodore Reik had to say about him:

> Freeman: Did you know Alfred Adler?
> Reik: Yes, certainly.
> Freeman: What was he like?
> Reik: He was *gumutlich*. You know, Adler was Jewish, yet he spoke in a strong Viennese dialect, which was a little funny to us. It was very interesting. It was not the way any of us spoke. (Freeman, pp. 108-9).

Evidently, to the primarily Jewish circle of pioneer psychoanalysts, Adler was an oddball, a Jew who put on airs, and, while attempting to become true Viennese, had foregone his own tradition. Adler, with his reputation as Viennese through-and-through, was not registered as an Austrian citizen until 1911 as both his parents were born in Hungary. Thus he was deprived of many of the privileges ordinarily granted solely to Austrians (Ellenberger, p. 579).

His biographers, however, tend to emphasize how typically Viennese was Adler in manner, speech and habit. They all describe how Adler had grown up on the outskirts of Vienna, where he experienced no anti-semitism and where, under any circumstances, he felt himself to be like all others, and not different because he was Jewish. Furtmuller said of him:

> Adler's early experiences made him unable to feel the difference between Jews and gentiles as something personally important. He had no cultural or religious ties to Judaism, but he never tried to forget or make others forget his Jewish extraction. He simply was able to establish natural human relations with people of all kinds and never felt himself hamstrung by racial barriers. (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, p. 331).

Bottome also stresses his non-Jewishness, a trait partially caused, she thinks, from growing up amongst gentiles. Apparently, she was unaware that Adler had also lived for four years from ages seven to eleven, in Leopoldstadt, the Jewish quarter of Vienna, and even went to the same school, the Sperlgymnasium, as Freud (Dr. Hans Beckh-Widmanstetter, as related to Ellenberger, p. 58). Wrote Bottome:

> There were practically no other Jews in the village of Penzing....It is perhaps owing to the fact that Alfred was never brought up in Jewish surroundings or with Jewish playmates that he became in many ways pure Viennese, and his whole outlook upon life, and his reactions to it, were typical of an Austrian peasant's, a peasant with particularly keen wits. (Bottome, p. 4).

In 1904, Adler was baptized in the Protestant Church of Dorotheergasse (Ellenberger, p. 584). Concerning religion, Bottome said of him:

> He respected and prized his race and its many contributions to mankind, but he greatly distrusted the orthodox Jew's attitude toward God. It seemed to him to be a form of refined selfishness to keep God for one tribe or for one set of human beings, rather than share a universal Deity with the common family of mankind. (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, p. 40).

Another biographer, Manes Sperber, remained extremely perplexed as to Adler's motivation for conversion and could not comprehend his discomforting silence on the subject:

> Our private conversations, which are among my most cherished memories, often lasted until late into the night, and there was hardly a subject of consequence upon which we did not touch...one issue remained unanswered...the Jewish question. I had learned quite by chance about his baptism, which lay many years in the past. It came as a deeply disappointing revelation. (Sperber, pp. 30-1).

Sperber remarked that Adler was a radical atheist and could not have converted out of religious faith. It would have been enough, Sperber thought, had he simply quit the Jewish congregation to show that he was a freethinker:

> The baptism of a non-believer was something else: an escape from Judaism. In going over to the Protestant faith Adler hoped to find a refuge from the peculiar fate of the Jewish community and from the consequences of his Jewish birth. This desire motivated him more strongly than one would gather from the details of his biography, most of which we owe to him. (Sperber, p. 30).

Had Sperber read Ellenberger's account of Adler, published earlier than his own, he might have become even further perplexed by Adler's attitude towards Judaism. Evidently, Adler also withheld information concerning his residence in Leopoldstadt, the Jewish section of Vienna which even now houses the majority of Viennese Jews.[1] In the pre-1900 period Leopoldstadt "housed large numbers of immigrant Orthodox "Ostjuden" from Galicia, who were the very antithesis of their capitalist co-religionists in the fashionable upper-middle class" (Janik and Toulmin, p. 59). The common language was Yiddish, not German. One must surmise, in view of Adler's silence, that living in Leopoldstadt alarmed him. He would have heard a rather familiar German-sounding language, but foreign nonetheless and outlandish to the ears. This was no longer the Austria he knew, but a state within a state. The fashions of the populace were also strange, the men in black top heads and *yarmulkas*, prayer shawls and *taleses*, and the married women, all with short hair in kerchiefs. The widows wore black. This was not the benign world of open air and freedom which Adler liked to remember when discussing his childhood; rather, it was the crowded and shut-in world of the Jew who intoned sing-song prayers in an ancient language Adler did not comprehend.

In all likelihood, Adler did not really think the Jew had a place in the modern world. The closest we can get to Adler's view on the subject is in an essay written for the Medical Society of Individual Psychology of London by an associate and translator of Adler's, Beran Wolfe:

> What is the cosmic purpose of the Jew?...Although most Jews consider Judaism their *raison d'etre*, we doubt whether his patriarchal monotheism justifies the cosmic values ascribed to it. Yahweh is fraught with too many infantile emotional fixations. Judaism as a religion has outgrown its usefulness. As the Jew matures, racially, he will put away his religion, together with his belief in magic. (Crookshank, p. 29).

There is no reason to suppose that Adler would have gainsayed Beran Wolfe's opinion, since the essay appeared in a small book together with several of Adler's. Hence, for Adler, the Jewish people would be better off to assimilate since their own ways of thinking were outmoded, unevolved and childish. No doubt Adler's perspective was formed, in part, from his tenure in Leopoldstadt as a boy, a rather shameful experience which he chose not to discuss.

A new picture of Adler emerges, one quite different from that given by his popular biographers. He was not simply the typical Viennese who belonged to the cafes and dialect of Vienna the way Babe Ruth belonged to baseball, Yankee Stadium and New York. In fact, Adler, non-citizen though he was, turned to Vienna to take him, nurture him, and embrace him. He not only learned the mannerisms and dialect, but characterized them. He turned to Vienna because he felt antipathy, perhaps shame, for the Jewish populace from which he, like it or not, sprang. He never admitted this, and it is very possible he remained, his lifelong, unaware. Nevertheless, his lack of conscious understanding of his own motivations influenced his thought and judgements. In light of our new understanding, it is now possible to comprehend the fuller meaning of Freud's infamous letter to Arnold Zweig upon hearing of Adler's death:

> I don't understand your sympathy for Adler. For a Jew boy out of a Viennese suburb a death in Aberdeen is an unheard-of career in itself and a proof of how far he got on. The world rewarded him richly for his service in having contradicted psychoanalysis. (Jones, 1957, p. 223).

This was the vindictive judgement of an ailing man one year before fleeing the nazi invasion of Austria, but there was an elemental truth contained in it. Without ever knowing that Adler had resided in the same urban ghetto as himself, he understood that Adler, deep-down, was a Jew, and all

Adler's honors and invitations did not fool the wise old psychoanalyst. Perhaps Adler did not remember, or acknowledge, his cultural source, but Freud did.

Adler was neither a citizen of the country he loved so well nor a member of its preferred race. He did not belong to them, and he would not belong to the Jews. He took on the mask of the Viennese, and fooled many people. Late in his life he was forced to flee. He then desired to become a world-citizen:

> Social interest means much more. Particularly it means *feeling with the whole, sub specie aeternitatis*, under the aspect of eternity. It means striving for a form of community which must be thought of as everlasting, as it could be thought of if mankind had reached the goal of perfection. (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, pp. 34-5).

Adler had raised the theory of social interest to a quasi-religious principle, although he himself had no religion. And though he never succeeded in defining just what was meant by "community", it most certainly included a sense of belongingness and cooperation between members. But to which community did Adler belong?

A depth-psychologist would necessarily investigate the root of Adler's alienation in his childhood development, family matrix and the traumas of early age. Given the paucity of data regarding his early history, results of such investigation would have to be considered extremely speculative, and there is no opportunity, after all, to confront Adler himself. Another route, much simpler, and perhaps more accurate in this case, lies in the understanding of human identity formed as part of the whole cultural matrix. That is what has been attempted in the present article. Adler's fear and subsequent overcompensation sprung from an unacknowledged feeling that he did not belong anywhere. He was fortunate, for unlike many, he had the opportunity to accept the living Jewish culture into which he was born; instead, he chose neither to acknowledge, nor confront it. For Adler, it remained unworked-through matter.

G. Adler's Socialism in Conclusion

Adler's joining in socialist activity was authentic. When the social-democrates began to catch fire in Austria, he contributed to the general effort; at the same time, Adler was influenced and educated by their philosophy. For a Jew residing in Austria there was really no other viable alternative, except the zionists, whose aims Adler did not share. The others, George von Schonerer's pan-German nationalists; as well as Karl Lueger's Christian social party, were partly founded on anti-semitism. In 1897,Lueger became mayor of Vienna. As a response to anti-semitism, Theodore Herzl created zionism, for conceivably the Jew had no place in Europe (Shorske, pp. 116-75).

Although the social-democrats had sympathy for the plight of minority people in the Hapsburg Empire such as the Slovenes, Serbo-Croats, Italians and Rumanians, and did recognize them as separate nationalities, they had no such programme for the Jews, who made up 4.6 percent of the population (1910) and outnumbered each of the four "nationalities" just mentioned (Wistrich, p. 96). In Adler's time, Jewish socialists tended to be both international and consciously non-Jewish. This was even the case of the leader of the Austrian social-democrats, Viktor Adler, who himself had converted to Protestantism. Nonetheless, he could not help but be affected by his Jewish sympathies all his life (Wistrich, pp. 95-114).

It was not a rarity for Jews to convert and throw off the "yoke" of an unpopular religion. Karl Kraus, Otto Weininger and Gustav Mahler, three renowned Austrians of the period, all "decided to cut the Gordian knot which bound them to the despised minority" (Wistrich, p. 101). On the other hand, we know that Freud took some pride in his Jewishness, and felt it an advantage, and therefore counselled others to maintain it (Bakan, p. 47). Adler chose conversion. He then emphasized the Viennese component of his character, but at the expense of his Jewishness. It was an omission which Adler chose never to question, and therefore, in some deep sense, inauthentic. It was an "omission" which became essential in creating Adler's life-plan. His ambition was to create a place in the world to which he could belong by force of his own authority. His powerful system, individual psychology, was the vehicle. In that sense, his socialism was secondary, and therefore dispensable.

When it was not uncommon, and perhaps even "with it", for young intellectuals to join in socialist activities, Adler took part. His contributions to social medicine were positive. Later, when the social-democrats took power in Vienna, Adler and his individual psychology system both profited by, and contributed to, the new regime. Up until then, at no time, had Adler's socialism really been a cause of conflict with the dominant social order; neither had it caused him any significant drawback to his life's ambitions.

In the latter part of the 1920's, Adler began to perceive socialism as a hindrance to the survival of individual psychology in Europe, and an obstacle to its expansion in North America. When he disassociated himself from his socialist colleagues, he was in effect saying: "You are the 'pests' keeping me from achieving acceptance, therefore you must go". With the socialists out of sight, the way was now cleared for him not only to retain acceptance of the German-speaking European community, but to gain it from the New World community as well. He then slashed much of the socialist aspects of his psychology, and indeed, achieved much worldly acceptance.

H. Footnotes

1 Conversation with Mr. Felix Mendelssohn, lay psychoanalyst and teacher of social work at the College of Social Work, Vienna, on August 19, 1982: Viennese Colleagues of Mr. Mendelssohn are presently engaged in compiling a history of the Leopoldstadt.

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V. Psychohistory as the Art of Detection

A. Introduction

In the *Epilegomena* to Robin Collingwood's significant work, *The Idea of History*, published posthumously, a striking discussion takes place concerning the real nature of historical evidence, the various means of distilling it, and the criteria for acceptance or rejection. This distinguished professor of philosophy wrote:

> The hero of a detective novel is thinking exactly like an historian when, from indications of the most varied kinds, he constructs an imaginary picture of how a crime was committed, and by whom. (p. 243).

In a subsequent chapter, he includes a sub-heading entitled *Who Killed John Doe?* (Collingwood, p. 266) and somewhat later compares professional historians to those two important European detectives of yesteryear, Monsieur Hercule Poirot and Sherlock Holmes (Collingwood, pp. 281-282). Neither detective suffers by comparison.

In the case of the detective, he begins with a problem, a crime in need of solution. The historian also begins with a problem, generally one of his own creation. If he does not begin with a problem, then he has no basis upon which to assemble or to discard facts. One must, hence, pose a question:

> It was a correct understanding of the same truth that led Monsieur Hercule Poirot to pour scorn on the *human bloodhound* who crawls about the floor trying to collect everything, no matter what, which might conceivably turn out to be a clue...nothing is evidence except in relation to some definite question. (Collingwood, p. 281).

The historian, in creating a story, in imaginatively recreating a scene, situation, life, or episode, must rely on data of various levels of authenticity. But how does the historian ascertain the veracity of his data?

> The web of imaginative construction is something far more solid and powerful than we have hitherto realized. So far from relying for its validity upon the support of given facts, it actually *serves* as the *touchstone* by which we decide whether *alleged facts* are *genuine*. (Collingwood, p. 244, italics mine).

Taken to its ultimate degree, it is the power of the theory, or story-line, that indicates which facts, or data, are valid. In fact, such an appeal to imaginative construction of the past borders closely on the fictional. Collingwood, in all seriousness, broadly comments on the novelist's art as compared to the historian's (Collingwood, pp. 242-246). H. Stuart Hughes, well-known American academic historian, also deals with history as art. For him, authenticity lies in the *inextricable connectedness* of events; and events in history are simply "segments of the endless web of experience...torn out of context for purposes of clearer understanding" (Hughes, p. 7). Nonetheless, with all this emphasis on historical thinking as a kind of artistic process, it can not be forgotten that facts, no matter what the context, may have a stubbornness and insistence which must neither be overlooked nor circumvented.

History then, is differentiated from the novelist's art, but in some way comparable. Nonetheless,

> few historians today would deny the neoidealists' central contention that historical understanding is a subjective process--a mighty effort to recall to life what is irrevocably over and done with. (Hughes, p. 10).

Here images of Wilhelm Dilthey and Jules Michelet come to mind.

> The mature Michelet is a strange phenomenon. He is in many ways more comparable to a novelist like Balzac than to the ordinary historian. He had the novelist's social interest and grasp of character, the poet's imagination and passion. All this, by some unique combination of chances, instead of exercising itself freely on contemporary life, had been turned backward upon history and was united with a scientific appetite for facts which drove him into arduous researches. (Wilson, p. 13).

Sometimes Michelet crosses dangerously over to the fictionalist's art, as in *Satanism and Witchcraft*, in which he puts passionate words into the mouths of fictional characters. Attempting to elucidate the terrible risk taken by the sorceress-healer, who, unlike others, comprehended that poisonous herbs in large doses could also be healing solutions in small ones, he described how the sorceress would disappear in early morning or late night searching for the fearsome herb:

> But a little shepherd lad was there, who tells the village, "If you had seen her as I did, gliding among the fallen stones of the

> old ruin, glancing from side to side, muttering some unintelligible gibberish to herself the while!...Oh, I was rarely frightened, I tell you.... (Michelet, p. 83).

The other mainstream of historical thought, according to Hughes, is neopositivism, best represented by the French medievalist, Marc Bloch. Bloch, together with Lucien Fevre, began the *Annales* school of history, about which more will be written later. But even here, while attempting to create a science of historial study according to a twentieth century scientific paradigm, there has been no denial of the subjective character of historical judgement. However,

> Bloch shifted the emphasis to what was external and tangible...to the realities that the historian can actually see or hear or touch: archaeological remains, languages, folklore, and the like. (Hughes, p. 16).

To refer to the title of this essay, *Psychohistory as the Art of Detection*, one sees no reason to apologize for recognizing the concept of art as being a central component of historical understanding. However, one may still reasonably inquire as to whether the concept of detection has any validity within an historical investigation. For instance, could Robin Collingwood, by introducing the killing of *John Doe*, be having a private joke at his colleagues' expense? Alternatively, one could put this particular effort of Collingwood's down to a vast idiosyncracy on his part. Finally, it's also possible that, due to the brain disease with which he was afflicted towards the latter decade of his life (Collingwood, Editor's Preface, p. xxi), the mentioning of Sherlock Holmes and Monsieur Poirot in the selfsame essay in which he deals with Euclid, Coleridge, Plato, and Descartes, is indicative of a mind lacking lucidity.

One must, however, take Collingwood seriously, for in his little homily he is setting forth to explain the historian's craft. Obviously, Collingwood himself recognized differences, such as the juridical contentment with a "degree of assurance or belief which would satisfy it in any of the practical affairs of daily life" (Collingwood, p. 168) whereas the historian is under no such obligation, and has no stated time in which he must bring forth a verdict. Basically the historian, like the detective, must recognize clues that the ordinary person would overlook. An astute historian perceives meaning, or possible meaning, in the interstices, the details partially camouflaged, and in materials so obvious that no one else pays them any mind and so they remain hidden. Such clues lead the historian towards fruitful inquiry and investigation and this is one aspect of the art of doing history.

But in the preceding paragraph, only clues were spoken of which, upon being discovered by the historian-cum-detective, led him or her towards the solution of a problem. There is a second aspect of the art of detection to which Collingwood also alluded in his brief story. This has to do with the clues which entangle the historian in so many false starts that he never gets out into the clear light. Only a critical stance, a certain skepticism, plus intuitive intelligence will allow the historian to circumvent such difficulties. These represent the errors of possible commission, just as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph represent errors of possible omission.

There is a third type of error concerned with the art of detection which falls into neither of the above categories, a paradoxical clue which usually goes unrecognized. This clue is akin to that factor to which psychoanalysis has so assiduously applied itself, that which remains *unsaid*, or *not forthcoming*. Psychologists, when assessing a patient or client through psychological testing, must attune themselves to noting what is neither said nor seen in the tested person's responses. It reminds one of the white spaces in the Rorschach cards; mostly they are unnoticed and unheeded. So it is in historical inquiry that an historian, so taken up with potent data and interesting clues, pays no mind to what is not given, or, in noticing it momentarily, shrugs it off as insignificant, or perhaps a problem too difficult with which to grapple. Often, however, it is through this very *lack* that one achieves greatest progress.

The nature of detection as an artistic inquiry in historical investigation was grasped by Collingwood as an outward, or objective act of consciousness. It required a psychoanalytic technique, however, to commence the purposeful examination of the historian's own inner rationale, or subjective motives, for creating an historical study. Beginning with Erik Erikson, this has become one of the significant themes in the blossoming discipline of psychohistorical research. Through the blending of the art of both historian and psychologist, it is now possible to direct one's attention not only to the act of detection on the outward plane, but the inward as well.

B. The Meaning of Psychohistory

Psychohistory in North America is usually traced back to the presidential address delivered by William Langer before the American Historical Association in 1957. Langer was particularly adamant that historians pay heed to Freudian concepts which, although having already galvanized the intellectual world of the West, were still largely unintegrated by historians:

> Psychoanalysis has long since ceased being merely a therapy and has been generally recognized as a theory basic to the study of the human personality. How can it be that the historian, who must be as much or more concerned with human beings and their motivation than with the impersonal forces and causation, has failed to make use of these findings? Viewed in the light of modern depth psychology, the homespun, common-sense psychological interpretations of past historians, even some of the greatest, seem woefully inadequate, not to say naive. Clearly the time has come for us to reckon with a doctrine that strikes so close to the heart of our own discipline. (Langer, pp. 286-287).

It is not surprising that Langer's *Next Assignment,* met with great resistance on the part of academic historians, culminating with Jacques Barzun's essay in defense of traditional history. Arguing that history-cum-history contained all that was conceptually necessary to fulfill the aims of a psychological understanding of history, he fulminated against this new half-breed hyphenated discipline of psycho-history.

Nonetheless, the continuing existence of *The History of Childhood Quarterly,* renamed *The Journal of Psychohistory,* since 1973, plus the frequency of articles on psychohistory in the *Journal of Interdisciplinary History,* attest to the constancy and breadth of a North American forum on the subject. And as early as 1977 over two hundred courses were offered in the United States in colleges and universities on the subject of psychohistory (Kren, p. 339). At this juncture the argument no longer devolves around whether psychohistory is a justifiable occupation for psychologists and historians, but what kind of psychohistory is justified.

One investigator compiled a survey and categorized the various broad definitions of psychohistory as defined by writers in this area. The "dominant group sees psychohistory as a fusion between history and psychoanalysis and/or psychology" (Lawton, p. 329). The second most dominant group, according to Lawton's analysis, emphasizes human motivation. In actuality, Lawton's distinction is insignificant, for it is characterized by a dichotomy between psychohistorians who wish to *understand* history and those who desire to unearth *motivations*. In reality, both sets of psychohistorians are trying to go beyond simple description, and are practically equivalent.

There are, nonetheless, other important distinctions between psychohistorians. One group of psychohistorians, best typified by Lloyd deMause, tend to reduce history to psychological complexes. A second group, including George Kren and Leon Rappoport, is more prone to perceive psychological motivation in history as just one amongst a variety of explanatory factors. DeMause, who is a captivating writer, and excellent scholar, wrote a long article entitled *The Psychogenic Theory of History* in which he pinned the source of all socio-historical change (psychogenesis) on "the lawful change in childrearing modes occurring through generational pressure" (deMause, 1977, p. 256). The approach is breathtaking, for his aim is nothing less than a universal explanation for the genesis of all change in history. However, as with all reductionist viewpoints, it over-simplifies the multiform levels of historical reality. Kren and Rappoport, in examining the relationship between psychology and history, take a comparatively balanced view of the subject:

> Sophisticated use of psychological perspectives by historians is already an accomplished fact, and among psychologists there is a

> growing awareness of the need for historical interpretations of human development. Perhaps Wilhelm Dilthey's dream of a new science of man that can comprehend *historical man* in all his manifestations may yet be fulfilled. (Kren and Rappoport, 1976, p. 73).

The second difference between the two approaches is in their emphasis on psychoanalytical explanations as the preferred psychology. DeMause is most conscientious in following or expanding on psychoanalytic lines of thought, as seen in his latest study, *The Fetal Origin of History*, where he seeks to discover the origins of the Oedipus Complex in the pre-natal period of human development (deMause, 1981). This scholarly and imaginative exercise in expanding on Freud's theory stands in distinction to Kren and Rappoport's rather eclectic approach to psychohistory, just as the name of their book, *Varieties of Psychohistory* (1976) indicates. Frank Manuel, the author of one of the included essays, *The Use and Abuse of Psychology in History*, pays special attention to the French tradition of historical psychology beginning with Lucien Febvre, who "summoned his colleagues to devote themselves to histories of *mentalite* and *sensibilite* (Manuel, p. 49). That is, Febvre felt that French historians should concentrate on what was thinkable in a human collective at a given time. This is a subject which will be expanded on, as it represents a formidable but different tradition from the North American one. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that conservative psychohistorians, of the bent of Kren, Rappoport, as well as Frank Manuel, can understand and respect other psychologically based means of comprehending history besides the psychoanalytical one.

The third difference between the two viewpoints resides in methodology. DeMause's chief tenet follows:

> Like psychoanalysis, psychohistory uses self-observation of the emotional responses of the researcher as its prime tool for discovery; nothing is ever discovered *out there* until it is first felt *in here*. (deMause, 1977, pp. 253-254).

As an example of this process, deMause wondered why he, a radical and anti-nationalist, was nearly moved to tears while watching a parade with marching bands. He took out his stopwatch and timed the drum-beats and discovered that they were in the vicinity of 110 to 130 per minute, the same as the elevated heart rate of woman during a contraction in labor:

> I was obviously a baby being born while watching the parade, being picked up and carried along by my mother's heart-beat whether I felt like it or not, and the tears in my eyes were for the impending separation from my mother! (deMause, 1975, pp. 170-180).

DeMause also relates crawling around with his two-year old son for *hundreds of hours* pretending to be babies in *mommy's belly*and crying, "Help! Save me!" while pretending to fall off the bed because that was the "endless game that seemed to give him a strong sense of the pleasure of mastery" (deMause, 1975, pp. 178-179). This was one of the means by which deMause was enabled to come to his theory that war is the completion of the group fantasy of strangulation in the birth canal, and eventual release. He also identifies with methods used by other psychohistorians to intensify emotional identification with their subjects while stripping their own defense processes. Henry Ebel, for instance, "surrounds himself with his historical material and *Primals* for hours while free-associating to the material in front of him, in a concentrated effort to reach deeper levels of motivation than the usual reading reveals" (deMause, 1975, p. 181).

Whereas DeMause and others identify themselves as social and historical microcosms, and use deliberate methods in order to intensify the perception of their own feelings, which they can then relate to the subject under study, Kren and Rappoport, while recognizing the import of transference and counter-transference in their research, are not likely to peg their subjective feelings to the objective social or historical world with such assurance. One of the pitfalls in deMause's theory is that people's psychological responses and adaptations change throughout history and from society to society so that our subjective feelings do not necessarily correlate with what theirs would have been:

> Frequently, psychobiographers attempt to apply psychological concepts developed in the twentieth century to subjects who lived in earlier eras; the likelihood is that the culture withih which the subjects lived would have been sufficiently different

> from our culture so that the concepts would not be applicable (Anderson, pp. 465-466).

DeMause is to be congratulated for his recognition of the part played by the subjective element (self) in reconstructing the past. In this respect he carries on in the tradition of Erik Erikson who wrote:

> If all this sounds self-indulgently personal, it is spelled out here only far enough to remind the psychohistorian that his choice of subject often originates in early ideals or identifications and that it may be important for him to accept as well as he can some deeper bias than can be argued out on the level of verifiable fact or faultless methodology. I believe, in fact, that any man projects or comes to project on the men and the times he studies some unlived portions and often the unrealized selves of his own life, not to speak of what William James calls *the murdered self*. The psychohistorian may owe it to history, as well as to himself, to be more conscious of what seems to be a *retransference* on former selves probably inescapable in any remembering, recording or reviewing and to learn to live and to work in the light of such consciousness. (Erikson, p. 60).

In actuality, all psychohistorians, whatever the approach, would agree in principle with Erikson's statement in *The Nature of Psychohistorical Evidence*. The deMause group, however, go so far as to make active use of the subjective element by creating various experimental exercises (already noted on a previous page). To the opposing psychohistorical group, deMause and colleagues certainly seem self-indulgent in raising the level of their child's play or their own free-association to historical paradigms. On the positive side, such continued experiments in method may not only yield valuable new psychological techniques, but foster a welcome spirit of methodological innovation.

It is worth noting an approach to history known as historical psychology which traces its roots to Lucien Febvre, French historian of the twentieth century. The origin and development of this tradition is discussed in Frank Manuel's essay included in Kren and Rappoport's *Varieties of Psychohistory*, but no notation is made of any influence that this tradition might be having in North America (Manuel, pp. 44-47). Perusal of issues of *The Journal of Psychohistory* tends to corroborate the view that Febvre and his followers have largely been ignored by psychohistorians actively studying history. Nonetheless, the French could provide a valuable dimension to psychohistorical studies and are especially sympathetic to those taking the more eclectic viewpoint of Kren and Rappoport.

Robert Mandrou, author of a recent book on early modern France from an historical psychology perspective, and a follower in the tradition begun by Febvre, had this to say about his mentor's approach:

> ...engrossed by the findings of scholars such as Henri Wallon, Piaget, and others, he effectively founded historical psychology...of which the outstanding example is his great study, *The reconstruction of affective life in the past: sensibility and history*. Since 1938, Febvre had outlined the approach with a firm hand: "begin by setting out in detail, then by reconstituting for the era under consideration, the mental equipment at the disposal of the men of that era; by a strenuous effort, not only of scholarship, but also of imagination, realize again the universe, within which each of the preceding generations lived and acted". (Mandrou, Preface, pp. xii-xiii).

Fernand Braudel, social historian, also traces his intellectual lineage back to Lucien Febvre and the foundation of the *Annales d'histoire economique et sociale* in 1929 (Braudel, p. 18). Braudel underlined the need for a unity amongst the human sciences, and most particularly the social sciences. Although Braudel himself was not an historical psychologist, he understood the need for such an alignment:

> One has, then, to concede that there does exist, at some distance, a social unconscious. And concede too, that this unconscious might well be thought more rich, scientifically speaking, than the glittering surface to which our eyes are accustomed. More rich scientifically, meaning simpler, easier to exploit--not easier to discover. But the step from the bright surface to murky depths--from noise to silence--is difficult and dangerous (Braudel, p. 39).

The major representatives of historical psychology in France at this time, at least from the North American perspective, would include the aforementioned Robert Mandrou, and Michael Foucault, most well-known for his masterpiece, *Madness and Civilization, a History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. Both are exceedingly conscientious scholars, in the *Annales* tradition, who use ordinary details of social life to which others pay no attention, to illustrate a particular point or thesis. Whereas Foucault writes with lightning-quick and often paradoxical insights, making himself deliberately difficult to comprehend, Mandrou proceeds with a workman-like linear logic webbed with fascinating details of life of the place and time under consideration. To illustrate, the subjects included in the first chapter, *The body: food and environment* of Mandrou's *Introduction to Modern France 1500 - 1640* consist of: diet; drink; malnutrition; clothing; living accomodation (p. v). Through such means, it is Mandrou's intent to describe the collective, but unconscious thought processes and sensations, upon whose foundation Frenchmen of the period under discussion were unknowingly motivated. In a larger sense, Mandrou recognizes that an historical psychology needs to recognize the psychological givens to all people of any particular socio-historical era in order to understand their collective limitations and possibilities. Unlike Foucault, who dared to take leaps of symbolic grandeur through the collective unconscious, Mandrou prefers to rest closer to the surface (also see Manuel, pp. 46-47).

To conclude, parallel to psychological history in North America is a sister discipline in France called psychological history which psychohistorians, although generally aware of, have not integrated into their own studies. In North America, there are two broad types of psychohistorians, those typified on the one hand by Lloyd deMause, the others typified by the perspectives of George Kren and Leon Rappoport. They differ in so far as deMause tends to reduce all history to psychological paradigms whereas Kren and Rappoport are content to include psychological explanations as one form amongst several. The second difference is that deMause is dogmatic about using a psychoanalytic approach whereas Kren and Rappoport are more eclectic. It is the Kren and Rappoport element, in fact, who are likely to exploit, if not embrace, the discoveries and methodologies of the historical psychologists of France. Finally, deMause is more prone to experimenting with new introspective-type psychological techniques and projecting his results upon the historical world whereas Kren and Rappoport, less experimental in technique, tend to balance self-observation and discovery with objective knowledge of the social world.

C. Guidelines for Biographical Studies

Psychohistory, in my estimation, is the study of human beings as thinking, feeling, sensing and intuiting creatures embedded in a particular socio-historical context. To *study* human beings means to describe and explain their actions both at their own conscious, and unconscious, levels of intent. Psychobiography, which has been the emphasis of my own investigations, is a form of psychohistory in which one human being, as opposed to a family, group, or generational cohort, etc., is studied in depth.

Certain guidelines for investigating an individual's life may logically ensue given my own definition of psychohistory, as presented above. Noting that a person is understood as having a subjective consciousness but embedded within the larger social and historical world, the individual may be identified (for our purposes) as dwelling in three separate, but intertwined, levels of being:

1. the Macro World of social, cultural, historical, and geographical givens;
2. the Molar World of social institutions and other social or cultural transmitting arenas; [1]
3. and the Micro World of an individual's more peculiarly biological and psychological characteristics.

These three levels, or dimensions of a person's world, affect not only how one thinks about oneself, but also how one appears in the world-at-large.

Not to acknowledge the social and historical community in which an individual is founded in the process of estimating a person's character and motives is an isolating mechanism which tends to simplify personal analysis but certainly does not do it justice. Psychological characteristics, and even biological ones, are directly affected by the kind of social transmitting arenas in which an individual is enmeshed. For instance, these transmitting arenas define the kind of education an individual will receive (generally through schools) and therefore the most likely opportunities and social roles that an individual may claim as a result of his or her education. At the same time, one's education defines one's probable limitations in terms of opportunities and roles. Individuals are psychologically affected by the kind and qualtity of social opportunities offered them. How they think about their self-worth, for instance, or what aims and goals they conceive for themselves in the future, are consequences of many factors, including one's social opportunities and roles. These, in turn, are directly (though not totally) affected by the kind of schooling and education one has received.

Schooling and education are examples of the Molar World, whereas one's feelings of self-worth belongs to the strictly psychological, or Micro World. On the other hand, the transmitting arenas themselves are affected by more global dimensions, the Macro World. For instance, schooling and education differ according to the traditional political system in place in a country. Naturally, one expects differing school systems according to whether one lives in a communist country, for example, or a capitalist one (Kozol). The school system, as a transmitting arena, transmits the political ideology of a nation and/or political elite to the human, or individual level. It is understood, of course, that there are other factors besides the political one which affect the kind of school and educational system in place. In fact, this system for biographical studies does not make the claim of stating how, in detail, these various levels--the Micro, Molar and Macro--interact, nor how their several constituents interact with each other, nor is it within the purview of the present essay to do so.

For clarity's sake, however, it should be repeated that the human being, in terms of his psychological and biological characteristics, is affected by the social institutions and other transmitting arenas in which he or she dwells, and these, in turn, are affected by larger global units including political and cultural traditions, etc. By defining it thusly, from the smallest, or Micro World, to the middle-level, or Molar World, to the largest, or Macro World, then the human being is seen as the resultant combination of much more powerful forces. Often this is the case, but the direction could be read in reverse. That is, it could be shown how the individual, as a psychological and biological being, may effect a change in one or more significant transmitting arenas, which, in turn, over the longer duration, change a nation's whole political, religious, or cultural structure. For example, this was what Erikson was able to accomplish in his psychobiographical study of Martin Luther (Erikson, 1958).

In a sense, all historians who subscribe to the *Great Man* theory of historical change attempt to show how a particular individual initiates deep and durable changes in a cultural, social, or political system. Through various psychoanalytic and historical techniques, Erikson was enabled to detect the salient features of Martin Luther's life, and how Luther projected, both consciously and unconsciously, his own vision upon the social world in which he was embedded.

D. The Art of Detection

In Bruce Mazlish's essay, *What is Psycho-history?*, he poses himself the following question: "Will the knowing psychohistorian...be prompted to discover new historical materials or will he merely reinterpret data already noticed, but discarded by other historians?" (Mazlish, p. 22). Mazlish answers himself by responding "Yes" to both questions. With regard to new material, Mazlish cited his own research on James and John Stuart Mill in which he searched for material at the British Museum that other, more traditional historians, had overlooked. He even had to persuade the librarian to obtain the documents he requested for she said, "Oh, you wouldn't want *those* volumes; they're only about his trivial personal affairs" (Mazlish, pp. 22-23). My own essays on Freud, Jung, and Adler (Haymond, 1979; 1982; 1983) all come under the rubric of *psychohistory*. They are not psychobiographies in the sense of being conscious attempts at creating full life-histories, but given the problems posed, it was necessary to do biographical work. In the case of Freud, one was forced, due to the nature of the problem, to understand in what manner his work was influenced by his Jewish social roots and by his being a Jew. In Jung's case, it was not only mandatory to describe what he did and why during the early 'thirties, but also the earlier sources and influences which led him to take the actions he did. Writing about Jung, post 1930, allowed me to see whether there was a common theme all his life long, or whether the events which took place in the 1930's were isolated and idiosyncratic, and perhaps not what they seemed to be on the surface. In Adler's case, I searched for the roots of his socialist mentality, and this was necessarily intertwined with his own development as a human being. In short, psychohistory posits that ideas cannot be understood except insofar as they are embedded in the material life. One cannot study Adler's socialism without studying Adler, nor Jung's relation to the nazi regime without studying Jung, nor Freud's Jewish influences without studying Freud. Although this sounds rather simplistic in writing, intellectual history and almost all philosophy has been written without acknowledgement of the influences of the social and material world on the lives of minds (Bousma). On the contrary, intellectual historians and philosophers have acted largely as if ideas had a substance of their own, capable of influencing each other, without human intervention.

One of the statements in the essay on Freud notes how he was formally associated with the *B'nai B'rith* "and took part in their social get-togethers, playing cards every second Tuesday in their company" (Grollman, p. 83). There were other statements, including quotes from Freud himself, on his attachment to Judaism. But there was nothing quite so powerful or indicative of his state of mind as the seemingly inconsequential notation that he played cards at the *B'nai B'rith* "every second Tuesday". This was a piece of ordinary social history of the kind so well beloved by the *Annales* school of France and generally overlooked by historians and psychologists of a different cast. Nonetheless, it was this seemingly insignificant curiosity which anchored my conclusion concerning Freud and Judaism; being a Jew meant a great deal to Freud, and Judaism likely had a far-reaching influence upon his works. But why should such an innocent activity as playing cards fortnightly at a Jewish social club be a cause for attention at all?

This simple activity, like a candid photograph, relates what Freud did when he relaxed. It reminds one of the postscript in a letter, after the writer completes his well-thought-up message, lets his hair down, and becomes spontaneous. Plainly speaking, Freud preferred the company of other Jews. It was amongst Jews that he could drop his guard, feel easy and be *at home*. These were the reasons, comprehended only at gut-level at first, that led me in pursuit of Freud and his Jewish roots. I was certain they could be discovered and identified.

For the problem concerning Jung and his possible affiliation with the nazi regime, I searched for some documentation, public or private, that would indicate how Jung felt about his actions during the 1930's. All I found, however, was one remark to Leo Baeck: "Well I slipped up" (Jaffe, p. 98). I had been convinced that Jung had a much deeper grasp on the subject of naziism; after all, he came through that horrendous period in Europe. How could he not have realized the absolute gravity of his actions and written words, when Hitler took power? I discovered in his correspondence between the years 1933 - 1940 some concern and anxiety about these matters and a desire to clarify the meanings of his actions (Adler and Jaffe, pp. 131-288), and that was all! Where at first I was baffled by his silence, I later concluded that he could not come to terms about these matters, and self-disclosure would never occur. Baffled and perplexed at first, I later inferred that the silence itself was an ally in comprehending his behavior.

Whereas understanding Freud required detection of something *given*, but so ordinary that it was as if it were hidden, recognition of Jung and his motives necessitated comprehension of the silence, of what was *not given*. Coming to grips with Adler's inner life meant having to deal with a third category of detection, that of an overabundance of information. Over and over one could read how typical a Viennese was Adler, and also how little it mattered to him that he was a Jew (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, p.

331; Bottome, p. 4; Wittels, p. 146; *et al*). In fact, there was such an overwhelming amount of similar opinion that a person could not help but accept it. Only later did I begin to realize that something was amiss, as if his biographers were all too thoroughly of one mind. Slowly contradictions appeared: Freud's infamous letter (Jones, p. 223); Manes Sperber's bafflement about Adler's conversion and silence (Sperber, pp. 30-31) ; Theodore Reik's description of Adler when they were both members of Freud's early circle (Freeman, pp. 108-109).

Because Adler's biographers and commentators were generally so monolithic in their estimations of Adler's character, and so laudatory besides, I grew skeptical. Contradictory evidence began to make itself felt, no matter how oblique it first appeared. In that way, only when what was *given*, but *falsely*, had been discarded, did I begin to come into contact with the inner life of Alfred Adler. Whereas previously, an overabundance of partially false information had acted as a camouflage keeping one from the truth, later, as a new perspective developed, even all the false information and opinion became useful data in yielding the secrets of Adler's inner life.

E. A Question of Motives

In the preceding section it was shown how historical discovery came about as a result of attention to details in the social and psychological realms. Whereas Bruce Mazlish characterized the historian's art as one of discovering new historical material as well as reinterpreting old data, I identified three forms of historical detection based on a somewhat different perspective: 1) That which is *given*. 2) That which is *not given*. 3)And that which is *given falsely*. Both he and I have been dealing with the art of detection but only as involved with the outer, or objective world of phenomena. However, there is a second realm of historical detection already alluded to in this paper, that of the personal motives of the psychohistorian as they relate, and are applied to, the subject of his own particular research activity. Through the elucidation of the process of detection in both realms, the outer-objective and inner-personal, the writer should then be able to shed light on the complete process of doing psychohistory.

Earlier, Erik Erikson was quoted with regards to the subjectivity of the psychohistorian whose choice of subject may come about not as a rational process but as a result of deeper, possibly hidden, motives. Erikson also noted that the psychohistorian "may owe it to history, as well as to himself" to become more conscious about his relationship to the subject of his study (Erikson, p. 60). It is certainly true that beneath the obvious level of rationality with which I approached the studies on Freud, Jung, and Adler, there were personal motives that had as much to do with me as with the subjects of my research. Furthermore, I was not necessarily aware of the existence of such motives, yet they influenced how and what I wrote. In this way, I am tacitly admitting that historical creation is an art form requiring cooperation between the writer of history and the object of the writer's concern. The product of this interface between the subjective element (the historian) and the objective world (properly speaking, the data) is called an historical study, or more simply, just history. This in no sense implies that without the writer's subjectivity getting *in the way* a cleaner, more objective, and somehow truer history could have been produced. On the contrary, the writer, with all his subjectivity, is as necessary to the commission of the act as the existence of historical events and personages which, to the historian, are objective data.

Actually, the subjectivity of the historian may well be viewed in both a positive and necessary light, for without motivation of some kind no historical study would ever get written. If, in addition, the historian experiences a deep-felt need to create a work, then such strong motivation will dramatically infuse the product. This motivating quality, especially if it is intense and unique, opens the possibility for the historian, in cooperation with the data, to extract something new, perhaps even a whole new perspective on the subject. In this respect the psychohistorian has a double obligation: first, to comprehend the psychological motivation of the historical actor under investigation; second, to willingly accept responsibility for his own psychological motivation in creating a particular work.

The method used to bring to consciousness my apparently hidden motivations in choosing to write on Freud, Jung, and Adler, is an old and accepted one, first identified by Freud as basic to the psychoanalytic technique, that of free-association. Attention was directed upon my earliest memories of each of these three important figures to the discipline of psychology, how and why they entered my mental life, and their subsequent development. The brief history which follows is a personal synopsis of my encounters with them, for which I make no apology, but present with hope that it may have value beyond the mere idiosyncratic.

With regard to my work on Freud, even before I began the formal study of psychology, he represented to me everything that psychology was meant to be about. Freud engaged in depth psychology, reflecting upon what was hidden and submerged. This too was my metier, and naively I felt the true interest of all psychologists. In graduate school I learned this simply was not the case, but academic psychology did not deter me from my original interest, to understand more deeply and systematically how the human mind, and my own in particular, really worked. In addition, I admired Freud's skill in balancing theory with practice. Freud drew much of his theoretical orientation from reflecting upon his own patients, and then reflected this back, so that his patients would benefit from his own theory making. And why should I not have admired this talent, for I myself was a university intellectual who had, at other times, wandered from city to city on two continents, where I learned much about practical matters of survival. In some sense Freud concretely represented a more successful idealized self.

No matter how long I attempted to avoid it, the truth still invaded my consciousness: I was a Jew. It's true I didn't attend the synagogue, but then, what did that matter, for I grew up as a Jew, and in some sense have always suffered for it. Didn't I have the right then to claim myself a Jew? That was my quandary. I also felt shame for being a Jew, for I had learned to feel quite ambivalent as a youngster with regards to my jewishness. It was something at once to be proud of, even arrogant about, yet I was also taught to act and look like a gentile, and somehow erase my jewishness.

The final key to my choosing to write about Freud and his Jewish roots came about as I began to study the Holocaust. I was given to understand that somehow Jews did not know how to fight back, and I was ashamed, as much for myself as for them. I remembered how I was bullied by the tough Italian and Irish kids in junior high school, while I whimpered. Neither I nor most other Jewish boys would defend themselves, except with our minds and mouths.

Hitler's propaganda encouraged people to believe that all Jewish scholarship was foisted upon the naive Aryan mind. "Was it true," I wondered, that "even our contributions were alien?" Certainly I had felt marginal to this society as long as I could remember, so how would it be possible for me, or any Jew, to contribute something that *fit*? Perhaps Hitler was right, and Jews only contributed through mental domination; and what they contributed was foreign anyhow, and suspect, and not, therefore, a genuine contribution.

It was through Sigmund Freud that I decided to resolve my own problems, not that they appeared so lucid at the time. And so one sees in the Freud essay my own question:

> Has the West been influenced by a partially alien "Jewish thoughtstyle" or "weltanschauung" which has superimposed itself on a host culture or cultures? If not, what is the exact nature of Jewish integration and way of thinking in western civilization? Is the term "Jewish thought-style" actually misleading because there is no such thing? And finally, what accounts for the broad influence of Jews in western culture?

It made me proud to read through the Jewish encyclopedia and note how many great social and scientific thinkers of the West were of Jewish origin. Sometimes I began to feel that there would be no modern culture without Jews. At any rate, in the most objective stance I could take, I resolved that if one of Freud's feet held firmly in the Vienna of the West, the other was placed solidly in the shtetls of eastern Europe, from where my own grandparents had come.

Many years ago I knew a fellow in California who was, by his own and other's admission, brilliant. He was younger than I, but he looked down on me, and dismissed my intellectual abilities. In fact, at that time of my life, I myself dismissed them. I was discovering that I lacked the inherent artistic energy to become a writer. Although I put up the best front I knew, I felt poorly about myself. This young fellow simply substantiated my own low self-esteem. One night I went to his home and he met me at the door. Although he didn't let me in, he read a passage of the book he was reading, a passage from Jung's *Paracelsus*. He then explained how Jung posited both a personal and universal unconscious. He shut the book abruptly, and told me that he had "been through" his personal unconscious and now consciously lived in the universal sphere. He then shut his door on me. I forgot about Jung for many years, but eventually, through my interest in depth psychology, I began to study his works. The more I read of his, the more fascinated I became. Eventually I began to read about him, his autobiography and other commentaries written by intimate followers of the Jungian tradition. Indeed, as a man Jung seemed to be even more wonderful than as a psychological thinker. I was under his spell.

Eventually I came upon derogatory comments concerning Jung and his affairs during the early 1930's. Because I didn't believe this could be true, for I didn't wish to believe it, I searched the library for original documents and ancillary opinions in order to disprove this negative data. However, the more I investigated the situation, the more apparent it became that something was amiss. I ceased my inquiry and put away my notes.

I was still in the throes of wondering about the Jews of nazi Europe, why they hadn't defended themselves better, and why others hadn't defended them either. All the high liberal ideals had not saved Jewish lives then, any more than they would now. I had met plenty of open-minded liberals by this time, for the late seventies witnessed a high tide of the human potential movement. I felt rejected by these *evolved* people, for I didn't subscribe to their ideas and good vibrations in an unquestioning manner. Also, I discovered behind the bombast was hardness, sometimes emptiness, and often pusillanimity. It was during this period that I reopened my notes on Jung and reviewed everything.

I was then ready to deal with Jung, and see through the high-flown language into the sometimes ugly truth of the situation. I thought he too, like my California acquaintance, was so full of universal consciousness, and yet like many self-proclaimed evolved people of the seventies, refused to deal with his own tawdriness. Writing about Jung, although I hadn't realized at the time, was a way of responding to those who had shut doors on me because they were supposedly *evolved* and I was not. There was a decidedly *sour-grapes* element in me at the time. Nonetheless, Jung's greatness as a psychological thinker lives on.

I realized, when writing the article on Jung, that I was angry at him for my having set him up as a superior being, only to recognize later that he was truly flawed, and that he may have been capable of hurting me when the chips were down, for he had already proved that with the Jews of Europe. Of course I attempted to balance my anger, in fairness to Jung, and to scholarship in general. I grappled with the task of objectifying this matter in the face of my own let-down. The essay on Jung is the result of that struggle. Perhaps I would feel vindicated and my residue of anger disperse entirely if some follower of Jung were to come clean and admit that Jung, like any other man, had unfortunate flaws, at least one of which he was never game enough to tackle. Then we could shake hands.

Long before I became interested in Alfred Adler I was told by a good friend whose word I always took at face value that Adler was a socialist. Some years later I became involved with an international socialist party, the Revolutionary Worker's League, and through involvement with them became educated in what a Marxist perspective could mean.

In the meantime, upon recommendation of an acquaintance, I read one of Adler's works, *What Life Should Mean to You*. I remember thinking how fluffy and bourgeois it seemed, and quite antithetical to a socialist point of view. I wondered how my good friend could have thought that Adler was a socialist. It was shortly later that he and I had a painful falling out, one that lasted several years. I was beginning to realize that the statements he used to make with such certitude were quite fallible. My sharp separation from him was necessitated by my own need to learn to trust in myself and my own considered opinions, and not be prey to anyone else's no matter how intelligent and well argued they were. My friend came to objectively symbolize, by contrast, what was wrong with me.

Had I written the Adler paper at that time I believe it would have been a far more passionate work, but less compassionate. My curiosity about Adler and his possible socialism registered with me, but it was several years before I decided to pursue this line, motivated in part by a desire to complete my little tryptych, as well as my Ph.D. thesis. In the meantime my old friend and I gradually resolved our former problems and have resumed what for me is a close and valued relationship. In part he has learned to express his own convictions with greater gentleness -- I, on the other hand, no longer fear being intimidated by him. I think my own lack of fear of intimidation, either by him or others whom I genuinely respect, is a positive and mature feature of my developing character. Because of this, I was also able to approach Adler with a degree of fairness and objectivity perhaps lacking in my studies of Freud and Jung. Passion, of course, has its own kind of virtue, and the Adler paper suffers some, I think, for a lack of it.

There is another aspect of the Adler paper which deserves consideration, the Jewish question. By dealing with Adler's quality of jewishness, I was enabled to discover the key to the whole problem of his diminishing socialist views. Yet what I dealt with in Adler (his roots as a Jew) represented a conflictedness in my own being which I have not as yet satisfactorily understood in myself, nor been able to lay aside, as Adler himself attempted to do.

This conflictedness regarding my own roots as a Jew living in the western world, and which has become so evident during the course of exploration of my own motives, is by no means a non-generalizable characteristic. In fact, it even goes beyond that relatively small group of Jewish individuals who feel doubtful about their rightful and proper place in the age of the diaspora. Questioning and vagueness about one's cultural roots and identity is an implicit experience common to all ethnic people whose forefathers immigrated to a strange land. In North America such people number not a few.

F. In Summation

We have dealt with the art of historical inquiry, our metaphor being that of the principle of *Detection*. This investigation has necessitated drawing from the works and theories of historians on two continents, including Robin Collingwood, Jules Michelet, and Ferdinand Braudel in Europe, and William Langer, H. Stuart Hughes, and George Kren in the United States. We began by noting that doing history necessitated some old-fashioned clue gathering not unlike that practiced in judiciary field-work.

There are important differences of course, but without stretching metaphor beyond logical belief, it is obvious that both social historians and detectives are engaged in determining the meaning of ordinary details apt to be dismissed or unnoticed by lay people. It was also recognized that researchers and writers of history require an ability to engage their subjects both as scholars and novelists, making use of systematic logic as well as artistic imagination. It is through recognition of the meaning of sometimes ordinary details that a theory, or story-line, is created, thereby bringing historical events into focus. On the other hand, it may equally be stated that without a guiding perspective the historian is unable to perceive those clues which emerge and permit the creation of an original piece of work.

In the twentieth century, it has further been understood by active scholars in several branches of the social sciences that interdisciplinary approaches through a fusion of various disciplines would enhance scholarly efforts. In France this view was taken up most poignantly by Lucien Febvre, and more recently by Michael Foucault and Robert Mandrou. The sometimes neglected (by historians) discipline of psychology has thus emerged as significant for new historical studies.

In the United States an even more concentrated activity has come to pass involving not only historians but scholars trained in the field of psychology, originating with the works of Erik Erikson, and followed by Lloyd deMause, Leon Rappoport, and others. This activity has now come to be known as psychohistory, primarily involving group, family, and life history (Mazlish, p. 36).

Naturally, any perspective which includes as significant a psychological view of the social and historical world requires attention to the minutae of human experience, particularly with those historians and psychologists accommodating a psychoanalytic view, as is the case amongst psychohistorians of North America.

Following this line of reasoning, and extracting from my own problem-oriented life-history studies of Freud, Jung, and Adler, as well as from predecessors such as Bruce Mazlish, three categories of historical detection have been identified:

1. those details which already exist but are overlooked;
2. clues which exist by their very lack of substance, through silence;
3. and those hints, or keys to the solution of a problem, which come about as a result of an overabundance of false data.

It is not without interest to remark that practitioners of psychoanalytic therapy are well aware of this self-same art of detection through analysis at the active level of face-to-face psychotherapy.

It is a fact that psychoanalytically inclined therapists are required to examine their own motives and responses in the process of aiding their patients. Erik Erikson, raising this same principle of transference and counter-transference to the level of historical inquiry, concluded that a kind of retransference took place between the historical investigator and the subject of his study. Logically speaking, if Erikson was correct, then the psychohistorian is responsible not only for unearthing the motives of the subject under historical investigation, but also for his own personal motivations for writing about that subject. Whereas the former kind of historical detection is objective in nature, the latter is subjective. Furthermore, formal commitment to the detection of one's own inner motives could not have come about for historians until their discipline had been wedded to the discipline of a psychodynamically oriented psychology. And this is precisely the state of psychohistory in its present guise.

In order to fulfill this double obligation, that which concerns the inner world of the historian as well as that of the objective world of his historical study, I took it upon myself, through the method of free-association, to examine and delineate my own motives for researching and writing each of my three separate works, those on Freud, Jung, and Adler. The results were indeed interesting, and quite surprising. The reasons for choosing those three -- for logically speaking I could have selected a countless number of other individuals -- had to do with a rather intricate complex of personal needs. The subjects whom I chose, the problems I chose to write about, and even the way in which I wrote about them, all had something to do with my own areas of personal conflict, some of which have still not been resolved. Yet the result of personal analysis contained a certain generalizability beyond my own immediate person.

In the future, psychohistorians, as they consider what it means for human beings to be founded in any particular socio-historical nexus of events and traditions, may find it fruitful not only to examine the psychological motivations of the subjects they choose to investigate, but their own most inner and personal motives as well. They may discover, as I did, that retransference of aspects of themselves are placed upon the *not so objective* examination of history. Difficult as this task is, it will bear double fruit, for it may not only guide the historian in assessing an historical personage more fairly and with greater insight, but also yield self-knowledge, which is, after all, not the meanest of enterprises.

G. Footnotes

1 Thanks are due here to Dr. Harry Garfinkle of the University of Alberta for coining the term *molar* and helping me adapt it to this particular context. Equal thanks are also due to Dr. Wilfred Schmidt of the University of Alberta for coining the poignant term *transmitting arenas,* which includes the usual term *social institutions,* but goes beyond it.

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